


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The Philosophy of Redemption

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PIPERFANGS

Appendix.

Critique of the teachings of Kant and Schopenhauer.

Whole, half, and quarter errors are very difficult and laborious to correct,
to sift through, and to place the truth where it belongs.

Goethe.

Preface.

The attentive reader, familiar with the history of philosophy, will have found that the teachings I have put forward contain both important truths discovered by *Kant* and *Schopenhauer*, as well as results that arise from the brilliant ideas of these great men. Yet, I have not referred to *Kant* nor *Schopenhauer* at any point. I have done so because I wished to present my work as if cast from a single mold: pure and simple. This aim also kept me from decorating my own thoughts with quotations from the works of other philosophers, guided by the consideration that thoughts that do not have the strength to assert themselves independently, or are not fiery enough to ignite, do not deserve to live: they may as well perish, the sooner, the better.

However, by avoiding naming predecessors in my system, I silently accepted the obligation to account for what I owe to myself and what to others, and I fulfill this obligation in the following pages.

The sacred fire of knowledge, upon which the salvation of humankind depends, is passed from hand to hand. It never extinguishes. It can only grow, with its flame becoming purer and less smoky. From this, it follows that no one can create an original philosophical work alone. Everyone has a predecessor, and everyone stands on some previously conducted scientific work.

Instead of openly acknowledging this, some people seek to obscure the relationship, clothing great truths discovered by others in new garments and giving them a different name. Indeed, some go so far as to ignore the brilliant achievements of the mind entirely or even displace them with pitiful sophisms, only to bask in the sad glory of having their seemingly new, sparkling system triumph.

Whoever belittles the men whose wisdom lives and works within them is like the miserable one who spits upon his mother's breast, which nourished him.

I thus freely confess that I stand on the shoulders of *Kant* and *Schopenhauer*, and that my philosophy is merely a continuation of one and the other; for although *Schopenhauer* subjected the main works of *Kant* to a careful and highly meritorious critique, in which he eradicated their essential errors, he did not completely free them from mistakes and also suppressed a very important truth discovered by *Kant* in an extraordinary way. He wholeheartedly accepted the transcendental aesthetics, although it contains the seed of a great contradiction; yet he waged a destructive battle against transcendental analytics, which is unjustified in the main and can only be explained by the fact that *Schopenhauer*, irritated by the glorification of reason by his contemporaries, exalted intellect and intuitive knowledge to such a degree that he was no longer

unbiased in judging the analytics. He judged it no less than transcendental aesthetics, a testament to *Kant's* wonderful calmness and astonishing intellectual power.

My current task is to first explore *Kant's* transcendental aesthetics and analytics and to unravel the threads to which I connect, then to subject *Schopenhauer's* entire ingenious system to a thorough critique. I turn to this task in the hope that I will succeed in presenting the achievements of these two greatest German thinkers in such a way, free from all contradictions and irrelevant matters, that even dull eyes will be able to recognize their invaluable worth. At the same time, I will develop further the main ideas of my philosophy, free from the allure of hidden contradictions, and place them in a new light.

Analytics of the Cognitive Faculty.

Whoever misses the first buttonhole
will never get the buttons right.

Goethe.

Kant's separation of space and time from the world is the greatest achievement in the field of critical philosophy and will never be surpassed by any other. He moved the enigmatic entities, true monstrosities that thwarted every attempt to probe the essence of the world, out of the world and into our mind, turning them into forms of our sensibility, into principles of cognition that precede all experience, into conditions for the possibility of experience. The justification of this approach is laid down in his immortal transcendental aesthetics, and even though there will always be "wild" people who will reject time and space as forms of the thing-in-itself and thus wage war against Kant's transcendental idealism, there is no serious danger to this great achievement: it is one of the few truths that have entered the possession of human knowledge.

However, *Kant* did more than separate the monstrosities of things-in-themselves and place them into us, the knowing subjects. Although he did not adopt this uncritically and simply impose it upon the subject, as I will clearly show, he was instead concerned with exploring how they came to their oppressive infinity, which no flight of imagination could traverse, and he had no qualms in placing them as they are, in our sensibility, as forms. The transcendental aesthetics allows no doubt on this point. It states:

One can never form a conception of there being no space, although one can quite well think that no objects are found in it.¹

Space is a pure intuition. One can think of only a single space, and when one speaks of many spaces, one refers only to parts of one and the same unique space. These parts cannot precede the single all-encompassing space as its components (from which it might be composed), but only be thought of as contained in it. It is essentially unified; the manifold in it, and therefore also the general concept of spaces, is based merely on limitations.

Space is thought of as an infinitely given magnitude.

(*Kk.* 64).

One cannot, with regard to appearances, remove time itself, although one can well remove appearances from time.

Time is a pure form of sensible intuition. Different times are only parts of the same time.

The infinity of time means nothing more than that all specific quantities of time are possible only through the limitations of one underlying time. Therefore, the original representation of time must be given as unlimited. (Kk. 70.)

Space and time, therefore, lie in us as two pure intuitions, prior to all experience, with space as a magnitude whose three dimensions extend infinitely, and time as a line coming from infinity and extending infinitely forward.

All objects of possible experience must be determined by these two pure *a priori* intuitions and are determined by them, as much by space as by time, because:

Although all representations, whether they have external things as their object or not, belong as determinations of the mind to the inner state, this inner state, under the formal condition of inner intuition, that is, time, is a *priori* the condition of all appearances whatsoever, and it is the immediate condition of the internal (of our souls) and thereby also, indirectly, of external appearances. *A priori*, one can say: all external appearances are determined in space and according to the relationships of space *a priori*, so I can say in a very general sense, based on the principle of inner sense: all appearances in general, that is, all objects of the senses, are in time and necessarily stand in relationships of time.

(Kk. 72.)

I will return to all these points later and demonstrate that they are based on a great contradiction that *Kant* was aware of, but deliberately concealed. For as certain as it is that space and time do not inhere in things in themselves, it is equally certain that space and time, as characterized by *Kant*, cannot be *a priori* forms and in fact are not.

It will be useful to clarify here what *Kant* understands by empirical intuition as opposed to pure intuition, based on the pure intuitions discussed. Only the impressions of the senses, which point to the limitations of space, thus to the outlines of external objects, provide intuitions. *Kant* therefore strongly opposes the idea that "besides space, another subjective and externally directed representation could exist that could be called *a priori* objective" (Kk. 67) and, in doing so, deflects attempts to trace *Locke's* secondary qualities of things, such as color, smoothness, roughness, taste, smell, cold, warmth, etc., back to a

common ground, a third form of sensibility. Without accepting the essential limitation, one might assume that *Kant* understood intuition as referring only to that segment of our representations which is based on the sense of sight. It is more and less than that: more, because touch also provides intuition; less, because the mere impressions of the sense of sight, like colors, are mere sensations, not intuitions, and the same applies to smells, taste sensations, and tones, which are entirely excluded here. (*Kk.* [First Edition] 68.)

The pleasant taste of a wine does not belong to the objective determinations of the wine, thus not even to the appearance of an object, but rather to the special nature of the sense and subject that experiences it. The colors are not properties of the bodies to whose perception they are attached, but mere modifications of the sense of sight, which is affected in a certain way by light.

He wants to say: A certain book, for example, has the same extension for all people; everyone determines its boundaries in exactly the same way. But for one person it can appear blue, for another gray, smooth to one, rough to another, etc. When it

comes to such representations, it is idle to speak of any ideality, as to whether they, along with the representation of space, belong to a purely subjective nature of the senses.

This distinction is very peculiar. I will return to it.

The results of transcendental aesthetics are primarily twofold:

- 1) That we do not recognize things in themselves as they are, but only as they appear to us, after passing through the *a priori* forms of our sensibility, space and time;
- 2) That these appearances and space itself only seem to be outside of us, but in reality, they are within us, in our mind. Or in *Kant's* words:

Since the senses never and in no single respect allow us to recognize things in themselves, but only their appearances, and since these are merely representations of sensibility, all bodies, along with the space they occupy, must also be held in us, and they exist nowhere but in our thoughts alone.

(*Prolegomena*, 204.)

The excellent *Locke*, strictly adhering to experience, came to the conclusion, when investigating the subjective aspect of representation, that, independent of the subject, the so-called primary properties of things — extension, impenetrability, form, motion, rest, and number — are essential.

Solidity, extension, figure, motion, and rest would be really in the world, as they are, whether there were any sensible being to perceive them or not.
(*On Human Understanding*, L. II.)

Kant went decisively further. By making space and time pure intuitions *a priori*, he could also deny things their primary qualities.

We can speak of space and extended beings only from the standpoint of a human being.
(*Kk.* 66.)

With the removal of extension, all the properties of things disappear; the things then shrink into a single thing in itself, the series of x turns into one x , and this one x equals zero, a mathematical point, naturally without motion.

Kant recoiled from this consequence, but his protests could not remove it from the world. What helped was his declaration that it would be the greatest injustice if we were to grant no things-in-themselves (*Prol.* 276), what helped was that he tirelessly insisted that transcendental idealism does not affect the existence and essence of things themselves, but only the way these things appear to the subject: he had destroyed the appearance, the foundation of appearance, at least for human thinking. One cannot speak of a better boundary determination between ideal and real than *Locke's*, with his brilliant, eternally valid distinction between ideal and real, even if such a distinction ultimately does not take place, where everything is dragged to one side. With *Kant*, we are only dealing with ideals; the real is, as said, not x , but rather zero.

I now turn to transcendental logic.

As we have seen above, sensibility gives us a faculty (receptivity) of our mind, with the help of its inner forms, space and time, intuitions. These intuitions are further completed by the subjective sensations of our multiple senses, namely the sense of sight (colors), and they are thoroughly complete in themselves.

Intuition in no way requires the functions of thinking.
(*Kk.* 122.)

But they are not whole, but part-representations, a distinction that is very important and must be maintained, as it is the only key that opens up transcendental logic, this profound work, to understanding.

Because every appearance contains a manifold, that is, various perceptions that are encountered scattered and individually in the mind, a connection of them is necessary, which they themselves cannot have in the mind.

(Kk. I. Ed. 653.)

It was believed that the senses not only provided us with impressions but also combined them and brought forth images of objects, which undoubtedly requires more than the receptivity to impressions, namely a function of synthesis.

(ib. 654.)

So that from the manifold a unity of intuition arises (for example, in the conception of space), it is first necessary to traverse the manifold and then gather it together, an action I call the synthesis of apprehension.

(ib. 640.)

The connection (conjunctio) of a manifold can never come into us through the senses.

(Kk. 127.)

The uniform-manifold and what belongs together must, therefore, be connected by a cognitive power into the whole of an object if we are not to end up with isolated, foreign, separated part-representations that are useless for knowledge. If I were to illustrate the matter with an image, I would say: the impressions that the senses present to us appear like building materials, like facades; if these impressions are to be presented to us as complete building materials, like staves of barrels, they require a connection to shape them into barrels. The capacity, whose function this connection, synthesis, is, according to *Kant*, is the imagination.

Synthesis, in general, is the mere effect of the imagination, a blind, though indispensable function of the soul, without which we would have no knowledge at all, but of which we are rarely conscious, if at all.

(Kk. 109.)

It is beyond any doubt that this synthesis of the manifold in an intuition is an *a priori* function within us, just as the capacity of the hand to grasp must precede the grasping of an object. Whether this function belongs to the imagination, as *Kant* claims, or to another cognitive faculty, I leave undecided for

the time being. Had *Kant* discussed at the beginning of transcendental logic and introduced the understanding with its 12 categories after it, the treatment of this great thinker's work would have been less misunderstood and distorted, and I would not now find myself, almost a hundred years after its first appearance, needing to restore its true sense, namely, against *Schopenhauer*.

The connection of the manifold in an intuition by the imagination would be a purposeless play if the connected manifold immediately fell apart again into its individual parts, and the knowledge of an object would be impossible if the synthesis were not conscious. The imagination cannot carry out its synthesis without this necessary consciousness, for it is a blind function of the soul, and it is only through a new cognitive faculty, which unites the imagination with sensibility, that it becomes possible. This faculty is the understanding.

Empirical consciousness, which contains various representations, is in itself scattered and without relation to the identity of the subject. This connection is thus only added through consciousness accompanying every representation, whereby I add one representation to the other and become conscious of their synthesis.

(*Kk.* 130.)

Without the consciousness that what we think is the same as what we thought a moment ago, all reproduction in the series of representations would be in vain. For a new representation in the current state, which should belong to the act that gradually generated it, would not be heard at all, and the manifold of it would never form a whole because it lacks the unity that only consciousness can provide.

(*Kk.* 642. I. Ed.)

The synthesis of the imagination into concepts, that is a function that belongs to the understanding, and it is through this that we gain knowledge in its proper sense.

(*Kk.* 109.)

Kant has explained the understanding in various ways: as the faculty of thinking, the faculty of concepts, judgments, rules, and so on, and also as the faculty of knowledge, which is, from our current standpoint, the most appropriate designation; for he defines knowledge as follows:

Knowledge consists in the specific relation of given representations to an object. The object, however, is that in whose concept the manifold of a

given intuition is united.

(Kk. 132.)

These definitions must be upheld since *Schopenhauer* completely misunderstood *Kant* concerning the object.

Now, by linking what the senses and the imagination cannot perform without consciousness, all representations become our representations. The "I think" accompanies all our representations, as if a thread runs through all of them, leading them to a single point. This center of consciousness is self-awareness, which *Kant* calls the pure, original apperception or the original-synthetic unity of apperception. If this unification of all representations did not take place in one self-consciousness,

I would have as many different selves as I have representations, of which I am aware.

(Kk. 130.)

Thus, the understanding accompanies the synthesis of the imagination with consciousness, whereby part-representations are connected into whole objects and then brings

the manifold of given representations under the unity of apperception, which is the highest principle in all human knowledge.

(Kk. 131.)

Let us best recap what has been said so far with *Kant's* words:

There are three original sources (faculties or powers of the soul), which contain the conditions for the possibility of all experience and cannot themselves be derived from any other faculty of the mind, namely:

Sense, Imagination, and Apperception.

These are based on:

- 1) The synopsis of the manifold *a priori* through the senses;
- 2) The synthesis of this manifold through the imagination;
- 3) The unity of this synthesis through original apperception.

(Kk. I. Ed. 125.)

And now we shall move on to the categories or pure concepts of the understanding.

The explanation of the understanding as a faculty of concepts is familiar to us. The categories are originally concepts produced by the understanding, *a priori* concepts that exist before all experience, as seeds in our understanding, which, on the one hand, are the conditions of the possibility of knowledge and experience (just as time and space are the conditions of the possibility of intuition) and, on the other hand, acquire meaning and content only through the material that sensibility provides.

Kant established 12 pure concepts of the understanding:

1. Of Quantity
 - Unity
 - Plurality
 - Totality
2. Of Quality
 - Reality
 - Negation
 - Limitation
3. Of Relation
 - Inherence and Subsistence (substance and accident)
 - Causality and Dependence (cause and effect)
 - Community (reciprocal interaction)
4. Of Modality
 - Possibility – Impossibility
 - Existence – Non-existence
 - Necessity – Contingency

These are derived from the table of all possible judgments. It is composed as follows:

Quantity of Judgments

- Universal
- Particular
- Singular

Quality of Judgments

- Affirmative
- Negative
- Infinite

Relation of Judgments

- Categorical

- Hypothetical
- Disjunctive

Modality of Judgments

- Problematic
- Assertoric
- Apodictic

He justifies his method with the words:

This same function, which gives unity to the various representations in a judgment, also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations in an intuition, which, expressed generally, is called the pure concept of the understanding.

(Kk. 110.)

We have seen above that the understanding constantly accompanies the synthesis of the imagination with consciousness and relates the connected part-representations to the original apperception. Insofar as it performs this activity, it is called the faculty of judgment. It provides the pure concepts of the understanding with the necessary content from the impressions of sensibility by guiding the synthesis of the imagination and subsuming what is connected under the categories.

It would be helpful now to briefly retrace the path we have taken.

We initially have a "sense of appearances," individual part-representations that sensibility, with the help of its form, space, presents to us. Under the direction of the understanding, here called the faculty of judgment, the imagination assists. The activity, whose function is the connection of the manifold, belongs to the faculty of judgment. Without definite rules, the imagination would connect whatever presents itself: things that are alike, things that belong together, as well as things that are different. The faculty of judgment has these rules derived from the categories, and in this way, complete representations first arise, which fall under certain categories.

However, the work of the faculty of judgment is not yet finished. The objects that are brought under certain categories would remain nothing but

a rhapsody of connected perceptions

if they could not be connected with each other. The faculty of judgment accomplishes this: it connects the objects with each other and subsumes these connections under certain categories (those of relation).

Now all our intuitions, which sensibility has provided to the understanding, have been passed through, ordered, connected, and brought into relationships; they have all been placed under concepts. There remains only one step for the understanding: it must connect the content of the categories to the highest point of our entire cognitive faculty, to apperception, or self-consciousness.

We already have threads tied to our connected representations of objects, and these threads lead directly into self-consciousness. But now the inserted categories have interrupted the direct course of these threads. They are now first united in the categories and brought into relationships with each other, and then they are connected in self-consciousness. And now we have a unified connection of all appearances, brought together according to general and necessary laws of knowledge and experience, a whole of compared and connected representations. In a word: this is the unity of self-consciousness over and against nature, which is brought forth by the work of our understanding.

Before we continue, I must draw attention to the fact that, according to this explanation, the synthesis of imagination has been replaced by another synthesis, that of the understanding. *Kant* calls this intellectual synthesis, which,

regard to the manifold of an intuition, would be thought of entirely in terms of the mere category and the connection of the understanding (*synthesis intellectualis*).

(Kk. 141.)

The synthesis of the imagination is

figuratively distinguished from all intellectual synthesis solely by the understanding.

(Kk. 142.)

I further point to one of the many definitions of the categories, which, as we are standing, is very clearly stated, namely:

The pure synthesis, presented generally, gives the pure concept of the understanding.

(Kk. 109.)

And now we want to take a brief look at the application of the categories to appearances. Here, we must first deal with the schematism of the pure concepts of the understanding. *Schopenhauer* calls the discussion of it "wonderful and

famously obscure because no person has ever been able to make sense of it," and he allows it various interpretations. *Kant* says:

Pure concepts of the understanding, compared with empirical (indeed, sensory) intuitions, are entirely disparate and can never be encountered in any intuition.

(Kk. 157.)

Since in all subsumptions of an object under a concept, the representation of the former must be of the same kind as the latter, there must be

a third element, which, on the one hand, stands in agreement with the category, and on the other, is of the same kind as the appearance and thus makes the application of the former to the latter possible.

(Kk. 158.)

Kant calls this mediating third the transcendental schema and finds that what it expresses is in time, so that each schema of a concept of the understanding determines time *a priori* according to rules.

A transcendental determination of time is so far akin to the category in that it is general and based on an *a priori* rule. But, on the other hand, it is akin to appearance insofar as time is contained in the empirical representation of the manifold.

(Kk. 158.)

The schemata now correspond, according to the order of the categories, to the sequence of time, the content of time, the order of time, and, finally, to the concept of time itself.

I can find nothing in this "wonderful" section other than that the synthesis of a manifold in an intuition would not be possible without a succession, that is, without time, which, slightly modified, has its full correctness, as I will show. But what great obscurity and confusion must have troubled *Kant* regarding this simple relationship because his categories are concepts that precede all experience. An empirical concept is, of course, akin to the objects it represents since it is only a reflection of them, but an *a priori* concept is naturally entirely dissimilar to empirical intuitions, and a linking element is required that obviously satisfies no one.

Nevertheless, we want to accept with *Kant* that this is satisfactory and now proceed to the application of the categories.

The rules for the objective use of the categories are the principles of pure understanding, which are divided into:

- 1) Axioms of Intuition
- 2) Anticipations of Perception
- 3) Analogies of Experience
- 4) Postulates of Empirical Thought in General

Kant compares these principles in mathematics and dynamics and attributes the first two to intuition and the latter two to experience, in which the application of the categories is emphasized. His thought process here is noteworthy:

All connection (*conjunctio*) is either composition (*compositio*) or combination (*nexus*). The former is the synthesis of the manifold, which does not necessarily belong together ... and similarly is the synthesis of what is alike in everything that can be mathematically considered. The second connection is the synthesis of the manifold insofar as it necessarily belongs together, like accident to some substance, or effect to cause — thus, although unlike, it is nonetheless conceived as connected *a priori*, which connection, because it is arbitrary, I call dynamic, because it concerns the connection of the existence of the manifold.

(Kk. 174.)

In the application of the pure concepts of understanding to possible experience, their synthesis is either mathematical or dynamic; for it relates partly only to intuition, partly to the existence of an appearance altogether. The *a priori* conditions of intuition are absolutely necessary for a possible experience, while the existence of objects in a possible empirical intuition is in itself contingent. Hence, the principles of the mathematical use of the understanding are unconditionally necessary, i.e., apodictic; but those of the dynamic use of the understanding, while they also take on the character of *a priori* necessity, only do so under the condition of empirical thinking in an experience, hence mediating and indirect, which means that the immediate evidence (although generally relating to experience) that belongs to them is lacking.

(Kk. 173.)

The principle of the axioms of intuition is now:

All intuitions are extensive magnitudes.

We now confront once again the partial representations, which initially in my analysis of the transcendental analytic, I proceeded from the composition of like parts of intuition and the consciousness of the synthetic unity of this likeness (the manifold).

Now, consciousness of the manifold likeness in intuition is altogether the condition under which the representation of an object first becomes possible, as the concept of a magnitude (quantum). Thus, the perception of an object, as appearance, is possible only through the same synthetic unity of the manifold of the given sensory intuition, whereby the unity of the composition of the manifold likeness is thought of in the concept of a magnitude, i.e., appearances are all magnitudes, specifically extensive magnitudes.

(Kk. 175.)

The principle of the anticipations of perception is:

In all appearances, the real, which is the object of sensation, has an intensive magnitude, that is, a degree.

As we saw in the transcendental aesthetic, *Kant* makes the strictest distinction between intuition and mere sensations. The former are restrictions of the pure intuitions lying within us prior to all experience (space and time), so that even without having seen an object, we can say *a priori* with full certainty that it has a shape and must necessarily stand in relation to time. The mere sensations, such as color, temperature, smell, etc., lack any similar transcendental basis; for, before all experience, I cannot determine the effect of an object with certainty. Experience, as we learn daily, teaches that one person calls something warm, while another calls it cold. This difference easily occurs, and now for taste and color: *Des goûts et des couleurs il ne faut jamais disputer.*

Thus, all these mere sensations wander, homeless, in transcendental aesthetics, as if bastards, illegitimate offspring of sensibility, because *Kant* could not find any form within our sensibility that would protect them as part of cognition, if he had fully considered that the infinite space contains all thinkable spaces, the infinite time all imaginable times.

But these sensations, as varied as they may be and as much as they differ from one subject to another, are inseparably connected to appearances and cannot be denied. Indeed, they are the main thing, because the effectiveness that they produce fills a part of space and time; for it is clear that an object does not extend further than it exerts its effect. In transcendental aesthetics, *Kant* could still cavalierly dismiss mere sensations, but no longer in transcendental analytics, where it dealt with a thorough connection of appearances, taking into

account their unique properties, to subsume them under various pure concepts of the understanding, according to the rules under the category of quality. *Kant* unites them under this category and calls the rule by which this is done the anticipation of perception.

One might think that what can be least anticipated (determined *a priori*) is what can only be perceived through empirical means and that only the axioms of intuition could rightly be called anticipations of perception. Or, in *Kant's* words:

Since there is something in appearances that is never recognized *a priori* and that also constitutes the real difference between empirical knowledge and knowledge *a priori*, namely sensation (as the material of perception), it follows that this is something that cannot be anticipated. In contrast, we can indeed anticipate the pure determinations in space and time concerning shape and size. These anticipations of appearances are *a priori*, for they are always given *a posteriori* in experience.

(179.)

But *Kant* does not stop there. Since he cannot resolve the difficulty through reasoning, he skips over it. He says:

Apprehension, though mediated by sensation, never refers to just one moment (when I, namely, don't consider the succession of many sensations). If something in appearance, the apprehension of which has no successive synthesis that proceeds from parts to the whole idea, has it so as extensive size; the lack of sensation at the same moment would represent it as smaller, thus = 0. What corresponds to sensation in empirical intuition is reality (*realitas phaenomenon*); what corresponds to the lack thereof, negation = 0. Now, however, a sensation is capable of reduction, so that it can decrease and gradually disappear. Therefore, between reality in appearance and negation, there is a continuous connection of all possible intermediate sensations, whose difference from one another is smaller than the difference between the given and zero, or total negation. That is, the real in appearance always has a magnitude.

(Kk. 180.)

Now I name that magnitude, which is apprehended only as a unity and in which the multiplicity can only be presented through the approximation to negation = 0, intensive magnitude.

(Kk. 180.)

Kant thus demands that, with every empirical sensation, I begin with the negation of the same, from zero, and produce it in gradual increase of all its parts. In this way, a progression takes place over time, and a synthesis of the

individual moments into a complete sensation occurs, which now has an intensive magnitude, i.e., I am now only aware that it has a specific degree.

However, this is still only an empirical process; it does not explain how an *Anticipation* is possible here. Now, here is the explanation.

The quality of sensation can at any time be presented as merely empirical and cannot be imagined *a priori* (e.g., colors, taste, etc.). But the real, which corresponds to sensations at all, in contrast with negation = 0, represents something, whose concept in itself contains a being and means nothing as the synthesis in an empirical consciousness at all ... All sensations are given as such, certainly *a posteriori*, but the property of the same, that they have a degree, can be known *a priori*.

(Kk. 185.)

The philosopher steps in,
And proves to you: it must be so.
(Goethe.)

Let us pause for a moment and orient ourselves.

We have, according to the Axiom of Intuition and Anticipation of perception, extensive and intensive magnitudes, i.e., whole, complete objects that we accompany with consciousness, which we think as such. The partial intuitions are connected, and the world is spread out before us. We see houses, trees, fields, people, animals, etc. But two things should be noted here. First, these objects are pure creations of the understanding. It alone has connected the data of sensibility, and the resulting objects are its work. The synthesis is only in the understanding, through the understanding, for the understanding, and nothing in appearance forces the understanding to connect in a certain way.

We cannot imagine anything as connected in the object without having previously connected it ourselves, and among all representations, connection is the only one that cannot be given by objects but can only be performed by the subject itself.

(Kk. 128.)

Analysis always presupposes synthesis; for where the understanding has previously connected nothing, it can also dissolve nothing, because the power of representation has been given only through it as connected.

(Kk. 128.)

Second, these objects stand isolated, separated, alien to each other. If experience in the proper sense is to arise, these objects must be connected with each other. This is accomplished by the categories of Relation, according to rules that Kant calls the Analogies of Experience.

The principle of the analogies of experience in general is:

Experience is only possible through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions. —

The principle of the first analogy is:

With every change of experiences, substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.

I will not dwell on this principle here, as I will discuss it on a later occasion. I will just mention that substance constitutes a common substrate for all appearances, in which all are thus connected. All changes, all coming into being and passing away, do not affect the substance, but only its accidents, i.e., its modes of being, its particular ways of existing. The corollaries from this principle are the well-known ones, that substance can neither arise nor perish, or as the ancients said: *Gigni de nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti*.

The principle of the second analogy is:

All changes occur according to the law of the connection of cause and effect.

If we have seen in the first analogy that the being of objects is regulated by the understanding, we now have the law to consider by which the understanding orders its changes. I will address this briefly here, as I will examine all causality relationships in time in the critique of Schopenhauer's philosophy. I will therefore limit myself to the simple restatement of Kant's proof of the apriority of the concept of causality.

I assume that appearances follow one another, i.e., that one state of things at one time is the opposite of a previous state. I actually connect two perceptions in time. Now, this connection is not a work of mere sense and intuition, but of an imagination's synthetic power, which determines them in the sense of the temporal relationship. This power must unite the states in such a way that the one or the other is preceding in time; for time itself is not perceived, and, in relation to what precedes and what follows, only the empirical, what is perceived together with it, can determine the objects. I am only aware that my imagination places one before the other, not that one state in the object itself precedes the other, or in other words, mere

perception leaves the objective relationship of the successive appearances undetermined. In order for this relationship to be recognized as determined, the relationship between the two states must be thought in such a way that one is necessarily determined by the other, which follows, and that it cannot be the other way around. However, the concept of the necessity of a synthetic unity that brings this about cannot be a pure concept of understanding, which is not found in perception, and here it is the concept of the relationship of cause and effect, of which the former determines the latter in time as the consequence, and not something that could merely arise in imagination.

(Kk. 196, 197.)

Thus, there is nothing in appearances themselves that necessitates the understanding to regard one as the cause of an effect over the other, but it is the understanding that first places both appearances into the relationship of causality and finally determines which of the two precedes the other in time, i.e., which one is the cause of the other. —

The principle of the third analogy states:

All substances, insofar as they can be perceived simultaneously in space, are in a state of thorough reciprocal action.

This principle extends the concept of causality to all appearances in such a way that every appearance affects the others of a world whole directly and indirectly, as well as all appearances affect each other directly and indirectly, and indeed always simultaneously.

In this sense, the concept of community or interaction has full legitimacy, and if the term "interaction" does not appear in any other language except German, it proves that the Germans think more thoroughly than others. Schopenhauer's position of this category will be addressed by me at the appropriate place. That Kant had in view the connections of appearances to a world whole, in which no single one can lead a fully independent life, which is clear to anyone who is unbiased. What the category of community recognizes is best expressed by the poetic exclamation of admiration:

How everything weaves itself into the whole!
One acts in the other and lives!

(Goethe.)

The categories of modality contribute nothing to completing experience.

The categories of modality have the peculiarity that they do not add anything to the concept to which they are attached as predicates, as a determination of the object, but express only the relationship to the faculty of knowledge.

(Kk. 217.)

I mention them here only for the sake of completeness due to the postulates of empirical thinking in their wording:

- 1) What agrees with the formal conditions of experience (of intuition and concepts) is possible.
- 2) What is connected with the material conditions of experience (of sensation) is real.
- 3) That which is determined by its connection with the real, according to general conditions of experience, is necessary (exists).

Now, turning back to the analogies of experience, the first question that arises is: What do they teach us? They teach us that the connection of partial representations into objects is the work of the understanding, and that the connection of these objects with each other is also accomplished by the understanding. The three dynamic relationships — those of inherence, consequence, and composition — have a meaning only for the human understanding.

The consequences resulting from this, Kant draws cold-bloodedly and calmly.

All appearances stand in a continuous connection according to necessary laws, and thus in a transcendental affinity, of which the empirical is merely the consequence.

(Kk. 1. Aufl. 649.)

The order and regularity in appearances, which we call nature, we project into nature itself, and we would not find it there if we had not placed it into nature originally through our mind or if nature had not been originally placed into it.

(ib. 657.)

As exaggerated and absurd as it may sound to say: the understanding itself is the source of the laws of nature, so correct and appropriate to the matter is such a claim, namely in accordance with experience.

(ib. 658.)

The understanding does not derive its laws from nature, but prescribes them to it.

(*Proleg.* 240.)

And so we stand, at the end of the transcendental analytics, more disheartened than at the conclusion of the transcendental aesthetics. The latter delivered to the understanding the partial representations of an appearing = 0, in which the understanding processed these partial representations into illusory objects, into an illusory nexus. Into the illusion of sensibility, the understanding projects, through connection, new illusion. The ghostly nature of the external world is unspeakably terrifying. The fever-free thinking subject, which is supposed to be the author of the entire phantasmagoria, resists with all its might against the accusation, but already the sirens' songs of the "all-destroyer" dull its senses, and it clings to the last straw, its self-consciousness. Or is even this only illusion and deceit?

The transcendental analytics should carry as its motto the verse above the gate of Hell:

Lasciate ogni speranza, voi ch'entrate.

But no! Schopenhauer said: "Kant is perhaps the most original mind that nature has ever produced"; I strike out the "perhaps" with full conviction, and many will do the same. What such a man, with so much effort and acumen, has written, cannot be wrong through and through, down to its very roots. And so it is indeed. If one opens any side of transcendental analytics, one will always find the synthesis of a manifold, and time: they are the indestructible crown on the corpse of the categories, as we will show.

Now my most urgent task is to demonstrate, at the points in transcendental analytics which I have deliberately left untouched, that infinite space and infinite time cannot be forms of our sensibility.

First of all, we must recall from the preceding that the connection of a manifold can never come to us through the senses, that:

It is solely a function of the understanding, which itself is nothing other than the ability to connect *a priori* and to bring the manifold presentations given under the unity of apperception.

(*Kk.* 131.)

If I can now prove with Kant's statements that infinite space and infinite time do not originally lie in sensibility as essentially unified, all-encompassing pure intuitions, but are products of an endlessly advancing synthesis of the understanding, then the scepter will not be broken over the fact that space and time do not belong to things in themselves — this brilliant philosophical achievement! — for Kant's space and Kant's time, as pure *a priori* intuitions, are entirely untenable, and the earlier we extract them from our *a priori* forms, the better.

It is not difficult for me to provide the proof. I will only cite the most striking passages, while I do not want to leave unmentioned that Kant eliminated the first two in the second edition of the Critique: for good reasons and intentionally.

Passages from the 1st Edition of the Critique.

The synthesis of apprehension must also be *a priori*, i.e., in view of representations that are not empirical. For without it, we would not have the representations of space or time *a priori*, because these can only be generated through the synthesis of the manifold, which sensibility, in its original receptivity, presents.

(640.)

It is clear that if I draw a line in thought, or think of the time from one midday to the next, or even just want to imagine a certain number, I must necessarily grasp one of these manifold representations after the other. But if I lose the preceding (the first parts of the line, the preceding parts of time, or the consecutively imagined units) out of thought, and do not reproduce them by advancing to the following ones, I would never have a complete representation and none of the aforementioned thoughts would arise, yes, not even the purest and first basic representations of space and time could spring forth.

(641.)

Passages from the 2nd Edition of the Critique.

Appearances as intuitions in space or time must be determined by the same synthesis through which space and time are determined at all.

(175.)

I imagine even the smallest time only as the successive progression from one moment to another, whereby through the addition of all the time parts, a certain time magnitude is finally produced.

(175.)

The most important passage is this:

Space, considered as an object (as it is truly required in geometry), contains more than mere form of intuition, namely a combination of the manifold, according to the form of sensibility, given into an intuitive representation, so that the form of intuition gives only the manifold, but formal intuition gives unity to the representation.

(147.)

One feels like they are dreaming! I urge everyone to keep in mind these sentences from the transcendental aesthetics, especially those stamped with the greatest definiteness:

Space is a pure intuition. One can imagine only one single space, and when people talk of many spaces, they understand parts of one and the same space. These parts cannot precede the unified, all-encompassing space, as its components, but can only be thought in it.

One will gladly admit that it is impossible to think of a more pure and complete contradiction. In the transcendental aesthetics, the form of intuition is always identical with pure intuition; here, however, they are sharply distinguished, and Kant emphatically explains that space, as pure intuition, is more than mere form, namely a combination of a manifold, mediated by the synthesis of the understanding, which is nothing more than the capacity to connect *a priori*.

From this, it first becomes clear beyond any doubt that infinite time and infinite space, as such, are not forms of sensibility, but connections of a manifold that, like all connections, are the work of the understanding and belong to transcendental analytics, specifically under the categories of quantity. Even Kant himself speaks of the axioms of pure intuition:

This successive synthesis of the productive imagination in the generation of shapes is the foundation on which the mathematics of extension (geometry) bases its axioms.

(Kk. 176.)

by which he ties the application of pure mathematics in its full precision to the objects of experience.

Let us, however, set all that aside and investigate how space and time, as intuitions, come to be. Kant said in one of the passages from the first edition of the Critique:

Space and time can only be produced through the synthesis of the manifold, which sensibility, in its original receptivity, provides.

What is this manifold of the original receptivity of sensibility? That we are dealing here with a connection prior to all experience is clear; for it would shake the foundations of the Kantian philosophy if the space we are considering first were the connection of a *posteriori* given manifold. But how could it be possible that the connection of a manifold be a *priori*? What spatiality, as unity, does sensibility provide for the imagination so that infinite space is produced through the synthesis of the imagination? Is this unity a cubic inch? A cubic foot? A cubic yard, a cubic mile, a cubic sun-distance, or cubic Sirius-distance? Or is it a unity of imagination, and are there various kinds of spatialities that the imagination connects?

Kant remains silent on this!

A *posteriori* the connection poses no difficulty at all. There I first have the vast sea of air, which the imagination presents. Who thinks that some force manifests itself within it? That would be a clumsy objection! Air and space are relational concepts. The greatest thinker who ever built an insane folly speaks of space, of a house, of a room he contains; Kant reaches the pinnacle of his "Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science" with the phrase: "Matter is that which fills space"; the poet lets the eagle, drunk on space, circle high in the air; but anyone who wanted to apply the concept of imagination to all of this should consider being? No! To the space that the air presents to you, it adds the spatialities of houses, trees, people, the entire Earth, the Sun, the Moon, and all the stars, which the thinking subject has previously freed from all their fulfilling activity. Now it sets itself to the gained immense spatiality, a similar one, and so on into infinity; a standstill is impossible, because there is no limit to the progression.

A *posteriori*, with open or closed eyes, one can therefore construct space, i.e., we do not have a whole, but only the certainty that we will never encounter a hindrance in the progress of the synthesis.

But what justifies us in this composition? Not even the pure spatiality of a cubic line can be delivered *a posteriori*, i.e., through experience. The smallest spatiality, like the greatest, arises only by thinking away the force that fills it, and it is a product upon which nature will never place its seal. Where one body ceases to exert influence, another begins its effect. My head is not in space, as Schopenhauer once remarked, but in the air, which certainly is not identical to space. Likewise, matter is not the movable within space, but substances move within substances, and movement is only possible due to the different so-called aggregate states of bodies, not because an infinite space encompasses the world.

If the world consisted only of solid substances, movement within it would only be possible through the simultaneous shifting of all bodies, and the notion of space would never arise in a human mind. Even movement in liquid elements does not strike anyone as movement in space. We do not say: the fish swim in space, but: they swim in water. The limitless view into the vastness and the aberrant reasoning (*perversa ratio*) are the creators of infinite space. In the world and among forces, there are no spatialities, and infinite space exists as little as the tiniest reality of space.

It is very remarkable that, in the pre-Kantian era, where space was attributed to things without question, this fact was already correctly recognized by Scotus Erigena. His world indeed lies in infinite space, which contains everything, but it does not move, and within the boundaries of the world, there is no space: there is only body in bodies. This fact does not change by Scotus placing space here and there into the world again; he did not have Kant's critical mind, and the difficulty of the investigation, even today, will be recognized by no one. (By the way, Scotus once even made the remark that space exists only in the mind of humans.) He says in his work: *De Divisione Naturae*:

Disciple: What, then, should be said of those who say that the dwellings of humans and other animals are places? Likewise, they consider the common air, the earth, also places of all those inhabiting them? They say water is the place of fish, the ether of planets, the celestial sphere the place of stars?

Master: Nothing else but to persuade them, if they are teachable and want to learn, or to dismiss them entirely, if they are contentious. For reason will mock those who say such things.

(Cap. 29.)

Do you see, therefore, how, according to the reasons stated, this world, along with its parts, is not a place but is contained in a place, that is, within the scope of its definite boundaries?

(Cap. 33.)

What remains except that we say, for example, that while we see our bodies placed on this earth or surrounded by this air, there is nothing else but bodies being in bodies? In the same way, fish are in the waves, planets in the ether, stars in the firmament, bodies in bodies: the smaller in the larger, the thicker in the more subtle, the lighter in the lighter, the purer in the purer.

(Cap. 35.)

The free, unlimited view through the absolutely transparent element is, therefore, the reason that everyone, whether the most brilliant or the most limited person,

could never conceive the idea that there is no space, although they could just as easily think that no objects could be encountered within it.

However, let us not judge prematurely. Should air and perverse reason really suffice to generate infinite space? Certainly not! They can only do so based on an *a priori* form. But what is this form? We will soon find out.

Now we must first return to the question of whether space can provide the connection of a manifold *a priori*? We have already seen that Kant leaves us entirely unclear about which parts of space can be connected *a priori*. So we ask: Can the idea of any spatiality exist in us before all experience, or in other words, can we arrive at the intuition of any spatiality before we have seen or touched objects? The answer is: No! It is not possible. Space exists either as a pure infinite intuition within me before all experience, or it is found *a posteriori*, by empirical means; for it is just as difficult to place the smallest spatiality, as pure *a priori* intuition, in sensibility as it is to place infinite space. If this were the case, it would be the most absurd torment to painstakingly achieve through synthesis of similar parts what I can immediately have as a whole.

Herein lies the reason why Kant, in transcendental aesthetics, presents space as pure intuition and does not first allow it to arise through a connection of spaces, by which the synthesis would have come into sensibility, whereas it is merely a function of understanding, or rather of blind imagination.

If infinite space can only be produced by the synthesis of an *a priori* given manifold; but if it is just as impossible to find a part of space before all experience as the whole space, it follows that infinite space *a priori* cannot be produced, and that there is no space, as pure *a priori* intuition.

I summarize: According to our investigations, there is neither an infinite space outside my head, in which things would be enclosed, nor is there an infinite space in my head that would be an *a priori* intuition. Likewise, there are no restrictions of space, spatialities, outside my head. However, there is an infinite space in my head (obtained through the synthesis of *a posteriori* given manifold, abstracted from its effect), which is projected outward. Thus, I have also, by empirical means, obtained the infinite phantasmatic space derived from perverse reason. I also have, from the same source, spatialities of any size, fantasy spaces.

Kant, therefore, did nothing more in the transcendental aesthetics, as I noted on the first page of this critique, than definitively place in our mind the phantasmatic space projected outward, which is usually considered an objective space independent of the subject. By doing this, he liberated things-in-themselves from space, which is his immortal merit. His error was that he denied that infinite space is of empirical origin, and that it was placed in sensibility as pure intuition before all experience. A second merit is that, in the transcendental analytics, he distinguished space as form from space as object (pure intuition). If he became entangled in an insoluble contradiction with the doctrine of transcendental aesthetics, he also showed that he had thoroughly examined the problem of space and gave his successors an invaluable hint in the right direction. We now follow this hint.

What is space as the form of intuition, which (remaining in Kant's line of thought for now) lies *a priori* in our sensibility?

The question is answered negatively: Space, as the form of intuition, is not infinite space. What, then, is it? It is, in general terms, the form that surrounds objects, reaching the boundary of their effectiveness. Thus, it is the condition of the possibility of intuition and its *a priori* priority has already been established beyond all doubt. Where a body ceases to exert its influence, there space sets the boundary. Although the specific effect of a body (its color) could set the boundary for it (I leave aside touch), this could only happen according to height and breadth, and all bodies would only be recognized as surfaces, just as all those in the field of my vision would move closer to each other, and their distance from me would be = 0. They would lie equally on my eyes. Through the depth dimension of space, the understanding (according to Schopenhauer's masterful depiction) determines, based on the minutest data, the depth of objects, their distance from each other, and so on.

This form is conceived under the image of a point, which has the ability to extend into indefinite width (in indefinitum) in three dimensions. It makes no difference to it whether sensibility places a grain of sand or an elephant on it, or whether it uses the third dimension to determine the distance of 10 feet from my standing object or the Moon; it applies equally to all dimensions, as far and as simultaneously as it is used. It is not itself an intuition, but it mediates all intuitions, just as the eye does not see itself, and the hand cannot grasp itself.

This makes it clear how we arrive at phantasy space. Through experience, we learn how to use point-space — otherwise, it would lie dead within us — and it is up to the subject to spread out into those dimensions, as far as it wishes, without giving it an object. In this way, we ascend into infinite celestial spaces without content and advance unhindered. Without this ever-ready form, perverse reason would never, based on the unlimited view into the distance, be able to

create infinite space. Yet, the possibility of the unlimited gaze is based solely on the *a priori* form of space (point-space). — I will only mention that the correct use of space requires long study. Small children grasp at everything, at things on the Moon, as if they were images on a wall. Everything floats closely before their eyes; they have not yet learned to use the third dimension. The same has been observed with certain blind people who were suddenly able to see.

The consequences allowed by point-space are extremely important. If infinite space is a pure *a priori* intuition, then it is entirely certain that the thing-in-itself has no extension. To understand this, only a brief reflection is required; for it is clear that, in this case, every thing only borrows its extension from the infinite space alone. If space, however, is not a pure intuition but only a form for intuition, then extension does not depend on space, but only on the perception and the knowledge of the extension depends on the subjective form. If there is a path to the thing-in-itself (which we have not yet examined), then it certainly has extension, meaning it has a sphere of effectiveness, although space *a priori*, as a subjective form, lies within us.

Regarding time, the questions are the same:

- 1) Is time created by the synthesis of the manifold, which sensibility provides in its original receptivity, or
- 2) Does it arise through the synthesis of a manifold that sensibility presents *a posteriori*?

Kant says:

Time determines the relationship of representations in our inner state.
(Kk. 72.)

Thus, it is the inner state that we must take as our reference point. If we look inward, assuming that the external world is still completely unknown to us and has no effect on us, and that our inner state shows no change, then time would be as dead to us as if we were in the deepest and dreamless sleep, and a representation of time would never arise within us. The original receptivity of sensibility cannot give us the slightest datum for generating time. Thus, the first question is answered negatively.

Let us now think about a change in sensations within us: if only the perception of our breathing, the regular inhalation and exhalation of air, exists, we have a series of fulfilled moments that we can connect. Only a fulfilled time is perceivable, and a fulfillment of moments is only possible through data from our

experience and not *a posteriori*. No one would think to say that our inner states did not belong to experience and were not given *a posteriori*.

How does infinite time arise, which is essentially thought without content? In a similar way as infinite space. The thinking subject abstracts from the content of every moment. The transition from one present moment to the next is the unity which the imagination hands over for synthesis. But since an empty moment is in no way an object of intuition, we borrow from space

and represent the timeline as an infinitely progressing line, which the manifold presents in one dimension and, in this way, applies the characteristics of the line to time, except for the fact that the parts of the former are simultaneous, while the latter's are successive.

(Kk. 72.)

A posteriori, an infinite time can be constructed, i.e., we have no specific intuition of it, but we do have the certainty that the progression of synthesis will never encounter an obstacle. But we ask here, as we did with space, how we become capable of such a synthesis? Not even the smallest conceivable time is delivered to us by experience as unfulfilled. Let everyone try to imagine a single moment of time. If one extracts everything from the fastest transition from one present to the next, at least this smallest unit of time remains fulfilled.

Now we conclude with space. If infinite time is only created by the synthesis of an *a priori* given manifold, and no smallest unfulfilled time is found in our original sensibility, then infinite time *a priori* cannot be created, nor can any *a priori* intuition of time be found in our sensibility.

There is neither an infinite time outside my mind, which distorts things, nor is there an infinite time in my mind that would be a pure *a priori* intuition. However, there is an infinite time (consciousness of an unhindered synthesis) in my mind, obtained through the connection of *a posteriori* given fulfilled moments, which have been violently deprived of their content.

We also have, through empirical means, an infinite phantasy time, whose essence is entirely succession, and which carries with it everything that lives, including objects and our consciousness, in its restless course.

Kant banished this infinite time into our minds, meaning he removed things-in-themselves from it and freed them from time. Opposed to this great merit is his fault of having placed time, as a pure *a priori* intuition, into our sensibility. A second merit is that he distinguished time as the form of time from time as the object (infinite line).

And now we again face the important question: What is time, as the form of intuition that lies *a priori* in our sensibility? The answer is already negative: Time, as the form of intuition, is not infinite time. So, what is it now? As the form of sensibility, it could only be the present, a point, like space — a point that is always becoming but is always present, a rolling, flowing point.

As pure present, however, time has no influence on intuition or, as Kant says:

Time cannot be a determination of external appearances; it belongs neither to a shape nor to a position.

(Kk. 72.)

Thus, I also state clearly: Time is not a form of sensibility.

As we will remember, Kant brought this matter to a conclusion by stating:

All representations, whether they concern external things as objects or not, belong as determinations of the mind, to the inner state,

which falls under the formal condition of time. However, the inner state is never an intuition, but a feeling, and it is this feeling, this inner movement that touches the mind, as it lies in the point of the present.

This sheds a peculiar light on the entire transcendental analytic. In it, sensibility is not addressed; this is the task of aesthetics. Only the manifold of sensibility, the material for the categories, crosses over into the analytic to be connected and linked. The analytic itself deals only with the understanding, the categories, the synthesis, the imagination, the consciousness, the apperception, and always, time comes up again and again. The transcendental schemata are determinations of time, the generation of extensive and intensive magnitudes happens through the progression of time, the analogies of experience arrange all phenomena according to their relationships in time, whose modes should be persistence, consequence, and simultaneity. Therefore, I said above: whatever part of the analytic we turn to, we always encounter the synthesis of a manifold and time, and both together were named the imperishable crown on the corpse of the categories. How is it that Kant could not bring the analytic to completion without a form of sensibility, without time? Likewise, he could not bring time to fruition without a form of sensibility, which is not an *a priori* form but is solely and exclusively a connection of reason. I will speak about this in more detail later; the point we now reach is the best suited to introducing Schopenhauer, Kant's only intellectual heir.

Schopenhauer's position on transcendental aesthetics and analytics is this: his unconditional recognition and his unconditional rejection of both. Both need to be addressed.

The infinite space and infinite time, the pure intuitions *a priori*, Schopenhauer accepted without criticism, taking them as forms of intuition, and he completely ignored Kant's strict distinction between forms and intuitions in the analytic. For him, it was a settled matter that space and time, as forms of intuition, lie in our cognitive faculty before all experience. Therefore, he denied, like Kant, the knowability of the thing-in-itself, between which and the knowing subject these forms always stand, according to which the sensory impressions are processed.

Nevertheless, with the utmost human restraint, he improved part of Kant's epistemology and irrefutably established his corrections. The first question he asked himself was: "How do intuitions of external objects come about at all? How does this whole world, so real and important to us, arise within us?" He rightly took issue with Kant's meaningless expression: "The empirical intuition is given from outside." This question is of immense merit because nothing seems more self-evident to us than the origin of objects. They are simultaneously present with the opening of our eyelids; what complex process within us is supposed to take place to produce them?

Schopenhauer was not deterred by this apparent self-evidence. Like Kant, he began from sensory perception, which is the first point of reference on subjective grounds for the creation of intuitions. He examined closely and found that sensory perception is indeed given, but intuition cannot arise, as Kant insists, within the senses, because:

Sensation of any kind is and remains a process within the organism itself, and as such is confined to the area beneath the skin, and therefore can never contain something that lies beyond this skin, something external.
(4th edition, W. 51.)

If sensation is to become intuition, then the understanding must step in and perform its one and only function, the law of causality:

for it grasps the given sensation according to its own form, *a priori*, that is, before all experience (since it has not been possible until now), and declares the given sensation of the body as an effect (a word that only the understanding understands), which must necessarily have a cause as such.

(4th edition, W. 52.)

The law of causality, the *a priori* function of the intellect, which requires as little time to learn as the stomach does to digest, is nothing more than the transition from the effect in the sensory organ to its cause. Please note how Schopenhauer bends this simple law, as we will later see, into various directions and, with apparent force, only in order to reject Kant's entire transcendental analytic.

Schopenhauer continues:

At the same time, the intellect, that is, the brain, employs the pre-existing form of the external senses, namely space, to place that cause outside the organism: for this is how the external first arises.

This operation of the intellect is not a discursive, reflective one, done *in abstracto* through concepts and words, but rather an intuitive and immediate one. For it alone, residing in and for the understanding, establishes the objective, real body in three-dimensional space, which, in time, according to the same law of causality, continues to change and move within space.

(4th edition, W. 52.)

Thus, the understanding creates the objective world, and our empirical intuition is an intellectual, not merely a sensual one.

Furthermore, Schopenhauer triumphantly establishes the intellectual nature of intuition: the setting up of the inverted image on the retina; simple vision of double sensations due to the corresponding similar points being hit; double vision of an object with crossed fingers; and finally, most masterfully, how the understanding transforms these double planar sensations into a stereoscopic spatial intuition with the help of the third dimension of space, using both stereoscopic vision and differentiations of light and dark to determine a body's contours, position, and the object itself in three dimensions, including height, width, depth, and atmospheric perspective, with the use of the visual apparatus and linear perspective.

According to Schopenhauer, the Kantian pure intuitions of space and time are not forms of sensibility, but forms of the understanding, whose sole function is the law of causality. Following this improvement in Kant's epistemology is another, namely that he separated intuitive knowledge from abstract knowledge, thereby dividing understanding from reason; for in doing so, he freed our knowledge from pure *a priori* concepts, driving a highly harmful and confusing wedge into it, without justification.

In Kant, sensibility observes, understanding (the faculty of concepts and judgments) thinks, and reason (the faculty of conclusions and ideas) closes. In Schopenhauer, the senses only provide the material for intuition (although he also attributes intuitive capacity to the senses, which we will discuss later), understanding observes, and reason (the faculty of concepts, judgments, and conclusions) thinks. Reason, whose sole function is concept formation, according to Schopenhauer, contributes nothing to the creation of the phenomenal world. It only repeats, mirrors, and steps alongside intuitive knowledge, reflecting on it with entirely distinct reflective processes.

It is empirical intuitive knowledge, along with its material, that reason processes into concepts, which it sensibly fixes through words and then applies in endless combinations, by means of judgments and conclusions, forming the fabric of our thought-world. Therefore, reason has no material content but only a formal one.

(4th edition, W. 109.)

The material content must be supplied to reason by its thinking, exclusively from external sources. From the intuitive representations that the intellect has created, reason carries out its functions by first forming concepts, leaving aside certain characteristics of things and retaining others, then combining them into a concept. Through this, the representations lose their intuitiveness but gain in clarity and ease of handling. — This, then, and this alone, is the activity of reason: while substance, however, can no longer be provided by its own means.

(4th edition, W. 109.)

Before we proceed further, I have a remark to make. Schopenhauer, apart from Kant, is, in my conviction, the greatest philosopher of all time. He has broken entirely new ground in philosophy and has advanced it vigorously, animated by an honest, free endeavor to bring humanity closer to the truth. But in his system lie the most irreconcilable contradictions in such abundance that it is already a great task to at least briefly shed light on them. This work is particularly hindered by the fact that he does not strictly adhere to his own definitions and first labels something as correct, and then later as incorrect. Now that we know what is meant by intellect and reason, and especially since we are aware of these cognitive faculties, it will be good to separate their functions from their forms, which Schopenhauer completely muddles.

In "Vierfache Wurzel" on page 51, the intellect itself is a function, and the law of causality is its only form. On page 57, however, the law of causality is the simple function of the intellect. In "W. a. W. u. V.I. 535" the law of causality is form

and function. The correct understanding is that the law of causality is the function, space and time are the forms (according to Schopenhauer's doctrine) of the intellect. Similarly, he attributes to reason in "W. a. W. u. V.I. 531" the simple function of forming the concept, while in the same place on page 539 it says:

All reflective knowledge has only one main form, and this is the abstract concept.

Only the former is correct; the form of reason is missing in his system.

The intellect, therefore, by means of its function (law of causality) and its forms (space and time), brings forth the perceptible world based on changes in the sensory organs, the empirical world of appearances. And reason draws its concepts from these empirical perceptions. Schopenhauer would, according to this, have had to discard the entire analytics of Kant. From the perspective of the intellect, the synthesis of the manifold could not be allowed, since the intellect, without the aid of reason, brings forth perception; from the perspective of reason, however, the categories must be rejected because concepts can only rely on empirical perception and therefore an *a priori* concept is a *contradictio in adjecto*. But the synthesis and the categories form the content of the analytics.


In rejecting the categories, as pure *a priori* concepts, I completely agree: an *a priori* concept is impossible; but it is wrong that the intellect, without the aid of reason, constructs the empirical world.

Before I can justify this view, which denies the unmistakably correct part of transcendental analytics, the synthesis of the manifold of perception on its part, I must explain reason and indeed all cognitive faculties.

Reason has both a function and a form. Schopenhauer does not give it a form and a function that fully encompasses its essence. He places its function in the formation of concepts; I, however, say: the function of reason is simply synthesis, and its form is the present.

It has three auxiliary faculties. First, memory. Its function is the preservation of all impressions on the mind as long as they are not judged. The second auxiliary faculty is judgment. Its function is: the combination of the related. We have thus: 1) the combination of corresponding parts of perceptions by the intellect, 2) the combination of like objects, 3) the combination of concepts, which is in accordance with the laws of thought. The third auxiliary faculty is imagination. Its function is merely to hold the connected perceptual content as an image.

All cognitive faculties — namely, sense, intellect, judgment, imagination, memory, and reason — converge in one center: the mind (called by Kant pure original apperception and by Schopenhauer the subject of cognition) whose function is self-consciousness. Everything converges in its center, and through this center, it traverses all its faculties with its function and gives them consciousness of their actions. The table of the mind is thus:



From the different gradations of the mind, it follows that the division of individual cognitive faculties is by no means a superfluous endeavor. Where there is sensitivity, there is mind, but how can one explain the difference between the mind of an animal and that of a human better than by distinguishing specific mental activities that the former lacks? Without dividing the mind into its individual activities (faculties), we would have to limit ourselves to entirely vague general expressions, such as that the intelligence of this animal is lesser than that of another. If we adopt the division, we can more accurately describe what is missing and, so to speak, place our finger on the source of the difference. Kant was therefore correct in dissecting the mind, and such a division is indeed necessary for critical philosophy.

Reason now advances in the field of the intellect toward two completely different types of connections, which Schopenhauer completely overlooked. He knows only the one type: the formation of the concept; he does not know the other: the connection of partial representations to objects and the linking of objects with each other.

The second type is originally the first, but we will first consider the formation of the concept.

That the formation of concepts is based solely on synthesis will be acknowledged by anyone after a brief reflection. Judgment provides reason with a similar manifold, which it compiles and designates with a single word.

Judgment assembles only what belongs together: in this process, separation occurs on its own. Reason unites both the assembled and the discarded. For example, it unites all horses in the concept of a horse, and what is separated (oxen, donkeys, insects, snakes, humans, houses, etc.) in the concept of non-horse. It always operates synthetically.

Its method is also always the same, whether it has countless or only a few objects, properties, activities, or relations to bring under one concept. Only the spheres of the concepts differ. Furthermore, the more a concept encompasses, the emptier it becomes, despite its fullness, and the less it contains, the fuller it is, despite its emptiness.

In this way, all of human experience, both external and internal, is reflected in concepts. Reason further operates in the combination of concepts into judgments and, in the connection of judgments (premises), forms something new from the dispersed knowledge in them in drawing out the judgment, which is the subject of logic and syllogistics.

As we now accompany reason on its other path, we first enter a field that is completely beyond the grasp of the intellect, and which, according to Kant, we shall call the field of inner sense until we come to know it better. We already touched upon this in the preliminary discussion of time. We found there that fulfilled moments are connected with the eyes. But how does reason proceed here? Its own form, the present, becomes the problem. It is conscious of a change in inner sense, through memory, and yet it has only the present, which becomes constant and yet is always new. Now it directs greater attention to the seemingly rolling point of the present and lets imagination hold onto the vanishing points: thus, the first fulfilled transition from the present to the present, i.e., from the first fulfilled moment, then a second, a third, and so on, is obtained, and through this, the consciousness of succession and the concept of time. The rolling point of the present is described in imagination like a line. Reason connected moment with moment, and imagination always held the connection firm. It itself does not connect, as Kant wants.

Reason, which is aware of the unimpeded progression of its synthesis and the ever-tangible change of inner states touching the present, also connects the vanishing moment with the coming one. In this way, the primal image of time is formed: a point between two moments, two connected wings.

The time constructed by reason must therefore also be distinguished from the *a priori* form of the present. It is an *a posteriori* connection. The basic unity is the fulfilled moment.

The synthesis of reason does not depend on time. Reason connects the progression of the present and lets imagination weave the connectedness into each new present with greater clarity. Therefore, time is not a condition of the perception of objects, which always exist fully and entirely in the present. But time is the condition of the perception of movement.

As the world would always be just a colored surface lying on our eyes without space, so without time, every development of our knowledge would be withdrawn; for, in Kant's words, without time,

a connection of contradictorily opposed predicates in one and the same object would be incomprehensible.

(Kant, p. 71.)

But it would be a grave mistake to assume that development itself stands under the conditions of time: only the knowledge of development, not development itself, depends on time.

Kant and Schopenhauer are mistaken regarding time because they first made it into an *a priori* form and then let real movement depend on it, caught in the strangest deception.

Furthermore, Kant allows time to sometimes flow, sometimes stand still:

Simultaneity is not a *modus* of time itself, as if no parts existed at the same time, but all follow one another.

(Kant, p. 191.)

Time, whose continuity is usually referred to by the expression of flowing (flux),

(Kant, p. 181.)

However:

Time, in which all changes of appearances are to be thought, remains and does not change.

(Kant, p. 190.)

Schopenhauer takes great offense at this last sentence; but he puts restless time into a better light by giving it its foundation, real succession, with which it stands and falls. He says, picking up from the last point:

That this is fundamentally wrong is proven by the firm certainty that resides within us all, that if all things in heaven and on earth suddenly stood still,

time would nonetheless continue its course undisturbed.

(*Parerga*. I. 108.)

And why would time, in this case, continue its course? Only because one thing on earth, this firm certainty we hold, does not stand still, but is understood in a state of continuous movement, which time fills continuously.

To illustrate the matter more clearly with an image, the point of the present can be compared to a cork ball floating on regularly flowing streams. The wave that carries it is the inner state, one wave among countless others, all following the same course. If we give the cork ball consciousness and let it disappear here and there, it still does not remain behind in the stream, but continues to float. This is exactly the case with humans. In unconsciousness and sleep, our consciousness is completely extinguished, and time rests; but our inner being does not rest, rather it moves forward unceasingly. In our state, in the midst of general development, we only notice upon awakening that a certain amount of time has passed, and we reconstruct it retroactively. Let us assume an individual has slept uninterruptedly for 50 years and has naturally changed in the meantime; however, they do not feel the infirmities of age, and their room is in the same order as when they fell asleep, so upon waking, they initially believe that only one night has passed. A glance out the window, a glance in the mirror immediately changes this perception. From the gray hair and the facial features, they can "approximately" calculate the time that has passed; better means, such as a clock, will tell them the minute, that is, the distance covered by the entire world stream during the time they had slept.

Yet time itself remains still. It is a fixed imaginary line, whose points are unchangeable. The past year 1789 and the future year 3000 each have a very specific place on it. What flows, what moves, what flows restlessly is the present, carried from the point of movement.

We must now, above all, investigate whether the intellect, assuming that reason contributes nothing to perception, with its function (the law of causality) and its forms (space and time) alone can produce the entire real world as it lies before our eyes, according to Schopenhauer's theory.

First, we come upon the quite unforgivable misuse that Schopenhauer makes of the law of causality. To him, it is a "maid for all tasks," a magical horse, on whose back he rides off into the blue whenever the obstacles in his thinking become insurmountable.

We recall that the law of causality denotes nothing more than the transition from sensory perception to its cause. It only expresses the causal relationship between the external world and the subject, or better, the Schopenhauerian "immediate object," the body, and this limitation is further narrowed by the fact that the transition can only ever go from effect to cause, never the reverse. Once the intellect has found the cause of the change in the sensory organ and has spatially arranged it, as well as brought it into a relation with time (I still strictly adhere here to Schopenhauer's line of thought), its task is complete.

The knowledge of the process itself is not the work of the intellect. It relies on thinking and was always a late ripe fruit of reason, which only Schopenhauer was allowed to pick.

Now, Schopenhauer obscures this clear fact by first attributing to the intellect the transition from cause to effect. He says, namely:

The intellect always has the same simple form: knowledge of causality, transition from effect to cause and from cause to effect.

(*W. a. W. u. V.I. 24.*)

This is wrong in two ways. First, as I said above, the intellect does not recognize the transition from effect to cause, as this is exclusively the task of thought (the intellect recognizes its function as little as the stomach knows that it digests); secondly, its function is exclusively the transition from effect to cause, never the reverse. Schopenhauer demands the impossible from the intellect here, i.e., that it thinks, and thus acquires the serious reproach that Kant made, namely, that he brought thinking into perception.

However, this obscuration is not enough for him; it is not intense enough, he wants a complete darkness to set in. He says:

The achievement of the intellect consists in immediately grasping the causal relations, first between one's own body and other bodies, then between these objectively perceived bodies and one another.

(*4 fache W. 72.*)

This is fundamentally wrong, and the simple *a priori* law of causality is being subjected to the greatest possible violence to make it serve Schopenhauer's purposes. It requires no special acumen to uncover the motives that led him to this conclusion, for it is clear that if the knowledge of the objective world rested solely on the intellect, and if one did not need the help of reason, then the intellect would comprehend the entire causal web in which the world hangs "immediately." If this is not possible, then reason must be invoked. However, this would mean (as Schopenhauer assumes entirely without basis)

that thinking occurs in perception, and beyond this, causality would not be thought through and thus not be *a priori*, but only the causal relation between one's own body and other bodies would be *a priori*, as is required by the foundations of Schopenhauer's system.

Anyone can see that Schopenhauer has actually brought thinking into perception. The intellect goes only from effect in the sensory organ to cause. He carries out this transition without the help of reason, for it is its function. But, according to Kant, this transition is only recognized through thinking, i.e., through reason. Reason further recognizes the transition from cause to effect in the sensory organ and finally recognizes the body as an object among objects, and only through this does it gain knowledge of the causal relationship between the bodies among themselves.

From this, it becomes clear that the causality, which expresses the causal relationship between object and object, is not identical with the law of causality. The former is a broader concept that the law restricts more narrowly. The causality in Kant's sense, which I have called general causality, is also not to be confused with Schopenhauer's law of causality. This only expresses the relation of a specific object (my body) to other bodies, which produce changes in me, and, as I must repeatedly emphasize, it is the one-sided relation of the effect to the cause.

The proof for the apriority of causality, which Kant completely failed at and which Schopenhauer brilliantly carried out, was thus not brought by Schopenhauer either, since the law of causality rests in us before all experience, but causality does not. However, Schopenhauer acts as if he had really proven the apriority of causality; further, as if the intellect immediately comprehended all causal relations. The latter, as we have seen, is a deception, as these relations can only be recognized through thinking, and the intellect cannot think them.

Therefore, when I later touch again on Schopenhauer's concept of causality, as I will do further below, we will be speaking firstly about how it is not identical with the law of causality and secondly that its supposed apriority cannot have the same character. It is an *a posteriori* connection.

After this preliminary discussion, I turn back to our actual investigation, whether the forms of space and time are really sufficient to produce the perceptual world.

We can disregard time because, as I have shown, it is not a form of perception but a connection *a posteriori* of reason. If, however, we suppose it to be a form of perception, it is obvious that it can only bring a completed object into

a relation by giving its states a duration. For good measure, I remind you of Kant's apt statement:

Time can be no determination of outer appearances; it belongs neither to a form nor to position.

Thus, only space remains, and it indeed gives the object form and position by exactly defining the sphere of force and determining its location. But is the object complete when I only have its mere outline, when I know it stretches so long, so wide, and so deep? Certainly not! The main thing: its color, hardness, smoothness, or roughness, in short, the *sum* of its effects, which space can only set the boundary for, cannot be determined solely through space.

We remember how Kant dealt with these effects of bodies. In transcendental aesthetics, he contemptuously set them aside as mere sensory perceptions, which do not rest on any transcendental basis in sensibility, and in the analytics, he laboriously placed them under the categories of quality, according to the rule of the anticipations of perception, for which he offered the miraculous proof.

Schopenhauer treated them with no less harshness. In his first writings, he names the specific sensory perceptions, even the special and precisely determined effects of bodies, from which he immediately leaps away to arrive at the mere abstract effects. Only in his later treatises does he address the matter again. He says in *W. a. W. u. V.I.* 23:

The nerves of the sensory organs impart to the perceived objects color, sound, taste, smell, temperature, etc., while the brain imparts to the same objects extension, form, impermeability, movement, etc. In short, everything that is first conceivable through time, space, and causality; —

further *Parerga* I. 93:

I have just stated that these forms (space, time, and causality) are the contribution of the brain to perception, just as specific sensory perceptions are the contributions of the respective sensory organs.

As our eye produces green, red, and blue, so does our brain produce time, space, and causality (the objectified abstraction of matter). My perception of a body is the product of my senses and brain function with x.

Every follower of Schopenhauer's philosophy will be filled with indignation at these statements because they deal a deadly blow to the intellectuality of perception. As we know, the original function of the senses consists only in delivering the poor material to the intellect for perception; the senses are

"servants of the intellect," and in what they deliver, there is never "something objective." That is why our perception is through and through intellectual, not sensual. But what changes now with this process when we consider the above passages? Now, partly the intellect, partly the sensory organs are at work: perception is thus partly sensual, partly intellectual, and the pure intellectuality of perception is irrevocably lost. (To avoid misunderstandings, I note that according to my theory of knowledge, perception is not intellectual but spiritual: it is a work of the whole mind.) Schopenhauer's merit is that he denied the senses the ability to perceive, as he asserted in *The Fourfold Root*.

Why did Schopenhauer fall into this regrettable contradiction with himself? Clearly, he was as little able as Kant to find the intellect, to which all specific effects of bodies ultimately refer. Here, both he and Kant left a significant gap in the theory of knowledge, which I have been fortunate enough to fill. The form that the intellect uses for assistance is matter.

We also understand it as a point to think about with the ability to objectify the specific mode of action of a body (the sum of its effects). Without this *a priori* form of the intellect, perception would be impossible. Even space would be useless within us without it, as it can only set boundaries for a specific mode of action. Just as little as the inverted image of a house, for example, on our retina could become an upright object without the law of causality and space, just as little could the blue color produced by the sensory organ, for example, be transferred to an object without the intellect and its second form, matter. Thus, matter is the condition for the perception of objects and is therefore also *a priori*.

And now I must reveal a whole web of contradictions in which Schopenhauer has entangled himself concerning matter. Matter was the heavy philosopher's cross that he had to bear throughout his long life, and it wore down his once-great thinking force to such an extent that word combinations arose which ultimately leave one unable to think anything of substance. Already above, we encountered such a combination:

"the objective abstraction of space, time, and causality,"

which vividly reminds one of Hegel's "idea in its being-other."

Accompanying Schopenhauer through his many winding paths, we find numerous explanations of matter on a subjective basis. The main points are the following:

- 1) Space and time are not merely presupposed for each thing as its material, but their union constitutes matter's very essence.

(W. a. W. u. V.I. 10.)

- 2) Only when filled are space and time perceivable. Their perceptibility is matter.

(4 *fache* W. 28.)

- 3) Matter reveals its origin from time in its quality (accident), without which it never appears, and which is, in essence, always causality, the effect on other matter, i.e., change (a concept of time).

(W. a. W. u. V.I. 12.)

- 4) Form is conditioned by space, and quality or effect is conditioned by causality.

(W. a. W. u. V.II. 351.)

- 5) Under the concept of matter, we think of what remains of bodies when we strip them of their form and all their specific qualities, which is why matter is the same in all bodies, one and the same. These removed forms and qualities are nothing but the particular and specifically determined mode of action of the body. Therefore, if we disregard this, what remains is the mere effect as such, pure action, causality (!) itself, objectively conceived, i.e., the projected image of our own intellect, which outwardly projects its sole function (!), and matter is purely and simply pure causality. Thus, pure matter cannot be perceived, only thought of; it is simply a mental construct added to every reality as its foundation.

(4 *fache* W. 77.)

- 6) What we truly think of under pure matter is the pure action in the abstract, i.e., pure causality itself. As such, it is not an object but a condition of experience, just like space and time. This is the reason why matter, on the table of our pure fundamental knowledge *a priori*, can take the place of causality next to space and time as the third purely formal element and, thus, an attachment to our intellect.

(W. a. W. u. V.II. 53.)

I will not dwell on shedding light again on the misuse Schopenhauer deals with causality in a passage where it is certainly not the function of the intellect. Here, I must protest against the new assertion that causality is identical with effect. Just as little as a general law of nature is identical with the force that acts according to the laws, just as little is causality the same as effect. Causality simply states: every change in nature must have a cause. What does this formal law have to do with effect itself? The effect of a body is its force, and Schopenhauer has reduced this to the will, with which it is identical. He seems to want to merge two entirely different concepts, mixing the formal with the material to obscure the issue, a method that cannot be tolerated. But more on that later.

According to the above, matter first requires the union of space and time. What does this mean? Space and time are, according to Schopenhauer, simple forms of our cognitive faculties, which must be filled with content if they are to mean anything at all. Schopenhauer very awkwardly expresses this in the second passage with the words: matter is the perceptibility of space and time, for he obviously wants to say: through matter, space and time become perceivable. Both statements are entirely different, as the first says something about the essence of matter, while the second makes the perceptibility of space and time dependent on matter, without affecting its essence.

The mere union of two empty perceptions will not result in matter! How can it be that an eminent mind could write such a thing? Even the extravagant fantasies of the ancient Egyptian priests and Zarathustra's do not exhibit such testimony of powerlessness.

In the third and fourth passages, it is stated that matter cannot appear without quality, and space conditions form. In the fifth passage, we are supposed to understand matter as what remains of bodies when we strip them of their form and quality. Further, in the sixth passage, Schopenhauer says that matter must yet have something else, beyond space and time, in their union, or its essence would be identical to causality, purely as effect, without any inherent action at all.

Then, suddenly, its essence is no longer sought in space, time, and causality, but is placed entirely in reason. Matter becomes a Kantian category, a pure *a priori* concept, something we mentally add as the foundation of every reality.

In the sixth passage, Schopenhauer leaves it with one foot in reason, but with the other, it must return to the intellect to take its place alongside space and time as the third purely formal element, something attached to our intellect. In the intellect, it now finds its only rightful and proper place, not because it is identical with causality, but because, without it, an effect could not be objectified at all.

Schopenhauer, however, has not seriously assigned it this place, as we will soon see. He soon chases it away again, not giving it any permanent residence, but turning it into a second "eternal wanderer." Only once more does he make use of it, placing it in the intellect. He calls it:

the visibility of the will,

which is identical with Kant's thing-in-itself. However, he soon abandons this explanation too, which is in any case incorrect, especially because a blind person could never arrive at the representation of material things in this way.

In the subject — this we have seen — there is no place for matter. Perhaps it finds a home in the object.

This is, however, not the case, at least not in the way we might think, because Schopenhauer says: The moment some particular object is set for the subject, the subject also recognizes it in a certain way. In this sense, I say: objects have such-and-such inherent and essential properties; or: the subject recognizes objects as having such-and-such properties.

(4 *fache W.* 135.)

If matter is not a form of perception, then it cannot be shown in the object either. Nonetheless, Schopenhauer accomplishes the impossible through a bold maneuver. The matter that he cannot get rid of, that constantly torments him and imposes itself upon him, must therefore be placed somewhere in the intellect because it cannot find a home there. Schopenhauer dares to seat it on the throne of the thing-in-itself, claiming that it must be placed somewhere. Thus, he splits the world as representation and gives it two poles, namely:

The knowing subject in itself, without the forms of its cognition, and then raw matter, without form and quality.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.II. 18.)

However, by doing so, he set himself on the path of materialism, and the goal of his journey is already apparent. One need only read the entire first chapter of the intended volume, where the troubling passage occurs:

It is just as true that the knower is a mere product of matter, as it is that matter is a mere representation of the knower,

and one will sense what is to follow.

Indeed, things quickly go downhill from here. Even at the pole of the world as representation, matter does not please him for long. He chases it from this position and places it between the world as representation, which was previously one pole, and the will, i.e., between appearance and the thing-in-itself, which he separates by a deep chasm, a radical distinction. Matter now becomes the bond between the world as will and the world as representation. (*W. a. W. u.* V.II. 349.)

Now there are only two steps left, and Schopenhauer takes them both. He first explains that matter is initially quasi-identical with the will, then completely replaces the will with matter.

That matter cannot be viewed or conceived of on its own is based on the fact that it is essentially the will itself, as the pure substantiality of bodies.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.II. 351.)

And:

If the gentlemen absolutely want an absolute, then I will give them something that much better meets all the demands placed on such an absolute than their conceived nebulous forms: it is matter. It is uncreated and indestructible, thus truly independent and *quod per se est et per se concipitur*: everything arises from its womb and everything returns to it.
(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 574.)

I am at the end. If there were anything else in philosophy besides subject, object, and the thing-in-itself, Schopenhauer would have placed matter there. He begins by putting matter in the subject with space and time; then, he places matter into time and causality; then into space and causality; then into causality alone; then he places it half in the intellect, half in reason; then entirely in reason; then entirely in the intellect; then, as the correlate of the intellect, in opposition to the world as representation, then between the world as representation and the world as will; then he makes it quasi-identical with the will; finally, he raises it alone to the throne of the thing-in-itself.

Schopenhauer did not stick to any view; he often switched and upheld several views within one chapter. Therefore, matter is an unsteady and fleeting wandering ghost in his works, always disappearing when it seems to be grasped, and reappearing in a new form. In his later years, Schopenhauer seems to have settled on the explanation: matter is the visibility of the will. As I have already shown, this restriction of matter to such will-objectifications is highly dubious, as it completely excludes everything that is based on perception. It becomes even more questionable when matter is made to depend on the visibility of the will, rather than being itself, as Schopenhauer previously asserted, the pure, essential will. The visibility of the will must entirely fall within the subject. But no! It is

the visibility of the will or the bond between the world as will and the world as representation.

Thus, it either does not fall within the subject at all, or it stands with one foot in the subject and with the other in the thing-in-itself. This is where the source of all false views of Schopenhauer's concept of matter lies. He could have, after so many attempts, never decided to place matter fully and entirely, as a form of the intellect, in the subject. Because he could not separate matter from will, but essentially made both, in his reasoning, independent of the knowing subject, he obscures and distorts them against each other, and especially will never acquires a clear image. One should read Chapter 24 of the second volume of *W. a. W. u. V.*, and one will agree. I know of no more self-contradictory text. Most of the explanations I have cited reflect it, and the confusion is indescribable. He even states there that

matter does not belong completely or in every respect to the formal part of our knowledge, as space and time do, but at the same time contains an *a posteriori* element.

In this chapter, he also states that matter is *actually* (!) the will itself. How brilliantly would philosophy have fared if he had done the one correct thing: completely separating matter and will from one another, placing the former in our minds and the latter outside of our heads.

Kant, with regard to matter, is free from inconsistencies. If matter, like space and time, is not a form of sensibility for him, then it lies entirely in the subject. Let me quote some beautiful passages from the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*:

Matter is not a thing in itself, but only a type of representation within us.
(668.)

Matter is nothing more than a mere form or a certain representation of an unknown object, through that perception which we call external sense.
(685.)

There may well be something outside us that corresponds to this appearance, which we call matter; however, in the same quality, as appearance, it is not outside us but only a thought in us, though this thought calls that which is thought to be outside.
(685.)

All difficulties arising from the connection of the thinking nature with matter stem solely from an apparent dualistic notion: that matter as such is not appearance, i.e., merely a representation of the mind, which corresponds to an unknown object, but that the object in itself exists outside of us and independently of all sensibility.
(689.)

Despite this clear explanation that matter is within us, Kant could not bring himself to make it a form of sensibility, like space and time. The reasons are evident. First, the forms of sensibility had to be pure perceptions. This characteristic can by no means be given to matter. Second, if so, the "mere sensations" would have received a transcendental basis, i.e., they would

have become necessary conditions under which objects can become objects of the senses. However, they are merely accidentally added effects of the specific organization connected with the appearance.
(Kk, p. 68.)

This is, however, false. It is the same as if one were to say: because abnormalities and madmen exist, the idea of humanity cannot be established. Consider color. All people with normal eye structure will identify a red, green, or blue object as red, green, or blue. The fact that there are individuals who cannot distinguish between certain colors, or whose retina is completely unable to differentiate between qualities, is irrelevant because, in some way, the surface of an object must always produce an impression. Let's consider a person who truly sees everything without color. His retina lacks the ability to differentiate intensity, i.e., he can only distinguish light from dark, and the gradations between these two extremes. An object that appears blue to a normally organized person will appear to him as darker than yellow, and so on; he will always have impressions by which he attributes certain properties to the object, and that same object will necessarily always appear the same to him under the same lighting conditions and on the same surface. It is not about seeing the same image of a colored object as others, but about seeing its surface at all, perceiving it as visible and, in short, perceiving it as material. This can only happen when the intellect — here space — takes hold of the form and, in addition to the outline, also uses a second form, matter, as an aid. Only now is the object complete, i.e., its entire effect, insofar as it makes impressions on the sense of sight, is objectified.

Moving on to the sense of touch, the same applies: it is also about receiving a particular impression from the object. One person may call something hard, while another may call it soft; but the fact that the object is perceived at all relies on the intellect's form of matter, a form that could never transfer this specific impression to the object without first passing through the mind.

The same is true for the senses of hearing, smell, and taste. When these senses receive a specific impression, they can only transfer it to the object through the subject by means of matter (or, more accurately, substance, which I will discuss later). It makes no difference whether the same wine pleases one person while disgusts a wine connoisseur.

In general, it has been clearly stated that matter objectifies the intellectual form that is the specific mode of action of a body. Without it, external forces such as the senses, the law of causality, and space would remain inaccessible. All effects, all forces, must first be material (substantial) before we can use them for our knowledge. Schopenhauer is correct that matter is the carrier of forces and that for our understanding it is the vehicle of qualities and natural forces. More precisely, these forces are inside the head, while the force is outside and independent of the head. Each force is the intellectual substance through which we cannot distinguish the inner from the outer. But the force itself, which is independent of the subject, is not substance; it is only force, according to Schopenhauer's brilliant doctrine, the will.

It should be noted here that the excellent Locke was on the right path to truth, but, seeing it from afar, was almost stunned. Instead of categorizing the secondary qualities, separated so shrewdly from the thing-in-itself, under the concept of matter and defining the thing-in-itself as pure force, he allowed them to wander as mere sensory impressions and made matter the thing-in-itself. He turned the matter upside down.

This is the right place to highlight one of Schopenhauer's merits, something I do all the more gladly because it best erases the painful impression left by his fruitless struggle with matter: namely, the true theory of color that he delivered. He presented it in his excellent writing: *On Vision and Colors*, which I count among the most significant works ever written.

Goethe had his well-founded primordial phenomenon, namely the fact that colors are not contained in white light (Newton's theory), but are the product of light and darkness, something shadowy, which he left to philosophers for further investigation. Schopenhauer took Goethe's beautiful legacy and gave the most sufficient supplement to it, by proving that the necessary turbidity for the production of color arises on subjective grounds, namely, within the eye itself. To it corresponds an objective σκιερον (shadowy element), which I will address.

It is not my intention to provide an excerpt from the beautiful treatise here. Only the main points must I highlight and remove a major error from it.

Schopenhauer starts from the eye's peculiar reaction to external stimuli, which he calls activity of the retina. The retina exhibits full activity when exposed to light. In darkness, the retina is inactive. The full activity of the retina can be gradually diminished, and Schopenhauer refers to the possibility of such gradations (between white and gray on the one hand, and gray and black on the other) as the intensive divisibility of the activity of the retina. In addition to this, there is also the extensive divisibility, since the retina is an expansive organ and can receive the most varied impressions simultaneously.

Of these two types, there is a third, the qualitative divisibility, totally different in nature, and on this the colors depend. A certain stimulus can act on the retina in such a way that its full activity divides into two halves, of which only one is active while the other remains at rest. The rest of one part is now Goethe's required σκοτεινον, and the active half brings forth the color. The closer this half comes to the full activity of the retina, that is, the larger it is, the brighter and nearer to white the color will be; and the smaller it is, the darker and nearer to black the color will be.

Schopenhauer explains his theory of physiological colors quite convincingly. The retina has the urge to express its full activity at all times; therefore, when one of the stimuli in question ceases, the half condemned to rest will engage in activity on its own and generate the so-called spectrum. Both, the first color and the spectrum, as the separate qualitative halves of the full activity of the retina, come together and in this sense form the complement of each other. Goethe demanded violet, orange, and green. There are six colors in total: red, yellow, blue, violet, orange, and green.


Fixed and distinguished points arise in the otherwise continuously rising and infinitely nuanced color circles. As in them, every color nuance will find in its appearance its complement in the eye, left behind as the full activity of the retina as a physiological spectrum.

Schopenhauer compares the difference between intensive and qualitative divisibility of the retina's activity to the difference between mechanical mixing and chemical combination. He says:

As a result of the difference between merely intensive and qualitative activity of the retina, we can quite rightly call the penumbra and gray a merely mechanical, albeit infinitely fine mixture of light with darkness; whereas the color, consisting of the qualitatively partial activity of the retina, can be viewed as a chemical combination and intimate penetration of light and darkness: for here both neutralize each other equally, and in giving up their own nature, a new product arises, which has only distant similarity to the other two, but instead has a distinct, unique character.

(Page 38.)

Now, if we take the full activity of the retina = 1 (white), then every active half of the qualitatively divided activity must be a fraction of 1. Schopenhauer defines these fractions and presents the following scheme:



Red and green divide the full activity of the retina completely evenly; orange is $\frac{2}{3}$, and its complement blue is $\frac{1}{3}$; yellow is $\frac{3}{4}$, and its complement violet is $\frac{1}{4}$ of the full activity. Each of the three color pairs forms 1: the full activity of the retina.

These circumstances, of course, cannot be easily proven and must therefore be hypothetically accepted: only through observation do they obtain such decisive, immediate confirmation and persuasive power that it will be difficult for anyone to sincerely and earnestly reject them.

(30.)

However, I must make a very definite point regarding green and red; I leave the other color pairs untouched.

It will be immediately clear to everyone that two such completely different colors, red and green, cannot be equal halves of the retina's activity. Apart from the fact that green is much darker than red, which is why Goethe, as well as Schopenhauer, places green on the negative side of the color spectrum alongside blue and violet, it is simply inconceivable that exactly the same change in the sensory organ should bring forth red at one time and green at another. Wouldn't it indeed be a miracle if I saw a red object, whose stimulus evokes in me the color red, always, year after year, as red, not green, while exactly the same change is taking place in my retina as when I see green, as green? How does it happen, assuming the given fractions are correct, that red always produces its spectrum, green always produces its spectrum, and red never has a green spectrum? Could red never also have a red spectrum, so that red and red, just as well as the full activity of the retina, would be red and green?

It is utterly incomprehensible to me how Schopenhauer could have overlooked the obvious impossibility of this, which anyone must immediately notice. The simple fractions must have seduced him.

The scheme cannot remain, and I replace it with the following:



With the exception of the new relationship between green and red, the scheme is exactly the same as Schopenhauer's. Only now is it clear why red necessarily has a green spectrum and vice versa, and why the most energetic green is always duller and less tiring than red. Now green is rightly placed on the minus side, where Schopenhauer placed it without any justification.

The rationality and simplicity of the numerical relationships derived from the following considerations may speak for this scheme:

- 1) The plus side adds up to $36/12 = 3$;
the minus side adds up to $12/12 = 1$.

White, yellow, orange, and red thus, when combined, produce an effect three times stronger than black, violet, blue, and green, which is certainly the case. Painters may decide that for themselves.

- 2) The three chemical primary colors are red, yellow, and blue.

Red equals $7/12$ of the retina's activity and requires, as its complement, yellow and blue or $+7/12$ and $-4/12$. From the positive fraction, the negative is subtracted, and what remains is:

$$5/12 = \text{green};$$

Yellow = $9/12$ requires red and blue or $+7/12$ and $-4/12$. After subtracting the negative fraction, what remains is:

$$3/12 = \text{violet};$$

Blue = $4/12$ requires yellow and red or $+9/12$ and $+7/12$. Since both colors are on the plus side, subtraction is not possible; it must therefore be added, and the sum of $16/12$ divided by 2 is $= 8/12 = \text{orange}$.

It should be noted here: every color and its complement are in a polar opposition, as Schopenhauer nicely explained. They are connected only by this opposition. They strive for unification, or rather: the retina has the drive to express its full activity. Thus, in each pair of colors, in the prismatic experiment, when one color is brought over the other, white is produced, i.e., the retina is thereby returned to full activity. However, what Schopenhauer overlooked is, first, the strict antagonism between the negative primary color blue on one side and the positive primary colors yellow and red on the other side, and second, the peculiar relationship in which the colors on each side stand to each other.

Schopenhauer refers to chemistry to explain that violet is the darkest of all colors, although it emerges from two lighter components than itself, stating that chemistry cannot predict the quality of the combination from its components. However, the matter is simpler.

When red and blue come together, a conflict arises, which ends with blue being completely overpowered, neutralized, and equally bound. This requires just

as much energy as blue possesses; red loses 4/12 of its free energy, reducing it to

$$3/12 = \text{violet.}$$

The same struggle ensues when yellow encounters blue. Yellow also loses 4/12, and its energy is reduced to

$$5/12 = \text{green.}$$

The composite colors of the minus side, violet and green, do not stand in the same antagonism as the positive colors. To use a playful analogy: they are like sons who have fallen out with their father and allied with his enemies, but deep down, they long for home; for in negative violet is positive red, in negative green is positive yellow. Blue is indeed in closest alliance with violet and green, but its origin is weak. The negative side consists only of one primary color, the brave blue, and two, somewhat hastily created, composite colors; the positive side, however, consists of two primary colors, yellow and red, and one equally legitimate, equally composite color, orange, giving this side superiority (3:1).

This scheme should not be misused by arbitrarily combining plus and minus colors to produce any derived color, such as the primary color blue itself. It can, however, be used to explain, as noted above, the creation of the three composite colors from the three primary colors; for absolute antagonism exists only between blue on one side and red and yellow on the other.

Regarding the peculiar relationship in which the colors on each side stand to each other, it is one of mutual, loving support. When they unite, the lighter of the two shares a part of its energy with the darker, and a new color emerges in the middle. This relationship is the basis of our scheme, so much so that even the primary color blue, standing on the negative side between violet and green, can be produced from these two composite colors. One can confirm this through a simple experiment: observe a green glass through a violet object (a silk ribbon, the back of a book, etc.), and one will see a wonderful blue. The green gives part of its greater energy to the violet, and the result is blue:

$$(5/12 + 3/12) / 2 = 4/12 = \text{blue.}$$

- 3) The three primary colors red, yellow, and blue together form the full activity of the retina, because yellow and blue = green, green and red = full activity. Red is +7/12, yellow +9/12, blue -4/12, which together makes +12/12 = 1. Consequently, the complementary colors they demand — green, violet, and orange — cancel each other out, meaning in fact: green is -5/12, violet -3/12, orange +8/12 = 0.

These striking results force the acknowledgment of the scheme. If you try the same combinations with Schopenhauer's fractions, you will encounter irrational ratios everywhere, which is the best proof against them.

However, this in no way diminishes Schopenhauer's great merit. He has blazed the decisive path here, and all the laurels belong to him alone. When, I ask, will the Goethe-Schopenhauer theory finally be acknowledged, and will Newton's ghost be chased out of physics with shame and disgrace?

Schopenhauer stopped at the process in the retina. The first chapter of his work begins and ends with the solemn declaration: "all perception is intellectual," but actually, for him, the perception of colors is sensual. It was reserved for me to give colors their unshakable foundation in the intellect, through the conceptual form of matter, and thus to bring the theory to a conclusion.

The subjective nature of color and its creation in the eye is thus established. But its objective nature, i.e., which cause in the object causes the retina's activity to divide qualitatively differently, must also be acknowledged; for there is an imperative from the object that undoubtedly takes place.

Goethe correctly identified the objective cause of physical colors. It is diminished light. The intimate penetration of light with darkness, however, is not immediate, but through an intermediary third element: turbidity, which brings forth the colors. If turbidity blocks the light from the eye, green, yellow, orange, and red arise, depending on the density of the turbidity. But if the eye looks into an illuminated turbidity in darkness, then green, blue, and violet arise.

The objective nature of chemical colors, that is, the colors inherent to bodies, is probably attributable to the same cause. Schopenhauer says:

Light and warmth are metamorphoses of one another. Sunrays are cold as long as they shine; only when they stop shining on opaque bodies do they transform their light into warmth ... The specific modification of a body that transforms the light falling on it into warmth is, for our eyes, a chemical color.

(74.)

However, I do not consider this to be entirely correct. My view is rather that every body has a particular capability, inherent to its nature, to transform the light falling on it partially into warmth, or rather, to modify its state at the expense of the motion we call light. In this way, the light is weakened, a portion of its energy is taken from it, and we have, as with physical colors, diminished light, which is reflected from the body and, by a specific stimulus, forces our retina to split its activity qualitatively into two halves. The less light a body transforms into warmth,

the brighter it will appear to us, and vice versa. To attribute color to bodies independently of the subject is absurd; rather, it is entirely certain that they have only the ability to generate colors in the eye so that a specific color points decidedly to a particular property that belongs to the essence of the body.

After these necessarily detailed explanations, we return to the synthesis of reason. The great union, time, which completed itself in the realm of the inner sense, in the moving point of the present, is kept in memory.

If we now take a blooming apple tree as the object of investigation at such a distance that it completely fills our retina, according to Schopenhauer it is the exclusive work of reason that completes this for us; according to Kant, without reason (with only understanding), we have nothing but a "rhapsody of perceptions," a collection of individual appearances that would never form a whole. I will prove that Kant was right.

Schopenhauer looks disdainfully and coldly upon Kant's profound doctrine of the connection of a manifold of perception and complains that Kant never adequately explained, nor showed, what this manifold of perception is before it is connected by the intellect. This complaint is unjustified, and it seems to deliberately ignore the clearest passages of the transcendental analytic, especially the one mentioned earlier, namely:

It was believed that the senses provided us not only with impressions, but also put them together and brought forth images of objects, for which ... something more, namely a function of synthesis, was required.

If Kant had always written so clearly, much odd and absurd commentary would never have made it to the market!

Going into more detail about synthesis, Schopenhauer says: "All things are connected in space and time, their parts not originally separate but united. Consequently, everything appears as a continuum." If one wanted to interpret synthesis in this way,

that I indeed connect the various sensory impressions of an object to this object, then this is much more a result of cognition *a priori* from the causal nexus, by means of which all various impacts on my different sensory organs are led back to one common cause of the same object.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 530.)

Both of these interpretations are false. We have already seen that time originally is a continuum, but reason must first connect it into such a unified whole; the mathematical space, which we have come to know as empty, is also composed in the same way. Because our understanding, through some function, does not recognize the cause of a change in the sensory organ, or cannot recognize it, different impacts from one object appear as different and isolated forces. But as soon as reason connects them, they form a complete unity.

This synthesis always occurs, even if we have seen the tree a thousand times before. It is significantly facilitated by the fact that, as adults, we already start from the concept of whole objects and can immediately, in a quick glance, comprehend a new object as a whole, whose parts we are solely responsible for examining in detail.

But did the child, who must learn to know the world successively, already see whole objects? Certainly not. We also have no memory of how helpless we were as infants, but we must assume that we only gradually learned to connect the parts of an object into a whole. Once the child successfully makes the connection in one object, everything is gained. Now, this newly acquired concept is applied to all other objects, and studying them becomes almost like play.

I have presented the most difficult example to sketch the first outline of the process. Now, let us allow only a part of the tree to meet the retina and proceed from there for our purposes. We fix our eyes directly in front of us and see a piece of the trunk. We immediately know we are looking at a tree, but we do not yet know its shape. Now, we begin at the bottom and go to the top, examining it from right to left, and as we look, we lose sight of the individual parts. Nevertheless, in the end, we have the entire tree in our imagination. Why? Because our reason connected the parts and the imagination always retains the connected whole. Here, the synthesis becomes clearly visible.

This becomes even clearer if we limit the process to the form. The eye is the most complete sense organ and functions with incomparable speed, so we can only grasp the process with difficulty. The eye behaves almost like wings have been clipped and the small steps of synthesis appear fractured. Now imagine, for example, that our eyes are closed and we are working with empty mental images. We begin by touching one corner of an object and let our hand slide down to another corner, and further and further until we arrive back at the starting point. What exactly has happened? The understanding related the first impression on the nerves of the fingertips to a cause, this cause being limited with the help of space, and the extended cause, with the help of matter, being given a specific manner of effect (e.g., perfect smoothness, a specific temperature, and solidity). It could do nothing more. This process is repeated with the second impression, with the third, and so on; it always begins anew:

relating the effect to a cause and constructing the same forms of shape, space, and matter. In this way, partial representations are produced, which, if held by the imagination alone, would be nothing but a "rhapsody of perceptions," which could never become an object. But reason was meanwhile not inactive. In performing its function, it connected the partial representations, and the imagination followed, like a faithful maid, always holding together the connected parts. Finally, we add the framework, and understanding gives it some weight, and the object is complete.

Reason could not process the impressions of the senses, and understanding could not connect the processed sensory impressions: only both together could produce the object, and Kant is right when he says:

Understanding and sensibility can determine objects for us only in connection.

(Kkk. 252.)

But, I add, without categories, which are completely superfluous.

Reason connected the partial representations, which were determined by space according to depth (elevations, depressions, thickness), length, and width, according to the shape of the frame, and the specific efficacy of the partial representations, which objectively make up matter, according to the quality of the frame, and the object was complete, without the help of categories of quantity and quality. There is no talk of concepts here. In this type of synthesis there is no mention of concepts at all.

Because Schopenhauer understood the function of reason only at one end: the formation of the concept, and the other end: synthesis as a manifold of perception into an object, he completely overlooked and very incorrectly judged that thinking contributes nothing to perception (as Kant rightly says: perception requires the functions of thinking in no way). Schopenhauer believed that reason could only bring thinking into perception, and therefore, he dismissed Kant's sharp doctrine of the synthesis of a manifold of perception by the intellect (reason), thereby cutting off the best part of Kant's epistemology. For thinking comes to the connection of a manifold through reason, in no way connected to perception.

Let us return to our apple tree. The connection of individual perceptions happened successively. Reason connected, and the imagination retained the connected. All of this occurred at the rapidly moving point of the present, and the succession in the connection was in no way noticed. This was, however,

coincidental, as reason already possesses time, and during synthesis, it could have directed its attention to the succession. In doing so, it would have noted the tree as something that remains through the observation, and the observation itself would have been placed in a temporal relation and given it duration.

Similarly, changes in location (such as the movement of a branch of our tree) are recognized at the point of the present when they are such that they can be perceived, as displacements relative to stationary objects. However, spatial changes, when this is not the case, are recognized only with the help of time. The same applies to development, which fills the sphere of the higher concept of motion along with the concept of spatial change. We think that we will stand before our apple tree again in the autumn. Now it bears fruit. We have the same tree and yet not the same. A connection of opposite predicates (blooming and fruit-bearing) is mediated to us in the same object and in the same time relation, i.e., it is entirely possible to look at the same bearing tree, and yet to see the tree, which earlier bore only blossoms, as the bearer of the fruit today.

We owe time, as we can already foresee, an extraordinary expansion of our knowledge. Without it, we would always remain confined to the present.

Here is also the place to say a word about the cognitive abilities of higher animals. Schopenhauer attributes to them only understanding and denies them reason. He must do this because he lets reason think only, not connect, and it is certain that animals have no concepts. My explanation of reason as a faculty to create two entirely different types of connections, which rely on a single function (essentially, I have only freed the gold of a brilliant idea of Kant's from a heap of worthless earth piled on top of it), proves very fruitful here. Every day, animals provide evidence that they are not entirely confined to the present, and people puzzle over how their actions might have come about. Either reason is attributed to them — i.e., the ability to think in concepts, as is commonly assumed — or everything is attributed to instinct. Both are incorrect. They have only one-sided reason. They connect; they also connect images at the rapidly flowing point of the present — in short, they can think in images.

Let us look back! The perceptible world is complete. Object follows object; they rest or move; they all develop and stand in relations of time, which is not an endless pure *a priori* perception, but rather an *a posteriori* connection based on the flowing *a priori* point of the present.

The next topic we will discuss is mathematical space.

As I have shown above, space, as a form of understanding, is a point with the ability to set boundaries to the spheres of influence of objects in three directions. By itself, space has no extension, although all extension can only be expressed through it by objectifying reason. It is the reprehensible game of a frivolous reason, in the hands of understanding, to let space step apart (which understanding uses only to determine objects), allowing it to extend freely, combining empty spaces (which can only exist in our imagination) into an empty objective space, whose dimensions extend infinitely.

On the other hand, it is correct that every object acts in three directions. The extent of this activity depends on the point-space — not independent of our minds, but present in a way that we could never perceive it without the point-space, which lies in us and is therefore an *a priori* condition of all experience.

Because this correspondence exists, I can say *a priori*, of any body, even before I know it, that it acts in three directions. If this form, separate from its content, is suited to significantly expanding human knowledge, then reason is justified in synthetically shaping it.

This is the case in mathematical space, as the utility of mathematics cannot be denied. Thus, reason connects these part-representations into objects, combining imagined spaces into mathematical space.

That it is a connection is clear. Just as little as I immediately have an object as a whole, just as little is mathematical space, as perception, given to me ready-made, but rather, in Kant's words:

Appearances are altogether quantities, and indeed extensive quantities, because as perceptions in space and time, they must represent the same synthesis, through which space and time are determined.

(Kk. 175.)

It is hardly necessary to point out that mathematical space only has a scientific and indirectly practical value, and that the perception of objects is entirely independent of it. This comes into being only with the help of the form of understanding: space, point-space. In this way, time is fundamentally distinguished from mathematical space; for the knowledge of many spatial changes and all developments is impossible without time.

Now let us consider causal relationships.

It is an undeniable fact for everyone that nothing in the world happens without a cause. Nevertheless, there have been some who have doubted the necessity of this highest law of nature, causality.

It is clear that the universality of the law is only protected against any doubt if it can be proven that it lies within us before all experience, i.e., that without it, it would be either impossible to perceive an object at all or at least impossible to establish an objectively valid connection between appearances.

Kant sought to prove the apriority of causality from the latter (lower) standpoint, but he completely failed. Schopenhauer refuted the "second analogy of experience" thoroughly in §23 of *The Fourfold Root* (particularly emphasizing that all effects have causes, but not all causes have effects, to which I refer).

Even if Kant's proof of the apriority of causality were not contradictory, it would still be false because it is based on a pure concept of understanding, and as we know, no *a priori* concepts are possible from this. Schopenhauer, therefore, raised the apriority of causality from a different standpoint. He demonstrated from the higher perspective that causality, as a law of causality, would not even be able to perceive the world in such a way that it is given to us before all experience. He made the transition from the effect (change in the sensory organ) to the cause an exclusive function of understanding.

However, I have already decisively opposed the notion that this simple and specific function of understanding leads to an extension of understanding itself through experience. The causal relationships, all of which fall under the concept of causality, are not covered by Schopenhauer's law of causality. They can only be determined by reason, as I will now demonstrate.

First, reason recognizes the causal connection between my representations and the immediate object (my body). They are only my representations because the causes of changes in my senses are their effects. The transition from their effects to their causes is a matter of understanding, while the connection of the effects with the causes and vice versa is a work of reason. Both relationships are connected by reason to form knowledge.

This *a priori* causal connection between me and the perceived objects does not determine anything more than that objects act on me. Whether they also act on other objects is, for now, questionable. Absolute direct certainty about this cannot be given, for we are not able to leave our own skin. However, it is equally clear that only a misguided reason could stubbornly cling to this critical objection.

Reason first recognizes that my body is not a privileged subject but rather an object among objects and transfers, based on this knowledge, the relationship of cause and effect to all objects with each other. Thus, it subjects all appearances in every possible experience of causality (of general causality) to a law that receives its universal formulation: wherever in nature a change takes place, it is the effect of a cause, which also anticipates time.

As reason, on the basis of the law of causality, subjects the changes in all objects to causality, it connects the effects of appearances, just as it previously combined these appearances themselves from partial representations into whole objects, thereby significantly expanding our knowledge. But this does not yet end the process.

From the knowledge that all bodies, without exception, act continuously (otherwise, they would not be objects of experience at all), reason gains another insight: that they act in all directions, so there are no separate, parallel causal chains, but rather that every body directly and indirectly influences all others and simultaneously experiences the effect of the activity of all others on itself. Through this new connection (community), reason gains knowledge of a coherent nature.

Kant addresses community in the third analogy of experience and intended nothing other than the dynamic interconnection of objects. Schopenhauer, however, did not want to accept this interaction in that sense and opened up a polemic against it, reminiscent of Don Quixote's fight with windmills and utterly petty in comparison. Interaction is not an *a priori* concept; therefore, Kant's proof cannot suffice. But the matter it deals with is fully correct. Schopenhauer clung to the word "interaction," which is supposed to express that two conditions of two bodies are simultaneously cause and effect of each other. However, Kant never said this in any syllable. He only says:

Every substance must contain determinations of causality in another and, at the same time, the effects of the causality of the other in itself.
(Kk. 213.)

For example, like when two wrestlers press against each other, and each presses because of the pressure of the other, and vice versa.

We now face the most important question in the theory of knowledge: Is the object of my perception the thing in itself, taken into the forms of the subject, or does the object give me no justification to assume a thing in itself underlying it?

The question is answered by a preliminary question: Is the cause of a change in my sensory organs independent of the subject, or is the cause itself of subjective origin?

Kant made causality a pure form of thought *a priori*, which has only the purpose of placing appearances in a necessary relationship to each other. However, the empirical content of perception is simply given and independent of causality. The causality that, when applied only to appearances, has validity within the realm of appearances, is entirely misused if it is used to grasp something beyond the world as a representation. After all of Kant's critical investigations, his clearly expressed purpose was to set limits on human knowledge, beyond which the "shoreless ocean" with its "deceptive mirage" begins. He never tires of warning against sailing on this ocean, and in many ways explains that

pure concepts of understanding never transcendentalize, but are always only valid for empirical use.

Nevertheless, Schopenhauer forcefully used causality to take hold of the thing in itself by concluding, in accordance with this law, from appearance to appearance, an intelligible cause for the ground. He concluded this only because there is nothing more to accuse his philosophy of than idealism, which seems to make the entire objective world an illusion and denies all reality. The three remarks in the first book of the *Prolegomena* are, in this respect, very instructive. This great inconsistency can be understood only as Kant choosing between two evils, and he firmly seized one. But the thing in itself is no evil; for Kant has given it nothing — no extension or movement — so mathematically, for practical thinking, it is nothing.

Now, let us assume that Kant had found the thing in itself through a legitimate procedure, and we knew only that it exists, not how it is. Then the object would be nothing other than the thing in itself, as it appears according to the forms of our knowledge. Or as Kant says:

In fact, if we regard the objects of the senses, as is proper, as mere appearances, we must also admit that a thing in itself lies at their foundation, though we do not know how it is constituted in itself but only how it appears, i.e., how our senses are affected by this unknown something.

(*Prolegomena* 234.)

This is the proper foundation of transcendental or critical idealism; but Kant had sneaked into it.

The supposed inconsistency of Kant was uncovered very early (G. E. Schulze). Schopenhauer discusses it several times, most thoroughly in *Parerga* I. 97–102. He accuses Kant of not, as truth demanded,

simply and absolutely considering the object as conditioned by the subject and vice versa, but rather only considering the manner and mode of the appearance of the object as conditioned by the forms of knowledge of the subject, which therefore also *a priori* come to consciousness:

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 596.)

and explains that one can never get beyond representation by the means of representation. How, then, is it to be explained that he thereby placed himself so decisively in opposition to Fichte's idealism, although he did not find enough words to condemn it? He had opened up the thing in itself on another path, as will, and therefore had no reason to fear the accusation of being an empirical idealist.

Is it really not possible, by the way of representation, to get there? I say: certainly it is possible, precisely by using Schopenhauer's law of causality. Kant's causality cannot lead us there, but Schopenhauer's law can.

The understanding begins to operate as soon as any change occurs in a sensory organ; its sole function is to transition from the change to its cause. Can this cause, like the change, lie in the subject? No! It must lie outside of it. Only by a miracle could it lie within the subject, for there is undoubtedly a necessity, for instance, to see an object when one wills to look at it. I can try a thousand times to see a particular object, but if it isn't there, I will fail. The cause is therefore entirely and firmly independent of the subject. If it still lay within the subject, the only remaining option would be to assume an intelligible cause that, with an invisible hand, brings about changes in my sensory organs — that is, we would have Berkeley's idealism: the grave of all philosophy. Then we would be acting very wisely to abandon, as soon as possible, all inquiry, with Socrates' words: "I know one thing, that I know nothing."

But we will not act in this way, but instead maintain that every change in the sensory organ indicates an external cause (subjective: cause). Space is not there to create something "outside" of me (we belong to nature, and nature does not play hide-and-seek with itself), but we know that the sphere of effectiveness of one — what we can now openly say — thing in itself sets the boundary and determines its position among the other things in themselves.

Had Schopenhauer taken this path, which he so deliberately avoided, his brilliant system would not have become a fractured, urgently repaired structure full of irreconcilable contradictions, which can now only be explored with mixed

emotions — displeasure soon followed by admiration. By not taking this path, he deliberately avoided the truth and rejected it with full awareness. However, it was different when Kant believed that space was a pure intuition *a priori*; it would have been much more honorable for him if he had, like Kant in the case of causality, acknowledged his inconsistency, rather than making the claim that the cause of any appearance, such as the sensation in the sensory organ, lies within the subject.

I said: Schopenhauer deliberately denied the truth. Let everyone judge for themselves. In *The Fourfold Root*, §76, it reads:

That these sensations of the sensory organs, even assuming they are stimulated by external causes, nevertheless can have no similarity with the nature of those external causes — sugar cannot resemble sweetness, nor the rose redness — Locke has already demonstrated in detail. But also, that they must have an external cause at all, rests on a law whose origin can demonstrably be found in us, in our brain, and is thus ultimately no less subjective than the sensation itself.

What an obvious sophistry and deliberate confusion! The law of causality is based solely on the perception of the acting thing in itself, not on its effectiveness itself, which would exist even without a subject. The law of causality is only the formal expression of the necessary, universal, and always consistent process of the understanding: seeking what changes a sensory organ. Only reflective reason connects, on the basis of general causality, the change in the sensory organ as an effect with what caused it as a cause; that is, it brings the totally subject-independent real influence of a thing in itself into a causal relationship with something else. The formal causal relationship is therefore purely subjective (without a subject, there is no relationship between cause and effect), but not the real dynamic underlying it.

As certain as it is that without this law of causality, we would never arrive at any perception — from which Schopenhauer rightly concluded its apriority — it is equally certain that understanding would never enter into function without an external influence, from which I, with the same good reason, infer that the effectiveness of things, i.e., their power, would be independent from the subject.

Let us now consider the final connection that reason accomplishes. It concerns substance.

Matter, an object of understanding, must be thought of in the same way as space and the present, under the image of a point. It is only the ability to

objectify, to make perceptible the specific effect of a thing in itself exactly and faithfully. Since the different effects of things, insofar as they are to be objects of perception, must all flow without exception into this one object of understanding, matter becomes the ideal substrate of all things. In this way, reason is given a multifaceted uniformity, which is linked into a single substance, from which all kinds of effects arise as accidents.

Reason links things in this direction so unconditionally and strictly that even things in themselves, which can only compel a weak impression upon our senses by surprise, immediately become substantial, as for example pure nitrogen, upon whose existence one could only conclude because it could neither support breathing nor combustion.

On the basis of this ideal connection, we finally reach the conception of a complete world; for by objectifying, we also cast all those sensory impressions that understanding cannot pour into its forms, space, and matter, like sounds, odors, colorless gases, etc.

This connection bears the danger, of which I am aware, that it is an ideal connection. If it is taken for real, the crude and transcendent materialism arises, whose practical utility, as I have acknowledged in my work, has forever closed the door to the theoretical field, which it never deserved. Schopenhauer withdrew his hand from it in a friendly manner; but he reached it out again when he placed matter into the subject, or into the object, or wherever else, but precisely through this baffling misjudgment, brought about confusion. This unfortunate half-measure was not his fault alone.

What can now be inferred from the unity of the substance, this ideal unity, based on the connection formed by the understanding of matter? At most, this: that the objectifying forces, in a certain sense, are essentially the same and together form a collective unity. From the nature of the substance, which is only unity, something can only be drawn that is in accordance with this nature, as a determination of the different modes of operation of bodies that oppose it, just as the nature of time is succession, because in the real development of things, succession exists, and space must have three dimensions, because every force is extended in three directions. What has always been inseparably linked with substance? Persistence, that is, something that does not lie in it, a property that is not drawn from it, but from the effectiveness of some things in an empirical way.

Thus, we see Kant not deriving the persistence of substance from it, but from *a priori* time, and Schopenhauer calls space to his aid:

The rigid immobility of space, which manifests as the persistence of substance.

Actually, he derives it from causality, which, for this purpose, in the most arbitrary manner, is made identical with matter, and the essence of this, in turn (but only for as long as he wants to prove the persistence of substance *a priori*), he places in the intimate union of space and time.

The intimate union of space and time, causality, matter, reality — these are thus one, and the subjective correlate of this One is understanding.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 561.)

We are throwing together the most different concepts here, as Hamlet said: Words, words, words!

The truth is that the persistence of substance is not to be proven *a priori*.

In the real realm, the ideal connection of substance stands opposite the collective unity of the world, whose creation and transience (precisely that which, in principle, is denied by the persistence of substance) I have proven in my philosophy.

By the fact that Schopenhauer did not allow a dynamic connection of things, independent of the subject, but only recognized an ideal causal nexus, he also fell into the serious error of forcibly removing the forces of nature, to which he ascribed reality, from the causal nexus.

It is clear that all changes in the world can only be brought about by forces. But if, as Schopenhauer wishes, these forces cannot enter the world of appearances, how are they supposed to accomplish the changes in it? He leaves this difficulty unresolved.

Each individual change is always a similarly individual change, but not the force, the cause of which it is the expression.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 155.)

A natural force itself is not subjected to causality; rather, it is precisely that which, as every cause, grants causality, i.e., the ability to act, to effects.

(*Ethics* 47.)

What is Schopenhauer doing here? He places an incomprehensible third entity, something entirely different from natural force, between natural force and effect: the cause, that is, the expression of the force, detached from the force. It

is as if a murderer said: "It was not my force that killed, but the expression of my force."

Schopenhauer goes so far as to praise this absurd distinction.

This confusion of natural force with cause is so frequent that it is detrimental to the clarity of thought. It even seems that for this very reason, I will never separate these concepts so far, yet it is necessary to do so.
(4th edition W. 45.)

The truth is that things in themselves, without an imagined intermediary, act upon each other, and their effectiveness can only be recognized by the subject, through ideal causality. Only in relation to the subject is it called the force that acts, the cause, and the state brought about by it, the effect of another force, effect.

The classification of causes into: causes in the strict sense, stimuli, and motives is not entirely correct. Schopenhauer says:

The true and essential difference between inorganic body, plant, and animal is based on the three different forms of causality: cause in the strict sense, stimulus, and motive.

(4th edition W. 45.)

The cause in the strict sense is that which exclusively brings about changes in the inorganic realm, i.e., those effects that are the subject of mechanics, physics, and chemistry. The third of Newton's laws applies to it alone: action and reaction are equal.

(4th edition W. 46.)

The second form of causality is the stimulus: it governs organic life as such, that is, plants, and the vegetative, thus the unconscious part of animal life, which is essentially plant life itself. ... Action and reaction are not equal, and the intensity of the effect does not follow by any means in proportion to the intensity of the cause through all degrees; rather, by increasing the cause, the effect can even turn into the opposite.

The third form of causality is the motive: under this is the actual animal life ... The mode of operation of a motive is very different from that of a stimulus: the influence of the former can be very brief, and it does not need to be constant; whereas the stimulus always requires contact, often even

requires a certain duration, such as by intussusception.

(4th edition W. 46.)

In this regard, I first object that the cause in the strict sense does not exclusively concern the inorganic realm. There are many phenomena, which physics and chemistry describe action and reaction as unequal. Often, two substances can only combine after they have left another compound and are in a state of excited affinity, like hydrogen and arsenic. If mercury is heated to 340°, it combines with oxygen to form mercury oxide; but at 360°, decomposition takes place again. The cause was intensified here, but the effect turned into the opposite. Heat softens wax but hardens clay, etc. Only in mechanics are action and reaction always equal.

Secondly, the motive is certainly only a stimulus. It either involves real contact, through light, for example, or an ideal one, mediated by imagination or memory. In any case, the motive works, even if it disappears immediately after perception, only as long as it exists, and therefore must have the same duration as the stimulus.

That such a sharp distinction between cause, stimulus, and motive exists, as pointed out above, was later refuted by Schopenhauer himself. He says:

What knowledge provides animals and humans through the medium of motives, plants provide through the susceptibility to stimuli; inorganic bodies, through causes of all kinds, and strictly speaking, all this is merely different by degree.

(W. i. d. N. 65.)

In the course of our critique, it has emerged everywhere that our cognitive faculties have only *a priori* forms and functions for the purpose of recognizing subject-independent realities. Nature, of which we are a part, plays no unworthy game with us. It does not deceive us, nor does it hide itself when we honestly inquire. The sincere researcher always gives as satisfying an answer as possible.

Only one thing we have not yet examined, namely, what opposes the synthesis of a manifold of intuition on the real side?

Kant denies the compulsion from the object towards a specific synthesis. The immediate question arises: how is the synthetic subject to recognize that the part-representations delivered by the senses to the understanding belong to one object? How is it that I always connect the same parts to one object and am

never in doubt about what belongs together and what does not? Kant does not explain this process and we must assume that the judgment faculty, almost instinctively, correctly chooses the parts that belong to an object and combines them into extended quantities.

We stand on firmer ground than Kant. As I have shown, space is the form of understanding, by means of which the subject can perceive the limit of the effect of a thing in itself, which therefore first gives it extension. Each thing in itself is a closed force of definite intensity, i.e., each thing in itself has individuality and is essentially a unity. Reason can therefore only connect into a magnitude what presents itself to it as an individual whole; i.e., it can only recognize through synthesis what is present independently of it as a unity, as individuality. Thus, it always knows exactly how to distinguish, from the continuity of the individual force, what belongs to it and what does not.

We are approaching the end. I will summarize. As we have seen, the world according to Kant is entirely appearance, a perfect artwork of the understanding, created from its own means, through it, in it, for it, in one word: a miracle! It would still be so, even if he had succeeded in giving the thing in itself a real foundation. He had to sneak in the same, for his philosophy offers no way to the thing in itself.

The world as representation according to Schopenhauer is likewise entirely and through and through a product of the subject, nothing but appearance. Against his better knowledge and conscience, he resorts to tangible sophistries, as if compelled by overwhelming need---because his philosophy rests on fragile cornerstones (on space and time as pure *a priori* intuitions), partly out of carelessness, because he was able to oppose the ideal world as representation to the real world as will.

One would be mistaken, however, to believe that Schopenhauer stuck to the end with the idea that the world as representation is nothing more than a pure figment and tissue of the knowing subject. He was a brilliant, great philosopher, but not a consistent thinker. His restless mind dealt with the same philosophical material countless times, always discovering new sides to it, but he never knew how, with rare exceptions, to unite them into a whole. His philosophy fits entirely with Goethe's remark in his color theory:

It is a continuous setting and negation, an absolute statement and immediate limitation, so that ultimately everything and nothing is true.

He perfected the Kantian theory of knowledge in some respects, but fundamentally corrupted it in others, and he was caught in a peculiar delusion when he claimed the merit

of having concluded the series of philosophers, which began with the most decisive materialism but led to idealism.

(*Parerga* II. 97.)

First, he says in *Parerga* I, 93:

The thing-in-itself is actually (!) not to be attributed with either extension or duration.

We encounter here for the second time his characteristic "actually." Earlier, it was said: matter is actually will. We will run into this "actually" again often, and at the end of this critique, I will permit myself to tie some of these "actuallys" together into a bundle.

Then he says:

The organic body is nothing other than will that has entered representation, which, viewed in the form of knowledge that is space, is itself will.

(*W. i. d. N.* 33.)

The will is Schopenhauer's thing-in-itself; it is also frankly admitted that the thing-in-itself has entered directly into the form of perception of space, i.e., of the subject. Here, everyone sees that it is only about the manner in which the thing-in-itself appears to the subject, whereas Schopenhauer, as we know, angrily accuses Kant of not having stated, as the truth required, simply and absolutely that the object is conditioned by the subject and vice versa, but only that it is the manner of appearance of the object, etc. So where is the object that otherwise completely conceals the thing-in-itself?

At this point, other appropriate questions arise. Is the body really just the will as it appears in the form of knowledge in space? Where is time in all of this? Where is the specific effect of the idea of the human? And how does it come to the conclusion that the body, which is the will passed into the form of subjective knowledge, is not subject to the law of causality? As *W. a. W. u. V. I.* 15 reads:

One should guard against the great misunderstanding that, because perception is mediated by the knowledge of causality, the relation of cause and effect exists between object and subject; since the same only takes place between objects.

The most important passage, however, is the following:

In general, it can be said that in the objective world, that is, in perceptual representation, nothing at all can represent itself that is not in the nature of the thing-in-itself, also in the will underlying the phenomenon. Precisely a corresponding modified striving must underlie this. For the world as representation cannot provide anything from its own means, just as it also cannot set up any idle, pointless fairy tales. The endless variety of the forms and shades of the plants and their blossoms must still always be the expression of a likewise modified subjective essence, i.e., the will as thing-in-itself, which is expressed and must be accurately depicted through it.

(*Parerga* II. 188)

How great a struggle Schopenhauer must have fought with himself before that passage was written down! According to it, the object is nothing other than the thing-in-itself that has entered the forms of the subject, which he most decisively denied in his world as representation. On the other hand, it is deeply painful to see how this great man, fighting with the truth, a true and noble disciple, ultimately was indisputably correct in the greater scheme.

Kant's cut through the ideal and the real was indeed such a cut. He misjudged the truth so completely that he even took the oldest of all, force, and placed it on the subjective side without granting it even the dignity of a category: he counted it among the predicables of pure understanding. He simply discarded the real in favor of the ideal and thus held only the ideal in his hand. Schopenhauer's division of the world into a world as representation and a world as will is also a failure because the real can and must already be separated from the ideal in the world of representation.

I believe I have succeeded in applying the knife at the right point. The focus of transcendental idealism, on which my philosophy rests, lies not in the subjective forms of space and time. It is not by the breadth of a hair that a thing acts further than space extends; not by the breadth of a hair is the real movement of a thing in itself ahead of my present: my subjective cork ball is always precisely above the point of world development. The focus lies in the subjective form matter. It is not that matter reflects the essence of the thing-in-itself, even to the tiniest detail, photographically faithful — no! It reflects it exactly, for this purpose, as an object of understanding; the difference lies in something much more powerful. The essence of matter is nothing other than force. Force is everything, it is the sole reality in the world, it is completely independent and self-sustaining; matter, on the other hand, is ideal, it is nothing without force.

Kant said:

If I take away the thinking subject, then the entire corporeal world must fall, as it is nothing but the appearance in the sensibility of our subject and a kind of representation of the same.

And Schopenhauer said:

No object without a subject.

Both explanations rely on pure *a priori* intuitions, space and time, and are correct conclusions from false premises. If I take away the thinking subject, I know precisely that individual forces, understood in their real development, remain, but they have lost their materiality: "The corporeal world must fall," "no object anymore."

So we have:

on the subjective side	on the real side
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a. <i>a priori</i> forms and functions:	
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the law of causality,	effectiveness in general,
the point-space,	the sphere of effectiveness,
matter,	force,
synthesis,	individuality,
the present.	the point of movement.

b. ideal connections:	
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general causality,	the influence of one thing-in-itself on another,
community,	the dynamic connection of the universe,
substance,	the collective unity of the world,
time,	real succession,
mathematical space.	absolute nothingness.

We will now briefly, according to my theory of knowledge (an advancement of Kant-Schopenhauer's), let the perceptible world emerge:

- 1) A change takes place in the senses.
- 2) The understanding, whose functions are the law of causality and its forms space and matter, seeks the cause of the change, constructs it spatially (sets the limits of the effect according to length, width, depth) and makes it material (objectifying the specific nature of force).
- 3) The representations formed in this way are partial representations. Understanding passes these to reason, whose function is synthesis and

whose form is the present. Reason connects them into complete objects with the help of the judgment faculty, whose function is to judge what belongs together, and the imagination, whose function is to hold together what is connected.

So far, we have individual, fully completed objects, next to each other and behind each other, without dynamic connection and standing at the point of the present. All the mentioned forms and functions have apriority, that is, they are given and are prior to all experience in us.

Reason proceeds to establish connections and links, based on these *a priori* functions and forms. It connects: a. the points that move through the present and those still to be passed through in time, which must be thought of as positions of indefinite length, like the image of a line. With the help of time, we recognize:

- 1) Changes in position, which are not perceptible;
- 2) The development (inner movement) of things.

Reason connects:

b. arbitrarily large empty spaces based on the point-space into mathematical spaces. Upon this rests mathematics, on which our knowledge is fundamentally based.

Reason connects:

c. based on the law of causality---

- 1) the change in the subject with the thing-in-itself that caused it;
- 2) every change in any thing in the world with the thing-in-itself that caused it: general causality;
- 3) all things among each other, by recognizing that each thing acts on all others and that all things affect each individual thing: community.

Reason finally connects:

d. all the different modes of action of things objectified by matter into one substance, with which the subject objectifies all such sensory impressions that understanding cannot shape.

All these connections are brought about *a posteriori*. They are the formal network in which the subject is caught, and with them, we spell out: the effectiveness, the real connection, and the real development of all individual

forces. The empirical affinity of all things is thus not, as Kant wants, a result of the transcendental, but rather both run alongside each other.

From here, the transcendental aesthetics and the transcendental analytics of Kant first appear in their full significance. In them, he has, with extraordinary sharpness of mind, established

the inventory of all our possessions through pure reason,

(Kk. 10.)

with the exception of the law of causality. He only erred in determining the true nature of space, time, and the categories, and in that he did not oppose anything real to the subjective pieces.

If we divide the ideal connections according to the table of categories, then the following belong in the container:

of quantity | of quality | of relation
time | substance | general causality
mathematical space | | community

I have, while still standing entirely in the realm of the world as representation, so to speak, found the forms of the thing-in-itself: individuality and real development, and have strictly separated force from matter and have the truth on my side. It is just as baseless as the widespread opinion in philosophy since Kant, that development is a concept of time, and therefore only possible through time (it is the same as if one were to say: the rider carries the horse, the ship carries the current); likewise, that extension is a concept of space, and therefore only possible through space, which all boils down to bringing time and space into a causal relationship with movement and individuality.

All sincere empiricists must decisively oppose this doctrine because only fools can deny the real development of things and their strict progression, and natural science, based on empirical idealism, is entirely impossible. On the other hand, those thinkers who were completely absorbed in Kant's doctrine were not capable of believing in a world that is absolutely independent of the subject. To escape this dilemma, Schelling invented the identity of the ideal and the real, which Schopenhauer properly dismissed with the following words:

Schelling hastened to proclaim an invention, the absolute identity of the subjective and the objective, or the ideal and the real, which all boiled down to the fact that everything, as rare minds like Locke and Kant, with

incredible effort and sharp thinking, had separated, he now sought to mix back together into the porridge of their absolute identity.

(*Parerga I*, 104.)

The only way by which the real could be separated from the ideal was the one I followed. What blocked access to it was the erroneous assumption that space and time are pure *a priori* intuitions, whose nullity I thus had to first prove.

My theory is nothing less than a theory of identity. The separation of matter from force proves this sufficiently. But there is also a fundamental difference between the law of causality and the effectiveness of things; between space, this ability to extend into indefinite expanses in three dimensions, and a very specific individuality. Is time, this measure of all developments, identical with the development of a force itself? etc.

Space and time, according to Kant's great teaching, are ideal; individuality and movement, however, without whose acceptance neither natural science nor a consistent philosophy is possible, are real. The former only have the purpose of recognizing these. Without the subjective forms, there is no perception of the external world, but rather striving, living, willing individual forces.

It is high time for the dispute between realism and idealism to end. Kant's assurance that his transcendental idealism does not negate the empirical reality of things arose from a complete self-deception. A thing-in-itself, which, as an appearance, borrowed its extension and movement from pure intuitions of space and time, has no reality. This is firm and clear. The critical idealism of Kant-Schopenhauer, which I have restructured in its foundations, leaves the extension and movement of things entirely untouched and only asserts that the object is distinct from the thing-in-itself through matter, although the manner and form of the appearance of a force is conditioned by the subjective form matter.

Since for Kant the thing-in-itself was a completely unknown x, with which he was so little concerned, the absurd consequences of those pure intuitions, space and time, as:

We can only speak of extended beings from the standpoint of a human being from space,

and:

The acting subject would, according to its intelligible character, not stand under any temporal conditions; for time is only the condition of

appearance, not of things in themselves. In it, no action would arise or pass, and thus it would not be subject to the law of all temporal determination, nor to all variables.

(Kant, *Kk.* 421.)

They paid less attention to this. On the other hand, Schopenhauer, who was constantly occupied with the thing-in-itself (will), celebrated his Saturnalias on almost every side of his works. The denied individuality and the denied real development of the thing-in-itself avenged themselves in the most dreadful way; for they shattered the thought construct of the genius into a thousand pieces and laughingly threw them at his feet. A philosophical building must be such that every intermediate wall on the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th floors rests on immovable foundational pillars, otherwise, it cannot withstand even moderately strong winds and will collapse. The strictly separate forms of the subject and the thing-in-itself are the foundation of all philosophy. If an error occurs here, even the most magnificent building is worth nothing. Therefore, every honest system must begin with the sharp, albeit very tedious, examination of the faculty of knowledge.

In this section of my critique, I will not yet touch upon the contradictions in which Schopenhauer necessarily had to entangle himself through the mentioned denial. This will come later, and then we will also see how often he shook off the bothersome chains of pure intuitions, space and time, and landed entirely on real ground. Now I will briefly show how Schopenhauer elevates the point of extension and movement of the thing-in-itself (will) to

objective reality, by allowing the corporeal world, which fills space in three dimensions,

to arise from subjective forms.

Beforehand, I must mention that he even made the existence of the world dependent on the subject. He says:

Among the many things that make the world so mysterious and troubling, the closest and first is this: as immeasurable and massive as it may be, its existence nevertheless hangs by a single thread: and that is the consciousness in which it stands.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.II. 4.)

Instead of existence, it should say appearance. He had completely forgotten that he said in *The Fourfold Root*, page 87:

One commits an abuse whenever one applies the law of causality to something other than the changes in the empirically given material world,

for example, to natural forces, through which such changes are even possible at all; or to matter, which they act upon; or to the entire world, to which an absolutely objective, not conditioned by our intellect existence must be attributed.

This is where I begin to lay bare a glaring contradiction regarding the object. Schopenhauer says:

Where the object begins, the subject stops. The commonality of this boundary shows itself precisely in that the essential and therefore general forms of the object, which are time, space, and causality, are, even without the knowledge of the object itself, found by the subject and fully recognized.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 6.)

However, the older philosopher teaches in the second volume, also on page 6:

The objective is conditioned by the subject and also by its forms of representation, which belong to the subject, not to the object.

What is there to say about this?!

And now, to the point!

The body lies, like all objects of perception, in the forms of all knowledge, in space and time, through which there is multiplicity.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 6.)

Time is that device of our intellect by which that which we perceive as the future seems not to exist at all now.

(*Parerga* II. 44.)

In reality, the constant emergence of new beings and the ceasing to exist of the present ones is to be regarded as an illusion, brought about by the apparatus of two polished lenses (brain functions), through which alone we can see anything: they are called space and time, and in their interplay (!) causality.

(*ib.* 287.)

Through our optical lens of time, what is future and coming presents itself as what already is and is present.

(*ib.* I. 281.)

Our life is of a microscopic nature: it is an indivisible point, which we perceive drawn out by the two powerful lenses of space and time, and thus we behold it in the highest clarity.

(*ib.* II. 309.)

If we could remove the forms of knowledge, like the glass from a kaleidoscope, we would see the thing-in-itself, to our amazement, as something single and unchanging before us, as imperishable, immutable, and, beneath all apparent change, perhaps even down to the most specific determinations, identical.

(*ib.* I. 91.)

Another conclusion, which could be drawn from the statement that time does not belong to the essence of the thing-in-itself, would be that, in some sense, the past has not truly passed, but that everything that has ever really and truly been must still exist in its entirety; and time, in the end, is nothing but a theater waterfall, which seems to fall but is in fact only a rotating wheel, which does not move from its place; this is how I have long since compared space to a facet-cut glass.

(*ib.* I. 92.)

So it had to happen! What Kant had only lightly sketched had to be painted in a clear picture by his greatest successor, so that even the dumbest minds could immediately recognize the enormity of the matter. Consider the process. The one thing-in-itself, to which all multiplicity is foreign, exists in the *Nunc Stans* of the Scholastics. The one thing-in-itself, opposed by everything else that belongs to the subject, opens its eyes. First, space enters the intellect, which is like comparing a facet-cut glass in its activity (the law of causality is responsible for the interaction, not to mention the law of causality and the interplay of space and time). This glass distorts the one indivisible point of the thing-in-itself, transforming it not into millions of figures of equal substance and size — no! — but into mountains, rivers, humans, oxen, donkeys, sheep, camels, and so on. All produced from its own means, for in a single point there is no room for differences. After this is accomplished, the lens of time enters into activity. This glass stretches the one act of the eternally, absolutely calm thing-in-itself, namely being, into countless successive acts of will and movements, but — mind you — from its own means. One part is already hidden from the subject, having been consigned to the past, while another part is still fully present. These hidden acts of will are pushed by the wonderful magic lens always into the present, from where they are thrown down into the past.

How is nature here made into a deceitful Circe by the same man, who never tired of explaining:

Nature never lies; she only turns all truth into truth.

(*Parerga* II. 51.)

What does nature show? Only individuals and real becoming. One may ask here: how is it possible that such a brilliant mind could write something like this, if it is not the natural consequence of what Kant already saw in the perceptions, space, and time, which form the foundation of Schopenhauer's philosophy.

Thus, from its own means, the subject produces the multifaceted world. However, as I pointed out above, when this matter was examined under a different light, the aging idealist had to admit: "The world as representation cannot provide anything from its own means, it cannot fabricate a vain, idly invented fable." But he made no retraction regarding the stubbornly denied individuality. He emphasized it in many places, such as:

The illusion of multiplicity arises from the forms of external, objective perception.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.II. 366.)

The multiplicity of things has its root in the ways of knowing of the subject.

(*ib.* 367.)

The individual is only appearance, it exists only for the knowledge bound to the principle of sufficient reason, the *principium individuationis*.

(*ib.* I. 324.)

Individuation is mere appearance, arising through space and time.

(*Ethics* 271.)

These are utterly refuted by other statements:

Individuality inheres first in the intellect, which, reflecting the appearance that belongs to it, gives it form according to the *principium individuationis*. But it also inheres in the will, insofar as the character is individual.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.II. 698.)

Furthermore, one can ask how deep, in the essence of the world in itself, do the roots of individuality go? At most, one could say this: they go as deep as the affirmation of the will to life.

(*ib.* 734.)

From this, it also follows that individuality does not rely solely on the *principium individuationis* and is therefore not based solely on appearance; rather, it has its roots in the thing-in-itself, the will of the individual, for

character itself is individual. How deep these roots go is one of the questions whose answer I will not undertake here.

(*Parerga* II. 243.)

Here I can only exclaim:

Magna est vis veritatis et praevalebit!

In conclusion, I must again address the injustice that Schopenhauer committed against Kant when he criticized the transcendental analytics. He misunderstood the synthesis of a multiplicity of intuitions, or rather, he did not want to and was not allowed to understand it. Kant clearly taught that sensibility alone provides the material for intuition, which the understanding processes, selects, absorbs, and combines, and that an object only emerges through the synthesis of partial perceptions. Schopenhauer twisted this to mean that a different object from the intuition must be added in thought, through the categories, so that intuition first becomes experience.

Such an absolute object, which is certainly not the perceived object, is added to intuition through the concept as something corresponding to it. The adding of this object, which is directly inconceivable in intuition, is the proper (!) function of the categories.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.II. 524.)

The object of the categories in Kant is not the thing-in-itself, but it is still its closest relative: it is the object-in-itself. It is an object that requires no subject, it is an individual thing, and yet it is not in space and time, because it is not perceivable, and it is the object of thought, and yet not an abstract concept. Therefore, Kant actually (!) distinguishes three things: 1) the representation, 2) the object of the representation, 3) the thing-in-itself. The first is a matter of sensibility, which perceives it, along with sensation, through the pure forms of intuition — space and time. The second is the matter of the understanding, which, through its 12 categories, adds the third.

(*ib.* 526.)

From all this, nothing is to be found in Kant's Analytic, and Schopenhauer simply fantasized. He even goes so far as to accuse the profound thinker, the greatest thinker of all times, of an incredible lack of thoughtfulness because he first sought to bring connection (reason) into intuition, which was precisely one of his immortal merits. One should listen:

That incredible lack of thoughtfulness about the nature of intuition and abstract representation brings Kant to the monstrous claim that without thinking, i.e., without abstract concepts, no knowledge of an object is possible.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 562.)

As we know, reason does not bring thinking, but connection into intuition. Naturally, we also think while we are intuiting, reflect intuition in concepts, and elevate it to the knowledge of a world whole, of its dynamic relationships, of its development, etc., but that is something entirely different. Mere intuition, the intuition of objects, things, comes about without concepts and yet with the help of reason. Since Schopenhauer allowed reason to form no concepts and to produce none, Kant must have been wrong. But it is the most beautiful duty of later generations to bring forgotten merit back to light and to cancel unjust judgments. In the present case, I considered myself called to fulfill this duty.

*[1] I note that I am citing Kant's works according to the Hartenstein edition and Schopenhauer's works as follows:

The World as Will and Representation. 3rd ed. 1859

On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. 2nd ed. 1847

Ethics. 2nd ed. 1860

On the Will in Nature. 2nd ed. 1854

Parerga and Paralipomena. 2nd ed. 1862

On Vision and Colors. 2nd ed. 1854

Physics.

Whoever dons the philosopher's mantle, has sworn to the banner of truth, and now, wherever it is called into service, any retreat, no matter what the reason, is a shameful betrayal.

— Schopenhauer.

As I have shown in the previous section, Schopenhauer improved in his writings, which concern representation, partly the theory of knowledge essentially of Kant (the aprioristic law of causality, the intellectuality of intuition, the destruction of the categories), partly he mutilated or violently distorted it (denial of the synthesis of a manifold in intuition). If he followed in this way only in the footsteps of his great predecessor, we see him, however, in his works on the will, taking a completely new path in Western philosophy, one which Schelling – let us be fair! – had hinted at. The Kantian thing-in-itself was like the veiled image of Isis in philosophy. Many tried to lift the veil, but without success. Then came Schopenhauer and tore it off. Even though he did not succeed in clearly reproducing the features of the image, his copy of the image still has immeasurable worth. And even if that were not the case, the mere act – the unveiling of the thing-in-itself – would suffice to make his name immortal. As Kant is the greatest philosopher, who has been written above the head, so Schopenhauer is the greatest thinker who has been written above the heart of philosophy. The Germans can be proud of him.

Let us now consider the path that led Schopenhauer to the thing-in-itself. Still completely under the influence of Kant's idealism, he came to the conviction that the appearance of the essence of the thing in its manifestation could in no way be expressed. He therefore concluded that as long as we find ourselves in the world as representation, the thing-in-itself must remain completely hidden. But, he said,

my body is for the knowing subject as such a representation like any other, an object among objects.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 118)

Consequently, the thing-in-itself also manifests itself in him, and it must therefore be accessible to me in my inner self, in self-consciousness.

This was a brilliant and ingenious insight, and I do not fear that I am guilty of exaggeration when I say that it will spark a revolution in the intellectual sphere, one that will bring about transformations in the world similar to those brought about by Christianity.

I will not dwell on discussing again the already criticized errors. It is known that Schopenhauer himself was ultimately compelled to confess that the appearance was not entirely a construct of the subject, but the expression of the thing-in-itself. And indeed, we have seen that in the world as representation, the forms inherent in the thing-in-itself, namely its essence as force, can already be discerned. But what this force itself is can never be grasped from the outside. We must plunge into the depths of our inner selves in order to determine this x more closely. Here it reveals itself to us as the *will to live*.

Schopenhauer says, quite rightly:

If we lead the concept of force back to that of will, we have, in fact, brought something unknown back to something infinitely more familiar, yes, to the only thing that is truly and completely known to us.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 133.)

And the extremely well-chosen expression “will to live” cannot and should not be suppressed from philosophy.

We have already plunged into our inner selves in the previous section, and now we must once again do everything possible to observe precisely what can be grasped through this approach. If we completely close ourselves off from the external world and look attentively inward, we immediately realize that reason is as if suspended. It has only one single purpose: to perceive external things and to objectify them according to its forms. We feel immediately and search for something to explain a certain impression by means of the law of causality. Secondly, we cannot shape our inner world according to space; we feel ourselves as immaterial because only the causes of sensory impressions are, without exception, necessarily material (substantiality). Awake and active are only our higher cognitive abilities, and with them also self-consciousness.

It is worth noting that, although we cannot spatially shape our inner world, we are nonetheless immediately aware of our individuality. In common sensation, we feel that our inner force operates within us, neither broader than a hair's width, but better said, it remains active in such a way that our reason spatially delimits the body. This is very important because Schopenhauer precisely denies that in common sensation or inner self-consciousness, any form of extension, shape, or effect is present (*W. a. W. u.* V.II. 7). However, in self-consciousness, we do not lose the feeling of our extension, i.e., our sphere of force.

This felt individuality touches the point of the present (the form of reason), because that, being given to each transition from present to present by reason, supplies content. We are aware of ourselves for only one moment. Our mind is engaged with something unfamiliar, and yet it is accompanied by our feeling,

which neither fully nor faintly fills the moments with thoughts, imagination, or contemplation of external objects, which are entirely dependent on existence, i.e., everything flows continuously, carried along by the constantly surging and boiling torrent of our feelings.

At the point of the present, we grasp ourselves unerringly, just as we are. Which part of our being is at work when the point of the present conceals itself from us? But time itself stamps our inner world as a mere appearance, just as Kant explicitly teaches:

As for inner intuition, we recognize our own subject only as appearance, not as it is in itself.

(Kk. 155.)

Schopenhauer confirms this:

Inner perception does not by any means provide an exhaustive and adequate knowledge of the thing-in-itself. However, inner knowledge is free from two forms that adhere to external things, namely space and the form of causality, which mediates all sensory perception. However, time still remains, as does the fact of becoming known and knowledge itself.

(W. a. W. u. V.II. 220.)

I do not recognize my will as a whole, not as a unity, not entirely according to its essence, but I recognize it only in its individual acts, thus in time.

(ib. I. 121.)

Apart from the fact that from this standpoint the essence of the world could never be inferred and philosophers would do nothing more than engage in Sisyphean labor — (for what good does it do me that inner knowledge is free from two forms? The remaining one is precisely sufficient to entirely conceal the thing-in-itself) — as I have demonstrated, it is absolutely false to attribute to time the power to bring about any change in the nature of appearances. We have it rather only for the purpose of recognizing the thing-in-itself according to its essence; it has no influence whatsoever on the essence itself. Therefore, I must take up the completely *positive* standpoint here that we can fully and unambiguously recognize the thing-in-itself from within. It is the *will to live*. I simply want life — here the innermost core of my essence is brought to light: my will is here a whole, a unity. Because I want life, I exist at all. To recognize this, I do not need time. I simply will. Life is present in every moment, and my entire life is only the sum of these points.

But on the other hand, if I want to recognize life in a certain way, I need time; for only in the general flow of things can I reveal how I live life. Without the

development or unfolding of my essence, this would be impossible; time not only brings about the development, but also makes it comprehensible, and reason shows me, through time, the individual coloring of my will overall.

Of course, on the one hand, I consider the complex, marvelous apparatus needed to recognize this, and on the other hand, the most important thing for me to recognize: the core of my essence (we do not recognize ourselves in self-consciousness, but we feel directly, although objectively grasped by reflective reason), so it seems obvious to me that such conspicuously artificial means stand in a right relationship to such meager results. Will to live! Desire to exist! An insatiable, burning thirst for life, an unquenchable hunger for life! And what does life bring?

It has nothing to show but the satisfaction of hunger, sexual desire, and perhaps a little momentary pleasure, as is the case with every animal, between its endless need and struggle, then occasionally a share of pleasure.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.II. 404.)

How miserable! And since our essence is something so terribly wretched, one cannot believe that it has truly revealed itself fully and believes that there must be something behind it that knowledge must discover with great effort. In truth, it lies entirely in its naked simplicity before us. It is, as Heraclitus said of the corpse, as contemptible as dung.

However, if we consider the terrible intensity with which the will to live, the devouring, burning passion, with which it demands only one thing: to exist, to live, then we recognize, as fitting to our cognitive powers, that the will is there; for without the comprehensive and intellectual gaze over all real relationships, this intense drive would never take on any other direction than what ethics imposes.

The denied real development thus emerged right at the beginning of Schopenhauer's physics (*World as Will*) as an abscess. Let us now see how this denied individuality took its revenge.

It is not my intention to treat Schopenhauer's philosophical system in too much detail. I must limit myself to pointing out the errors and briefly indicating the merits. The detailed elaboration of Schopenhauer's brilliant thoughts must be sought in his works, which anyone who counts themselves among the educated should know thoroughly, as they are the most important in the entire literature of the world since the appearance of *The Critique of Pure Reason*.

After Schopenhauer had found the will to live as the core of our essence, which had entered into the forms of the knowing subject, presenting itself as the body, he rightfully applied this discovery to everything in nature.

For what other kind of existence or reality should we attribute to the rest of the material world? And where do we get the elements from which we compose such a world? Apart from will and representation, we know nothing about it. When we attribute reality to the material world, which immediately stands only in our representation, the greatest and best-known reality, then we give it the reality that each person experiences their own body as the most real. But if we now analyze the reality of this body and its actions, we also find that our representation contains nothing in it but the will: with that, reality is itself exhausted.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 125.)

But in order to elaborate on this, the nature of the will had to undergo a more detailed investigation, as it does not express itself in the same way everywhere. Thus, Schopenhauer found that the will is a blind, unconscious drive, which does not belong essentially to knowledge and consciousness. He then separated the will from knowledge entirely and made the will dominate knowledge, while knowledge was its tool.

Independent of knowledge, this was a second brilliant insight.

The foundation of my doctrine, which sets it in opposition to all that has been said before, is the complete separation of the will from knowledge, which all previous philosophers considered inseparable, indeed, saw the will as determined by knowledge, as the fundamental substance of our spiritual essence, and mostly regarded it as a mere function of the same.

(*W. i. d. N.* 19.)

However, he was on a misguided path, for he had not grasped the essence of animal knowledge deeply enough, as I will show shortly.

So, it is written in the same work, page 3:

Knowledge and its substrate, the intellect, are something entirely different from the will, merely secondary, only a phenomenon accompanying the higher stages of the objectification of the will.

And (*W. u. W. u.* V.II. 531.).

Knowledge is originally foreign to the will, an added principle.

But even here, truth was stronger than the philosopher struggling with it. He had to admit, though with some circumlocution:

In the nervous system, the will objectifies itself only indirectly and secondarily.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.II. 289.)

Then directly:

So, the will to know, viewed objectively, is the brain; as the will to walk is the foot, the will to digest is the stomach, the will to grasp is the hand, to show the genitals, and so on.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.II. 293.)

In itself and outside of representation, the brain is also will, like everything else.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.II. 309.)

A fatal contradiction! For from the first point of view, which is completely revoked in these last passages, Schopenhauer's aesthetics are partly constructed. In this contradiction, he has inflicted a nearly fatal wound upon his system.

The true state of affairs, as I have shown in my philosophy, is briefly the following: Movement (inner movement, drive, development) is essential to the will to live. It reveals itself as activity. A motionless will is a *contradictio in adjecto*. Life and movement are identical and mutually defining concepts. In the inorganic realm, the movement of the individual is whole and undivided, because the will is unified. In the organic realm, however, movement is a result, since the will has split and separated organs from itself. In animals, this split has developed such that one part of the divided movement has split again into something moved and something moving, into irritability and sensitivity, which, when combined with the undivided part of the movement, make up the entire movement as it manifests in the unified inorganic realm. One part of sensitivity, that is, a phenomenon of movement, is the *spirit*. Depending on whether a greater or lesser part of the movement has been divided into something moved and something moving, or whatever that may be, depending on whether a smaller or larger part of the movement has remained as a whole, the animal has a greater or lesser intellect.

The human spirit, like the intellect of the smallest animal, is nothing more than a part of the essential movement of the will. It is its guide, first directed outward. Here I attach the explanation of instinct, which is nothing other than the undivided part of the whole movement.

It is the same everywhere, whether I say: the stone presses against its base, the iron combines with oxygen, the plant grows and breathes carbon dioxide, the animal captures prey, the human thinks, or, simply put: the individual will is alive or moves. All individual life is individual movement of the will.

From this, it becomes clear that the intellect belonging to the will (a part of its movement) can never enter into an *antagonistic* relationship or gain power over it. Everywhere in nature, we are dealing with a single principle, to the individual will, to whose nature, at a certain stage, the intellect belongs.

Schopenhauer grasped the intellect just as little at the root as he did reason. Since he ascribed to it the function of forming concepts, etc., he thereby made the intellect into something added to the will, into something completely different from the will, when in general he should have said that nature always continues what is already existing and cannot let something arise from nothing. The intellect already lay in the motion of the fiery nebula of Kant-Laplace's theory.

Two other errors are closely connected with this mistake of Schopenhauer. The first is the restriction of life to organisms, a procedure that is as incomprehensible as basing life on the will to live for everything that exists. In doing this, he undermined his own good expression. He says:

Only the organic deserves the predicate "life."
(*W. a. W. u.* V.II. 336.)

Living and organic are interchangeable concepts.
(*W. i. d. N.* 77.)

To which I protest with all determination. Everything that exists, without exception, has power, power is will, and will lives.

The second error is the complete degradation of feeling, which, like matter, wanders unsteadily and fleetingly through his system. He says, in a general discussion of feeling,

that the actual opposite of knowledge is feeling.
(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 61.)

Reason includes under the concept of feeling every modification of consciousness that does not immediately belong to its mode of representation, i.e., is not an abstract concept.
(*ib.* 62.)

This explanation leaves feeling floating between heaven and earth.

Once he was on this slippery path, he immediately attached himself to it, as feeling commands an underground existence, namely in its highest intensification as the feeling of pleasure and pain, being arbitrarily related to the will.

Directly given to me is the body only in muscular action and in pain or pleasure, both of which initially and directly belong to the will.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.II. 307.)

This is fundamentally wrong. Feeling relies solely and exclusively on the nervous system, indirectly on the will. If we were to allow the will to directly inhere in plants and chemical forces, we would also have to attribute sensation to them. In nature, it first appeared when the will altered its movement, or in other words, when the first animal emerged. Feeling belongs to the entourage of the driver. The larger the part of the movement that, viewed objectively, has separated from the will as a nervous mass, the greater the susceptibility to pleasure and displeasure, pain and sensuality. In the most brilliant individual, it reaches its peak. No nerves, no feeling.

Schopenhauer had to obscure this so clear fact, because he detached the intellect from the will and allowed it to become something entirely different. The spirit, having emerged from the will, stands in a triple relationship to the will in humans. First, it directs its movement outward, then it lets its actions be accompanied by pleasure and displeasure, pain and sensuality, and finally, it enables a look into itself. These latter relationships are of the utmost importance. Metaphorically expressed, will and spirit are a blind horse grown out of it, with a rider grown out of the horse. Both are one and have only one interest: the best movement. Nevertheless, no difference in opinion can arise between them. The rider, whose own strength depends entirely on the horse and is entirely dependent on it, says to the horse: "This way leads nowhere, but I believe it leads there." The horse is incapable of making a movement of its own, it relies entirely on the rider's decision, which alone steers it and directs it toward the chosen path. If the rider were merely a guide, his influence would be zero. But he is more; he is a giver of pain and pleasure for the will. In doing so, he becomes more and more of an adviser, whose voice must not go unheard without consequences. Due to this peculiar relationship, there are people whose will always agrees with reason. From this rare phenomenon, it has been falsely concluded that reason can directly determine the will, even compel it, which is never the case. The will always decides by itself, though through experience it may come to the point where, despite its violent desires, it always follows its adviser. Thus, nature, which never lies, honestly responds when questioned.

After this digression, let us return to our main topic. Schopenhauer applies the will found in our inner being, but not necessarily connected to the mind, to all phenomena in nature. He was entirely justified in this approach, but its execution partly failed him because he started from physics (in the narrower sense), instead of from chemistry.

If we consider the inorganic realm entirely impartially, we see that it consists of nothing but simple chemical forces, or, objectively, from simple substances. These fundamental substances and their connections, according to my philosophy, form individuals, i.e., every substance as well as every connection of basic substances has its own peculiar properties, a specific individuality, which distinguishes it from all others. It maintains this individuality as long as it can. The individuality lies first in the entire substance or in the whole compound, attached, for example, to all sulfur, all carbon dioxide, and to every particular manifestation, as the slightest properties of one share the properties of the whole.

The physical forces belong to the essence of these individuals and have no independence. We perceive in bodies only weight, rigidity, fluidity, cohesion, elasticity, expansion, magnetism, electricity, heat, etc., which appear as chemical substances and connections. Schopenhauer constantly confuses these physical forces with the concept of substance, making matter a pot in which the physical forces reside, upon which they depend for possession. Such an incorrect view of inorganic nature is therefore impossible. Whoever deals with matter in this way must necessarily end up making mistakes. Chemistry creates its compounds differently, for example, in aesthetics than they are handled in other scientific realms.

The physical forces, according to Schopenhauer, are the lowest objectifications of the will to live.

Plants, animals, and humans, as higher stages, follow them. However, plants and animals are not independent objectifications of the will, but mere appearances: pure objectification is only the species. Higher animals, on the other hand, already show individual character, and the human being is almost "an act of objectification of the will." (*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 188.) I will return to all of this, which I in no way accept.

The question we must now concern ourselves with above all is: What are these objectifications of the will?

Schopenhauer says:

I understand objectification to mean the presentation of itself in the real physical world. In the meantime, this is entirely conditioned by the knowing subject, that is, by the intellect, and thus, outside of its knowledge, absolutely unthinkable.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.II. 277.)

I only refer to what has already been discussed. Not only is, according to Schopenhauer, the plurality of individuals an illusion, but the species as well, in short, every pure objectification. Schopenhauer thus pushes objectification back into something real between the countless individuals and the point of one thing in itself, because it would indeed be too absurd if the optical lens did not have room for the real individuals of a species, but also to produce the species themselves, from their own means. However, he is not serious about the reality of objectification, and it is meant only as a *momentary reassurance* to the attentive reader. In fact, space also creates the objectification of the will. If Schopenhauer had been consistent, he would have had to add an auxiliary lens to space, whose sole task would have been to multiply the objectification created by space into countless individuals. But where do we get such entities from, and what should we call them? There lay the difficulty.

So, we are dealing with *one undivided will*, with a single point that space first stretches into objectifications in a miraculous, utterly inexplicable, mysterious way. Then, space again pulls these objectifications apart in the same wonderful, inexplicable, mysterious way, into countless individuals. The cited passage already shows that the subject produces the individuals and the objectifications from itself. This becomes even clearer from the following:

No less than the gradations of its objectification touch it (the will) directly, the multitude of appearances at these various stages, i.e., the quantity of individuals of every form, or the individual expressions of every force, is conditioned directly by time and space, into which it never enters.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 152.)

How strange: "no less!" Where does this "more or less" come from? Who produces it? Should this mean that objectification is free from space, time, and matter, but not free from the form of objectification for a subject? Yes, is that supposed to be clearly expressed? But this is the point where Schopenhauer's aesthetics become entirely untenable, and it is precisely here that Schopenhauer's idealism falters.

Let us, however, set aside all of this for a moment and focus on the other explanation of objectification: that it is a *will-act of the thing-in-itself*. Perhaps we can gain something from this, despite everything, a more favorable perspective. That such a will-act is by no means comparable to a human will-act is clear. The

one will wanted to be an oak, and the oak was there; it wanted to be a lion, and the lion was there. It is, of course, only a matter of the essence of the oak and the lion, not of things as the subject sees them, of objects. Very well! They were there. But what lived in them? Had the will always given away part of its essence as it produced objectifications, and is the last objectification the rest of its strength, so that it is fully and entirely combined in all objectifications? No, Schopenhauer says, certainly not.

Is not perhaps a smaller part of it in the stone, a larger part in humans?
(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 152.)

The will to live is present in every being, even the smallest, entirely and undivided, as fully as in all beings that have been, are, and will be, taken together.

(*Parerga* II. 236.)

This is incomprehensible and contradicts our laws of thinking.
Schopenhauer also calls this subject a *completely transcendent* matter (*W. a. W. u.* V. II. 371), after he had said on page 368:

The unity of the will, which lies beyond appearances, is a metaphysical matter, and therefore its knowledge is transcendent, i.e., not based on the functions of our intellect and thus cannot actually be grasped by it.

This is the third main point we would like to emphasize here.

But Schopenhauer did not even remain with the view that there is one will in the world. He says:

Metaphysics goes beyond appearance, i.e., beyond nature, to what is hidden in or behind it.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.II. 203.)

The metaphysical, that which lies behind nature, contains and maintains its existence and essence; hence, it dominates it.

(*W. i. d. N.* 105.)

And indeed, Schopenhauer is a transcendent philosopher, a pure metaphysician. While he often refers to his philosophy with great ostentation as *immanent*, in a remarkable fourth point, he admits that he himself is not convinced of this:

My philosophy remains grounded in the factual, in outer and inner experience, as it is accessible to everyone. It stands and demonstrates the true and deepest connections of the same, without, however, going beyond

them to transcendental things and their relationships to the world.
(*W. a. W. u.* V.II. 733.)

The truth is, as we increasingly and more clearly see, that he actually always sails the boundless ocean and takes "banks of fog and soon melting ice" (as Kant says) for new lands.

So, the will is a unity living *behind* the world, giving it existence and stability, a unity that I am supposed to believe in after I have so clearly recognized the individual will within me. No! Never! If we are to believe at all, then every sensible person believes in the simpler and more honorable view. Simpler and more honorable than Schopenhauer's worldview is, without question, the Judeo-Christian theism, which is consistent within itself and certainly not absurd. Schopenhauer demands the impossible. I am supposed to first believe that the objectifications of a single will are without extension and movement, second, that a single will underlies them, and third, that this single will does not directly impact them but lies behind the world. A transcendent unity may adorn a religion, but a philosophical system is thus desecrated.

Thus, the denied individuality took revenge for the first time in the domain of the will. We will still make even more devastating blows.

How does it stand with a unity in the world? No better! Nature, which never lies, shows everywhere only individual, developing forces, which the ideality of space and time, as I have shown, in no way reduces to mere appearances. In self-consciousness, the force reveals itself as individual will. Only with evident violence can these individual wills be fused into one indivisible, hidden, transcendent will. Pantheism is untenable. Only materialism has seemingly condensed the world into a simple unity. However, I have proven that it has no foundation, and thus, it cannot hold for long.

I taught an original unity; however, it is irretrievably lost. In a shattered transcendent realm, true immanent philosophy must posit a pure, simple, resting, free unity. Our thinking can neither comprehend nor grasp its rest or freedom. We can only lightly touch this unity and must, in the immanent realm, begin with a totality of individual, necessarily developing wills.

The individual will is a fact of inner consciousness, which is confirmed at all times by the consciousness of other things. At the same time, experience repeatedly teaches the dynamic connection of all individual wills. This finds its complete explanation in the pre-worldly unity. This unity further sufficiently explains the purposeful nature of the entire universe and frees us from the seductive, flattering, and baseless teleology: the grave of honest natural

research. The danger of assuming a worldview gifted with the highest wisdom is clear, which is why Kant ruthlessly combated teleology and eradicated it from all insights. The purposiveness of every organism further rests on the unity of the appearing individual wills, as Schopenhauer has excellently demonstrated. A judgment of the world based on final causes (*causae finales*) is legitimate only insofar as certain effects (*causae efficientes*) lead to a particular direction, like a point where they will converge in the future. However, great caution is needed in determining such points because the door is wide open to error. The first movement of pre-worldly unity, its dissolution into multiplicity, has determined all subsequent movements, for every movement is merely the modified continuation of a previous one.

A second, subordinate unity yet to be established, which is as untenable and unfounded as a current simple unity in, over, or behind the world, is the *species*. It is high time that this concept stops causing mischief in science and is ruthlessly expelled. Schopenhauer, as a pure metaphysician, had to admit how natural forces and "ghostly universal presence" overwhelmed him, and we are ready to welcome him heartily with open arms and want to see how he transformed it.

But above all, let us recognize that the objectification does not affect the single will; otherwise, any investigation would be excluded from the outset. Let us think of a real objectification. It is a will-act of the single will that has entered reality as the will to live. The real objectification has no form; it can at most be conceived, but not seen, for space does not give it form but tears it apart into many individuals, to whom a form is granted. How does it come about that I see a single lion standing before me, for example, as simply? Only the gods know! In fact, all living lions are fundamentally *one lion*. Where is this *one lion* now? How does it hold itself? According to Schopenhauer, it is contained in each individual lion entirely; but then, again, that is not the case: it is behind all the lions, with not a word, it is everywhere and nowhere, so that the matter is simply transcendent, completely incomprehensible to human thought.

Let us assume, however, that it can somehow be grasped by thinking, and we immediately find ourselves in a new incomprehensibility; for the objectification has no *development*. It reigns in solitary stillness, motionless, unchangeable, above the emerging and perishing individuals. It is, as Schopenhauer says, like the rainbow over the waterfall. This, too, is transcendent, for nature shows in the organic realm nothing but constantly developing organisms.

In short, no matter how we turn and twist the objectification, we cannot grasp its essence, just as little as we can grasp a *single will*. Everyone will realize

that the most eager attempt to understand objectification must fail, because Schopenhauer's philosophy is based on *a priori* intuitions, space and time, which do not allow the thing-in-itself to have motion and extension. Space and time in Kantian terms, an indivisible will, objectifications without form and development — all these principles are errors that follow one another, forming a swamp of misconceptions.

This entirely and absolutely transcendent objectification also corresponds to the concept of *species* in Schopenhauer. He speaks of the life of a species, of the infinite duration of the species, in contrast to the perishability of the individual being, from the servant relationship in which the individual stands to the species, to the species' force, and so on. He says:

It is not the individual, but the species alone that nature is concerned with.
(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 325.)

We find that nature, from the stage of organic life onwards, has only one intention: the preservation of all species.
(*ib.* II. 401.)

The species being discussed here is likewise transcendent, like the identical objectification of the one will in the organic realm. What applies to this also from her, and I could therefore drop the topic, only to pick it up again in ethics, where the species appears in a special light. However, the concept of species has, compared to the concept of objectification of merit, the advantage that it is known to everyone and everyone has always thought of something much simpler under it. This simple concept must have also struck Schopenhauer, and thus, against his will, he honors the truth, in the following two passages and in the conclusion of the third:

The peoples are actually (!) mere abstractions, only individuals really exist.
(*W. a. W. u.* V.II. 676.)

The peoples exist only *in abstracto*: the individuals are the real.
(*Parerga* I. 219.)

Thus, the essence of every living being lies first in its species; however, its existence again only in the individuals.
(*W. a. W. u.* V.II. 582.)

The last passage, in its entirety, is downright pathetic and desecrates the spirit of Schopenhauer. How violently, in it, existence is separated from essence. It is also a typical example of how Schopenhauer was slightly misunderstood regarding what he must have meant. — The truth is that the species is nothing

more than an ordinary concept that groups together much similar or related reality. Just as all needles are grouped under the concept of a pin, so all tigers fall under the concept of tiger. To speak of species in another sense is entirely wrong.

If all tigers stopped existing today, the species "tiger" would also cease, and the very rare remaining term (like the bird Dodo) could only be illustrated by real observation. The individual being has its existence and its essence only as a metaphysical loan from the species. There are only individuals in the world, and every mosquito in a swarm has full and whole reality.

I propose that in science we no longer speak of the life of a species, of the infinity of the species, etc., but that we refer only to the species as a concept, without ascribing any real background to it.

All these errors are closely related to Schopenhauer's false assertion: all causes are occasional causes. We recall how violently, in his theory of knowledge, he had to force the cause between force and effect, because appearances, as such, have no reality. This foundational error now extends into the world as will.

Malebranche had taught that God is the only active force in things, so that physical causes are merely apparent, *causes occasionnelles*. Schopenhauer taught the same, only he replaced God with the one indivisible will. Naturally, he had to highlight the remarkable agreement and in *W. a. W. u.* V.I. 163/164, he could not find enough words of praise for Malebranche.

Yes, I must admire how Malebranche, entirely caught up in positive dogmas, which his era irresistibly imposed on him, nevertheless, in such chains, under such a burden, was still so fortunate to hit the truth correctly, and knew how to unite it with those dogmas, at least with the language of the same.

However, Malebranche was right: every natural cause only gives occasion, the reason for the *appearance* of that one indivisible will.

This appearance of the one will vividly reminds one of the appearance of Jehovah on Mount Sinai and in the burning bush.

And now, let us read the truly hair-raising example *W. a. W. u.* V.I. 160/161. One thinks they are dreaming. The simple effects, which arise from the nature of iron, copper, zinc, oxygen, etc., these inorganic individuals of a very specific character, flow in and are, with changing conditions, transformed into the

appearances of gravity, impenetrability, galvanism, chemistry, etc., which all forces lying behind the world are supposed to alternately seize upon the one matter, as violently as possible.

As we have seen above, Schopenhauer divided the causes into: causes in the strictest sense, stimuli, and motives. They are all efficient causes, but as such only occasional causes. Alongside these, there are final causes, which, although he rejects teleology like Kant, he nevertheless explains

as motives that act on a being, even if they are not recognized by that being.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.II. 379.)

The efficient cause (*causa efficiens*) is that by which something is, the final cause (*causa finalis*) is that for which it is.

(*ib.* 378.)

In fact, we cannot clearly conceive of a final cause otherwise than as an intended purpose, i.e., a motive.

(379.)

I protest against this. Only humans can act based on final causes, which Kant so nicely called ideal causes, and these are essentially only efficient causes once again. In short, in the world, there are only efficient causes. Every movement is only a consequence of a preceding movement, and all movements are thus traced back to an initial movement, which we cannot comprehend (the dissolution of unity into individuals, the first impulse). As a regulative principle, as Kant so excellently said, teleology is of great use; but one must use this principle with the utmost caution.

There are – I repeat – only efficient causes in the world, and indeed, things act directly on things-in-themselves.

I will only allow the concept of occasional cause to apply to what is commonly called an innocent cause in everyday life.

I also have to criticize that Schopenhauer did not differentiate between the qualities of will (character traits, character features) and the states of will. Like Spinoza (*Ethics* pars III), he mixed everything together indiscriminately. Anger, fear, hatred, love, sorrow, joy, Schadenfreude, etc., stand next to cruelty, envy, hardness, injustice, etc.

This sin of omission had bad consequences, which particularly stood out in aesthetics, in the treatment of music; for music is based solely on the states of the human will.

Schopenhauer's division of nature is, as I have shown, thoroughly flawed because he could not attribute reality to appearances. The appearances are extended, arise, decay, move themselves, act upon one another, just as daily observation teaches – but they are only the product of the subject, by its own means, with the help of his two magical lenses: space and time. Behind the appearances sits, in eternal rest, the one indivisible will, which is a motionless point, but which, in a completely incomprehensible way, manifests itself as acting in the world!

How these self-forged chains must have oppressed and constrained the great man. No wonder his spirit had to shake them off to breathe freely. But what a sight does Schopenhauer offer us then! The ideality of space and time is forgotten, forgotten is that the individual and the objectification of the one will do not meet, forgotten is that their causes are occasional causes, forgotten is the critique of pure reason and the world as representation: he simply takes the appearances as things in themselves, extended in real space and in real time.

The most striking result of this procedure is found in the sections: *On Philosophy and the Science of Nature (Parerga II. 109-189)* and *Comparative Anatomy (Will in Nature)*. In the first section, Schopenhauer begins with the luminous primordial nebula of Laplace's cosmogony and ends with the present-day world. It is explained in detail how the will to life "gradually," "little by little," "with appropriate pauses" objectifies itself, one stage after the other, until man finally closed the great chain of mighty revolutions and stepped onto the stage. Here and there it stirs the conscience, and it is remarked in passing that, fundamentally speaking, the whole performance was in vain, for there was no conscious subject present to perceive the processes, — yet the truth prevails, and the idealistic philosopher must concede:

that all the described physical, cosmogonic, chemical, and geological processes, since they were necessary as conditions, had to take place long before the emergence of consciousness, and they exist even before this emergence, therefore outside of any consciousness.

(Page 150.)

But how eloquent is this struggle of Kantian idealism with real development. How pitifully the great man twists and turns in an attempt to reconcile real development, which he must acknowledge, with the ideal time to

which he rightly clings. But it doesn't work because he believed that time is a pure, infinite intuition *a priori*.

The other section is even more interesting because Schopenhauer attacks Lamarck's great theory of descent, from which Darwinism is known to have originated.

Of course, it finds no favor in his eyes. He condescendingly mocks Lamarck's assumption that species gradually, over time and through successive generations, came into being and attributes the "ingenious, absurd error" to the remaining metaphysical state of philosophy in France.

Thus, Lamarck could not think of a structure of beings other than in time, through succession.

(Page 42.)

One would also be wrong here to believe that Schopenhauer remained steadfast in his opinion. We have already seen above that he had to acknowledge real development. On page 163 of the relevant section, he now seriously engages with the emergence of species through real succession.

Their emergence (namely, of the higher animal species) can only be conceived as *generatio in utero heterogeneo*, that is, so that from the uterus, or rather from the egg, of a particularly favored animal pair, after its somewhat inhibited life force of its species had accumulated and abnormally increased in it, now at a single, fortunate hour, at the right position of the planets and the convergence of all favorable atmospheric, telluric, and astral influences, exceptionally no longer one of its kind emerged, but rather a form that was closely related to it, yet stood one step higher; so that this pair, this time, produced not just an individual, but a species.

The most contradictory views lie, like lambs on the pasture, peacefully side by side in Schopenhauer's works: often separated only by a space of a few pages.

The real movement denied in the theory of knowledge and the rejected individuality appeared, like offended spirits from which our fairy tales tell, in Schopenhauer's *World as Will*, and turned the ingenious, immortal conception that everything that has life is will, in its execution into a caricature and a grimace. In vain, Schopenhauer tried to invoke the spirits: the magic word, that space is a point, that time is *a posteriori* a connection of reason, was denied him.

And those offended spirits continued to work to poison his aesthetics and his ethics.

Aesthetics.

A fixed hypothesis gives the lynx's eyes assurance for everything that affirms it and makes one blind to everything that contradicts it.

— **Schopenhauer.**

Schopenhauer's aesthetics is based on:

- 1) The transcendent objectifications of the will to life,
 - 2) The intellect completely separated from the will (the pure, will-less subject of knowledge),
 - 3) The division of nature into physical forces and species, and it is already clear from this that it is flawed. We will see, however, that he very often forgets this foundation and places himself on real ground, where he then mostly recognizes the truth. Beyond all praise, profoundly moving for every friend of nature and art, are his depictions of aesthetic joy, which loudly proclaim that he has fully and completely experienced the overwhelming power of beauty and has often had this experience himself, as a highly gifted spirit.
-

The objectifications of the one will to life known to us, we call Schopenhauer's ideas in aesthetics, and these are supposed to be Plato's ideas, which we will examine later. Already in *The World as Will*, it says:

The levels of objectification of the will are nothing other than Plato's ideas.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 154.)

Through the critique of objectifications, I could now hold myself superior by ideas; but I will not neglect this, since Schopenhauer himself in aesthetics feels compelled to introduce the nature of objectification as seriously as he does in physics. He says:

The Platonic idea is necessarily an object, a known thing, a representation, and thereby, but only thereby, distinct from the thing-in-itself. It merely has the subordinate forms of appearances, which we grasp under the principle of sufficient reason, or it has not yet entered into them; but the first and most general form has been retained by it, which representation, in general, has: the being-an-object for a subject. These subordinate forms (whose general expression is the principle of sufficient reason) are what

multiply the idea into individual and perishable individuals, whose pallor, in relation to the idea, is entirely indifferent.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 206.)

What is this first form of appearances, which representation, in general, has, the object-being-for-a-subject? Did Schopenhauer really have something in mind with this? Or do we only have a completely nonsensical phrase before us, a bold combination of mere words? So it is, in fact:

For where concepts are lacking,
A word appears at just the right time.
(Goethe.)

There are real things-in-themselves; they become objects when they have gone through the forms of a subject. This reflection in a subject is their being-an-object for a subject: separating object-being from the subjective forms of space, time, and matter is simply not possible. If I attempt it in thought, I reach no other result than that I, as an individual, am *not identical* with the objects, or in other words, I simply recognize that there are independent things-in-themselves.

Being-an-object for a subject means nothing other than having entered into the forms of a subject, and an object-being without the subordinate forms of appearances for a subject is nonsensical. *Q. e. D.*

Now, let us hear how Schopenhauer demonstrates object-being for a subject with examples illustrated.

When the clouds move, the shapes they form are not essential to them, they are indifferent to them: but that they are elastic vapor, compressed by the blow of the wind, driven away, expanded, torn apart: this is their nature, it is the essence of the forces that objectify themselves in them, it is the idea: only for the individual observers are the respective figures important.

The stream, which flows downward over stones, the whirlpools, waves, foam formations that you see are indifferent and inessential: that it follows gravity, behaves as unelastic, completely displaceable, shapeless, transparent fluid, this is its essence.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 214.)

The examples are well-chosen in that the essence of vapors and liquids does not belong to any specific form. But do they prove anything about the questionable object-being-for-a-subject? Absolutely not. I cannot perceive the elastic vapor or the transparent fluid at all unless they have entered into the forms of the subject, that is, unless they are extended and material in some way.

Through the meager awareness of the artist that it is neither the cloud nor the stream, he recognizes only the nature of the water and the vapor. He always recognizes it in forms and gives it back in forms.

I generally ask every thinking person whether a thing can be conceivable for him differently, as an object, that is, as spatial and material, and I ask in particular every landscape painter whether, when depicting an oak, for example, he really proceeds from the wonderful input of a shapeless and immaterial essence of the idea of the oak, or whether he merely intends to reproduce the perceivable form and color of the trunk, the leaves, the branches in some way? No one has ever grasped the inner essence of the difference between one beech tree and another oak; this difference only shows itself in the exterior, also in space and matter, and is the source of the artist's imagination.

The first and most general form of representation, that of object-being-for-a-subject, is thus, once again, nothing but the entering into the forms of the subject, which, again, means that there is no separation or independence between the two.

Schopenhauer also could not remain with the unfounded assertion. The aforementioned example of the stream ends with the words:

this is its essence, this is, when intuitively recognized, the idea,
to which I connect the following passages:

The knowledge of the idea is necessarily intuitive, not abstract.
(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 219.)

The idea of man is fully expressed in the intuitively perceived form.
(*ib.* 260.)

The ideas are essentially something intuitive.
(*ib.* II. 464.)

The Platonic ideas can at most be described as normal intuitions, which are valid not only, like mathematical ones, for the formal, but also for the material of the complete representations, that is, complete representations.
(4 *fache W.* 127.)

And the extraordinarily characteristic passage:

The idea is the focal point of all these relations and thereby the complete and perfect appearance ... Even form and color, which in the intuitive perception of the idea are the immediate, do not fundamentally (!) belong

to it, but are only the medium of its expression; since, strictly speaking (!) space is as foreign to it as time.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.II. 415.)

I have nothing to add to this!

Now, let us accompany Schopenhauer on other, equally strange detours.

The multiplicity of individuals is conceivable only through time and space, the emergence and decay through causality alone, in which forms we can only imagine the different manifestations of the principle of sufficient reason, which recognizes the last principle of all finitude, all individuation, and the general form of representation, as it appears in the knowledge of the individual as such, does not apply to the idea. The idea does not enter into this principle: therefore, neither multiplicity nor change pertains to it.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 199.)

How subtly he reduces only multiplicity and change to time and space and leaves form out of the equation. Further:

The pure subject of knowledge and its correlate, the idea, have stepped out of all those forms of the principle of sufficient reason: time, place, the individual who knows, and the individual that is known, have no significance for them.

(*ib.* 211.)

Place, how fine! There is no discussion of form. It makes no difference whether I see the same Chinese person in Hong Kong, Paris, or London, but I cannot perceive the immaterial, formless idea of a Chinese person in Hong Kong, nor anywhere in the world.

The perception of an idea requires that, when observing an object, I must really abstract from its location in space and time and, thereby, from its individuality.

(*Parerga* II. 449.)

In the first part of this sentence, Schopenhauer is clearly playing with space and time. The idea, as something external, must be spatial; the idea, as its innermost essence, insofar as it is accessible, can only reveal itself through succession. This is the fundamental distinction between the visual arts and music and poetry. He clings to the location in space and time, where, however, only form and real succession can be discussed. The second part of the statement,

however, is entirely false and absurd. The individuality that we have learned through something completely real, to which our knowledge is tied only through subjective forms, should then depend on location in space and time. Incomprehensible logic!

Let us proceed!

Not only is the idea removed from time, but also from space: for not the spatial *form* that appears to me, but rather the expression, the pure significance, its innermost essence, which it reveals to me and appeals to me, is actually (!) the idea and can be entirely the same with great differences in the spatial relations of the form.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 247.)

In this sentence, a confused thought is reflected. The external aspect of the idea must be separated from its internal aspect, as I already said. The individual will, the idea, enters the forms of understanding, space, and matter, and becomes an object. Take a human being, for example: now there is an object of specific form, specific skin, hair, and eye color before me – in a word: I have its external aspect. Into this external aspect, the inner essence of the human being seems to manifest itself in a particular way. It reveals itself in the form. The form is not a distinct foundation from the one that determines it. Let us imagine two people of the same benevolent disposition, it is then irrelevant whether the "spatial relations" of one are larger or smaller, whether one has a full-moon face, and the other has a pure Greek face. The features of both will be *benevolent*, and in the eyes of both, the gentle light of friendly kindness will shine. But can I then separate their bodies and contemplate only their benevolence and kindness? Always it is the eyes, shining, always the features that express this benevolence.

From this external aspect and the appearance of the inner, the pure inner has now totally disappeared. There is only a sinking of the human being into the inner, namely, into their own inner. If the human being dives deeply into this, we know, the understanding is suspended. Speaking of an object for a subject can no longer be the case. We have the innermost core of our being immediately in self-consciousness. Here, man directly grasps wickedness, baseness, nobility, courage, envy, mercy, etc., the qualities of will, and joy, sorrow, love, hate, peace, etc., the states of will. Poets and composers embark on this path to the inner self, and since the core of their being, like that of all other people, is will to life, they, supported by their objective observations in the world, have the ability to temporarily impart the individual quality of a character different from their own and to feel its states. Shakespeare's heart must have felt the dark joy of the living

villain's heart while writing *Richard III*, and he experienced all the sufferings of Desdemona as well.

And yet, the power of intuitive knowledge is so great that brilliant poets and composers, who thus deal with the formless innermost essence of the will, are always surrounded by forms and images. The true dramatic poet sees his hero, under some imaginative image, triumphantly rejoicing or collapsing under the weight of misfortunes, just as the composer sees groups of blessed or desperate people, innocent children, sunny and stormy landscape scenes in rarely interrupted succession, gliding on waves of sound.

The result of this investigation is that the ideas are as untenable as the objectifications. I have demonstrated the impossibility of a first form of representation, of object-being for a subject independent of the lower subjective forms, and shown that Schopenhauer himself finally had to admit that the idea is essentially something intuitive. Every intuition has entered into the subjective forms, is thus an object. The idea is also identical to the appearance of the individual will, and therefore Schopenhauer's *idea* and *object* are interchangeable terms.

Since the idea is something intuitive, it can therefore serve the poet only incidentally and not at all the composer; for both deal directly with the will. The idea is therefore not sufficient as a foundation for aesthetics in Schopenhauer. Nor can it be otherwise. I have also already spoken above about an external and internal aspect of the idea in relation to my philosophy; for with me, the idea is synonymous with the individual will. The idea, understood externally, is an object, grasped internally, it is individual will.

Before we leave the ideas, we want to briefly examine whether Schopenhauer rightly called them Platonic ideas.

The characteristic of the ideas in Plato is not natural originality; for even artifacts are ideas, and Plato speaks of the ideas of the chair, the table, etc. It is also not the intuitive quality, since Plato speaks of ideas of the good, of justice, etc. The ideas are thus primarily concepts. Next to them, however, are the *archetypes* of all beings, the imperishable, timeless *forms*, of which the real things of the world are only incomplete, transient copies. It is important to note here that Plato completely removes these ideas from real development. He removes them from space in part (multiplicity); form leaves them space.

Plato further explicitly states (*De Rep.* X) that the model of art is not the idea, but the individual thing.

What did Schopenhauer make of this doctrine? He complains about the latter explanation of Plato (*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 250) and about the concept (reason) of ideas.

Some of his examples of ideas and his discussions of them are only applicable to concepts (*ib.* 276).

He focuses only on the archetypes, which always remain and do not become or pass away. However, he leaves these forms as they are, without making any use of them. Plato did not remove them entirely from space. He spoke rather of multiplicity, as well as emergence and decay, and left them form. Schopenhauer said nothing:

In these two unifying determinations, it is necessarily implied that time, space, and causality have no significance or validity for them, and they are not included in them.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 202.)

This, in relation to space, is fundamentally wrong. It is clear: Schopenhauer has removed himself from Plato's realm of ideas, adapting them to suit himself, and has imposed a new meaning on them so that the Platonic ideas must no longer be called Platonic ideas, but rather Schopenhauerian.

The Platonic ideas are usually regarded as concepts, and Plato, in his two explanations, at least subsumed the multiplicity into a unity. This, however, is true only of concepts because each individual being has full and complete reality. Schopenhauer's statement:

The idea is the unity, which has fallen apart into multiplicity through the forms of time and space in our intuitive apprehension, whereas the concept is the unity restored from the multiplicity through the abstraction of our reason.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 277.)

is nothing more than a phrase that dazzles at first glance but is hollow and lacks substance.

Finally, I draw attention to another contradiction. In *W. a. W. u.* V.II. 414 it is written:

An idea so conceived is not yet the essence of the thing-in-itself because it is derived from the knowledge of mere relations; however, it

is the sum of all relations, the essential character of the thing, and thus the complete expression of the being, which is represented as an object through intuition.

Ten pages later, it states:

What we now see clearly is that the ideas of things, as spoken of here, represent a higher wisdom that knows only relations.

What confusion!

We now stand before the pure, will-less subject of knowledge.

The relationship in which Schopenhauer places the will in relation to the intellect is well-known to us. The intellect is something added to the will, entirely subservient to it, in order to sustain a "being with many needs."

The intellect is, from the outset, a sour wage laborer of a manufacturing workshop, which keeps the will busy from morning to night.

(*Parerga* II. 72.)

The objects of the world only have interest for the will insofar as they are related to its particular character.

Therefore, the knowledge that serves the will learns nothing more about objects than their relations, recognizes the objects only insofar as they are in this time, at this place, under these circumstances, from these causes, with these effects, in a word, as individual things.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 208.)

This knowledge is essentially deficient and superficial. If we extract from an object the aspect that can be advantageous or obstructive to our personal purposes, we let all other aspects of the same object fall away: they have no interest for us.

The knowledge in service to the will generally remains subordinate to that service, as it has emerged from it, having sprouted together with the will, just as the head is attached to the body. In animals, this subservience of knowledge is not even worth mentioning.

(*ib.* 209.)

On the other hand (I am still deeply in the thought process of Schopenhauer), among humans, such subservience is sometimes lifted when the ordinary

contemplation of individual things is abandoned, and the intellect turns to knowledge in its pure form regarding individual things, revealing themselves as ideas.

When one lifts things out of their relations in this way and gives over the entire power of one's mind to contemplation, immersing oneself completely, and allows consciousness to be entirely filled with the calm contemplation of the natural object immediately before oneself, whether it be a landscape, a rock, a building, or whatever else; when one loses oneself in this object and forgets one's individual self, forgets one's will, and remains only as the pure subject, the clear mirror of the object — then what is recognized is no longer the individual thing as such, but the idea, the eternal form, the immediate objectification of the will on this level. And consequently, no concepts are retained in this contemplation, because the individual has lost itself in this perception: rather, it becomes the pure, will-less, painless, timeless subject of knowledge.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 210.)

From this, it becomes clear that in aesthetic contemplation, the will is completely eliminated from consciousness, and the intellect has entirely freed itself from the will to lead an independent life. Schopenhauer expresses this relationship even more sharply in the following sentence:

The idea encloses both object and subject equally, as they are its only form: in it, both hold the same balance: just as the object here is nothing but the representation of the subject, so too is the subject, having fully dissolved into the contemplated object, itself become the object, as the object itself has become its clearest image.

(*ib.* 211.)

In a word, it is a mystical intellectual union.

From the standpoint of my philosophy, I must reject the described process and can only agree with the starting point that Kant chose:

Taste is the faculty of judgment of an object, and a representation through an interest in either its beauty or its defects — without any other interest.

(*Critique of Judgment* 52.)

The condition for the possibility of an aesthetic perception is that the will of the knowing subject stands in no interested relation to the object, i.e., it has absolutely no interest in it, neither desiring it nor fearing it. However, it is not necessary that the object has stepped out of its other relations. I hold

Schopenhauer's first explanation, which completely abolishes the second, to be incorrect, namely, that the idea, as the result of the sum of all relations, is the essential character of the thing. In its relations, the essence of a thing only clarifies itself. The character of a tiger, for example, is certainly expressed in its resting form, but only partially. I recognize it far more fully when I see the animal in its excitement, namely, in battle with other animals, in short, in its relations to other things.

Regarding will-less knowledge, I have the following to say. I remind you that the intellect, according to my philosophy, is nothing more than the function of an organ, thus a part of the essential movement of the will. The entire movement of a thing is its life, and life is the essential predicate of the will. Will and life are inseparable, even in thought. Where life is, there is will, and where will is, there is life. The movement of the will is therefore absolutely restless. It will forever direct existence in its individual way, but its straight path is diverted by the influence of other individuals, and the life path of a higher individuality is a line in zigzag. Every satisfied desire creates a new desire; if this cannot be satisfied, a new one immediately arises beside it, which, if satisfied, is followed by another. Thus, the individual rushes, in insatiable desire for existence, restlessly and ceaselessly, wavering between satisfaction and desire, always wanting, living, and moving.

Thus, while there is silence in life, there is still a great difference between these movements; not between the movement of one thing and another of the individual, but between the movements of one and the same individual. Even if no being can advance the general course of the world, it still fulfills the transition from the present to the next with varying intensities of the will. Soon it is passionately excited, soon tired, sleepy, sluggish.

In these latter states, the movement of the will towards the outside is almost zero, and only the inner spirit continues its steady course. Nevertheless, there is no happiness in such states; for the exhausted will is constantly occupied with its relationships to the external world, in short, it steps out of its relations to things that have an interest for it, but not entirely.

But, as if struck by lightning, the relationship changes and the most glorious peace, the purest joy, pervades the calmly flowing waves of the will when the subject, prompted by an inviting object, falls into aesthetic contemplation and immerses itself completely disinterestedly in the essence of the object.

It is the painless state that Epicurus praised as the highest good and as the state of the gods; for we are, for that moment, freed from the painful compulsion of the will, we celebrate the Sabbath of the penal labor of willing, the wheel of Ixion stands still.

As Schopenhauer so wonderfully says (*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 231): The will is not eliminated from consciousness; on the contrary, it is entirely fulfilled by the blissful state evoked by the object. The will does not rest either: it lives, thus it moves, but all external movement is inhibited, and the inner does not fall into consciousness. Thus, one believes the will is entirely at rest, and from this deception arises its inexpressibly blissful satisfaction; for it feels like the peace of the gods.

The intellect is freed and can finally want nothing for itself; it feels neither pleasure, nor displeasure, nor unease, but the will is only aware of its states. There is only one principle, and this one is the individual will. The will is just as much in aesthetic contemplation as in the highest wrath, in passionate desire. The difference lies solely in its states.

This happy state of the will in the aesthetic relation now has two stages.

The first is pure contemplation. The subject, which is no longer aware of its progress in time, looks at the object that is, as it were, elevated from the course of natural development. The object is, for the subject and the subject itself, through illusion, timeless. On the other hand, the subject becomes an object (as Schopenhauer teaches), nor is the object free from space and matter. Pure contemplation is most often evoked by nature. A glance into it, and if it only met fields, forests, and meadows, would immediately raise an individual with delicate nerves above the sultry atmosphere of ordinary life. A person of coarser nature will hardly forget their personal purposes by such a glance; but I dare to say: place the rudest and most desirous people on the cliffs of Sorrento, and aesthetic joy will come over them like a beautiful dream.

Secondly, aesthetic contemplation is evoked by works of architecture, sculpture, and painting, preferably by monumental buildings and by such paintings and plastic works, which, as a whole, can be quickly grasped and do not express violent excitement. If the figures of a painting or a plastic group are numerous or dramatically moving, the subject becomes aware of their synthesis and, as a result, becomes slightly restless, so that pure contemplation cannot last long. The Zeus of Otricoli, the Venus of Milo, the Danaid in the Braccio Nuovo of the Vatican, or a Raphael's holy family can be viewed for hours, not the Laocoön.

The will, in the state of pure contemplation, breathes as quietly as the smooth, sunny sea.

At the second level, the will perceives a process in the world, or through art, vibrating in corresponding movements: it is the state of empathy, of sympathy. If we live through a scene in a family, without directly experiencing it ourselves, by being touched by it, it is for us without interest, but interesting; thus

we empathize with the outbursts of passion, the fervent pleading for mercy, etc. Poetry and music also work in this way, although much purer than real events, and one can say: in contemplation, nature takes precedence, while in aesthetic compassion, art takes precedence.

At this level, the object (qualities and states of the will, represented in words and tones) is removed from space and matter, but entirely in time, and empathy is entirely sequential.

Thus, I must reject the will-less recognition, just as I reject Schopenhauer's theory of ideas. The aesthetic state concerns only the will, which in this state recognizes the object according to its individual nature.

In this way, a difficulty is also solved, which did not escape Schopenhauer's keen mind but which he could not clear out of the way.

Concerning the postulated change in the subject and object, the condition is now that not only is the cognitive power withdrawn from its original servitude and completely left to itself, but also that it remains active with all its energy, even though the natural spur of its activity, the drive of the will, is now missing.

(*Parerga* II. 449.)

He adds: "Here lies the difficulty and, in this difficulty, the rarity of the matter." If the will were not involved at all, aesthetic recognition would never be possible. – The rarity of the matter, I must dispute. A reasonably well-endowed nature sinks easily and often into aesthetic contemplation.

The third flaw in Schopenhauer's aesthetics arises from the incorrect classification of nature, whose glorified reflection of the purpose of all art it is. As we know, he eliminated all special modes of action of inorganic forces and thus revealed an objective matter in which the lowest objectifications of the will are revealed. In aesthetics, these now change their names and are called the lowest ideas. He speaks of the idea of weight, rigidity, cohesion, hardness, etc., and assigns no other purpose to architecture, as fine art, than to present some of these ideas more clearly to perception.

I reject both one and the other. My philosophy knows no ideas of iron, marble, etc., and is certainly right on its side. Secondly, the material of a building is not the main thing, but rather the form, as I will now explain.

In the realm of plants and animals, the ideas are identical with the species concept, which I have already criticized. Only the higher animals, according to

Schopenhauer, possess striking individual characteristics and are “in a certain sense” special ideas. But every human is to be regarded as a special idea.

The character of each individual person can, insofar as they are quite individual and not entirely understood as a member of the species, be regarded as a special idea, corresponding to a peculiar act of objectification of the will.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 188.)

In humans, individuality emerges powerfully: every human has their own character.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 141.)

When he drew these final conclusions from his observations, his vision was free and clear.

A fourth essential flaw in Schopenhauer’s aesthetics, which does not come from his physics but from his inadequate theory of knowledge, is the persistent confusion of beauty into:

- 1) The subjectively beautiful,
- 2) The ground of beauty in the thing itself,
- 3) The beautiful object.

I have clearly articulated this distinction in my philosophy, and I believe that it was only through my reduction of the subjectively beautiful to ideals, based on *a priori* forms and functions, that the connections of our mind elevated aesthetics to a science in the strict sense of Kant, who, as is well known, completely denied it this character. He says:

The Germans are the only ones who now use the word aesthetics to designate what others call the critique of taste. The mistaken hope that lay behind the effort, which the excellent analyst Baumgarten undertook, to bring the critical assessment of beauty under principles of reason and to elevate its rules to the status of science, is futile. For the rules or criteria in question are, in their most important sources, purely empirical and therefore can never serve as laws *a priori*, by which our judgment of taste must be guided.

(*Critique of Pure Reason.* 61.)

Schopenhauer knows only the beautiful object and defines it as follows:

When we call an object beautiful, we thereby express that the object of our aesthetic contemplation has a twofold effect: on the one hand, it makes its appearance objective, that is, in contemplation we are no longer aware of ourselves as individuals, but only as a pure, will-less subject of knowledge; and on the other hand, we recognize in the object not the individual thing, but an idea.

(*W. a. W. u. V.l. 247.*)

The consequence of this would be that every thing in which an idea reveals itself should appear beautiful in our aesthetic contemplation, and Schopenhauer explicitly states this:

Since, on the one hand, every existing thing can be considered objectively and apart from any relation; and since, on the other hand, in every thing, the will, at some level of its objectification, appears, and thus every thing expresses an idea: therefore, every thing is beautiful.

(*W. a. W. u. V.l. 247.*)

He further says:

One thing is more beautiful than another by making that purely objective contemplation easier for us, by simultaneously forcing us to call it very beautiful.

(*ib.*)

Schopenhauer dealt with this contemplation as Kant did with causality. Just as Kant made the succession of events the sole criterion of the causal relationship, whereas success is always a consequence but not every consequence is a success, so Schopenhauer makes everything beautiful, because it can be aesthetically contemplated, while it must be said: the beautiful can only be recognized in the aesthetic state of the subject, but not everything that is contemplated in this state is beautiful.

Schopenhauer goes so far as to attribute beauty to every artifact, simply because an idea is expressed in its material, which can make the subject objective — which is fundamentally wrong. Let's imagine, for example, two objects made of bronze, say two weights, one being a regular, polished cylinder, the other a rough, inaccurately crafted cylinder. According to Schopenhauer, both express ideas of rigidity, cohesion, gravity, etc., and can be made objective; consequently, both are beautiful, which no one would seriously claim. Here, only form, color, smoothness, etc. decide, and all of this is precisely the subjective beauty that Schopenhauer does not recognize.

The subjective beauty, which depends on:

- 1) Causality,
- 2) Mathematical space,
- 3) Time,
- 4) Matter (substance),

I have dealt with extensively in my work and refer to it here. It is the formal beauty and the unshakable *a priori* basis from which the subject determines what is beautiful and what is not. The subject generally does not recognize anything except what makes no impression on its senses, which therefore conforms to its forms. Neither creating nor thinking about something can recognize anything in nature as beautiful unless beauty has first been attributed to it by a human.

The ability of humans to judge according to formal beauty is the sense of beauty. Every human being has it, like every faculty of judgment, like every reason. But just as many people can only establish very short mental connections, cannot expand their field of vision much, while some encompass the whole of nature and its connections with their minds, so too is the sense of beauty a seed in many, more developed in others. The legislative sense of beauty can be acquired, for it is offered as a seed to everyone and only requires care and cultivation. Just look at the artistically inclined Italians and the French, who bathe their minds daily in a sea of beauty, or rather, of grace.

One may be most affected by a flat seacoast, another by an Andalusian landscape, a third by the Bosphorus. Because this is the case, Kant believed that aesthetic judgments have no necessity, no universal binding force. But this is a one-sided view. In matters of beauty, the person with a more developed sense of beauty is a competent judge, and when the judgments of such a judge speak of laws with *a priori* foundations in us, they are binding for everyone. It makes no difference whether one protests and stiffens in opposition based on their personality, refusing to agree. One only develops a sense of beauty in oneself when one gives a voice to such a judgment.

If an object of nature or art fulfills all the conditions of formal beauty, it is perfectly beautiful. One may, for instance, examine Goethe's *Iphigenia* under the conditions of subjective beauty, where in a poem the contemplation of beauty is flawless in causality, time, and substance. Or look at the Gulf of Naples, perhaps from Camaldoli or San Martino, and examine it according to the formal beauty of space and matter, and whoever would not give the highest place to the colors, to the lines of the coast, to the scent of distance, to the shape of the pine trees in the foreground — what more could one want? Not the genius of the painter's sense of beauty would dare to advance anything beyond that or desire to sit there.

The perfectly beautiful works of nature and art are very, very rare; many only correspond to one or two types of formal beauty. A drama may conform to all the laws of subjective beauty of time and substance but be entirely wrong with regard to the beauty of causality.

Schopenhauer felt the necessity of subjective beauty, for his keen mind did not easily miss anything, but he tried in vain to get to the bottom of the matter and sank (as he unfortunately did so often) into mysticism. He says:

How is the artist to recognize and reproduce the successful and replicable work of nature, and how can he discover it among the failures if he does not anticipate the beautiful prior to experience? Has nature ever produced a completely beautiful human being in every part? — Purely *a posteriori*, and from mere experience, there is no knowledge of the beautiful possible; it is always, at least partly, *a priori*, although of a completely different kind than the *a priori* known forms of the principle of sufficient reason.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 261.)

That we all recognize human beauty when we see it, happens with such clarity because the true artist shows it in such a way that we see it as we have never seen it before, and surpasses nature in his depiction; this is only possible because the will, whose adequate objectification must be judged and found at its highest level, is us ourselves.

(*ib.* 262.)

This was followed by a completely false explanation of the ideal.

This anticipation of beauty is the ideal: it is the idea, insofar as it is at least partly known *a priori* and, in this way, opposes mere *a posteriori* perception of given natural objects, thus making art practical.

The artist creates the ideal in a different way. He compares the living similar individuals, grasps the characteristic, separates the unessential and accidental, and combines the essential that he finds. The resulting individual then steps into the realm of subjective beauty and rises from this bath like the foam-born goddess, transfigured and in ideal beauty. The Greek artists could not have produced their exemplary works for all times had they not found good models among their people, and this is confirmed by what Kant said:

It is entirely different with those creations (ideals) of the imagination, about which no one can explain and give a clear concept, like monograms, which each individual, although by no supposed rule, is determined by features that constitute a floating drawing derived from a mix of different

experiences, rather than a specific image.

(*Critique of Pure Reason*. 442.)

The power of imagination lets one image fall upon another and knows, through the congruence of many of the same kind, how to bring forth a middle figure that brings everything into a common measure. The imagination achieves this through a dynamic effect that arises from the manifold perceptions of such forms upon the organ of the inner sense

(*Critique of Judgment*. 80.)

Here, the following difficulty may also be addressed. Kant had rightly noted that a Negro necessarily has a different norm of beauty or form than a white person, the Chinese another, the European another (*Critique of Judgment*. 80), and Schopenhauer said:

The source of all delight is homogeneity: the sense of beauty is found in one's own species, and in this, one's own race is regarded, without hesitation, as the most beautiful.

(*Parerga* II. 492.)

This is true. But it proves nothing against subjective beauty. If a black Phidias were born in Africa, he would create forms carrying the characteristics of the Negro race; but still, within those boundaries, valid and universally applicable laws of beauty would emerge for all human beings. He would create the full calf, the firm, muscular body, the well-developed chest, the oval face, the regular features, not the flat calf, the bulging or protruding belly, etc., all of which correspond to perfection.

How powerful subjective beauty in space, particularly symmetry and sculpture, truly is, is proven more than anything else by the fact that no Greek artist ever thought of creating an Amazon with only one breast, although every Greek believed (rightly or wrongly, let that remain undecided) that the Amazons destroyed one breast to facilitate the handling of weapons. Imagine an Amazon with only one breast, and the aesthetic pleasure would be significantly impaired.

Schopenhauer thus became mystical when he wanted to explain subjective beauty, which he observed from afar. It is remarkable, however, that he did not reach the same conclusions, for his aesthetics contains many strikingly beautiful ideas related to the matter at hand. I select the following:

We see in good ancient architectural style every part, be it a pillar, column, arch, structure, or door, window, staircase, or balcony, achieving its

purpose in the straightest and simplest way, laying it out in a manner that is both frank and naive.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.II. 472.)

Grace consists in every movement and posture being carried out in the lightest, most appropriate, and most comfortable way and thus becoming the pure expression of its intention, or the act of the will, without excess, without anything untimely, without insignificant gestures, without the lack that represents wooden stiffness.

(*ib.* II. 264.)

The lack of unity in the characters, their contradictions against themselves or against the nature of humanity in general, as well as the impossibility or their approaching improbability in events, even if only in minor details, offends in poetry just as much as distorted figures, incorrect perspectives, or faulty lighting in painting.

(*ib.* I. 297.)

Human beauty expresses itself also through form: and this lies solely in space, etc.

(*ib.* 263.)

Rhythm is in time what symmetry is in space.

(*ib.* II. 516.)

The meter, or measure of time, is pure rhythm, whose essence lies solely in time, which is an *a priori* pure perception. Therefore, speaking with Kant, it belongs solely to pure sensuality.

(*ib.* 486.)

A very special aid in poetry is rhythm and rhyme.

(*ib.* I. 287.)

Melody consists of two elements, one rhythmic and one harmonic. Both rest on pure arithmetic ratios, thus time is their foundation: for one, the relative duration of tones, for the other, the relative speed of their vibrations.

(*ib.* II. 516.)

Colors immediately evoke lively pleasure, which, when they are transparent, reaches the highest degree.

(*ib.* I. 235.)

Painted fruit is permissible, as it represents a further development of the flower and presents itself as a beautiful product of nature through form and

color.

(*ib.* I. 245.)

Painting also achieves a beauty that is attained through the pure harmony of colors, the pleasing grouping, the favorable distribution of light and shadow, and the tone of the entire image. This inherent, underlying kind of beauty promotes a state of pure recognition and, in painting, is what diction, meter, and rhyme are in poetry.

(*ib.* II. 480.)

Among all peoples, at all times, the colors red, green, orange, blue, yellow, violet have special names, which are understood everywhere as denoting those specific, well-defined colors; although these rarely appear pure and perfect in nature: they must, therefore, be recognized somewhat *a priori*, in an analogous way, like the regular geometric figures. — Everyone must, therefore, carry within themselves a norm, an ideal, an Epicurean anticipation of yellow and each color, independent of experience, with which they compare every actual color.

(*On Visions and Colors* 33.)

Compare these excellent passages with the following:

Causality is the form of the principle of sufficient reason: knowledge of the idea, however, constitutes the essential content of that principle.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 251.)

In architecture, the ideas of the lower levels of nature, such as weight, rigidity, cohesion, are the actual theme; not, as was previously assumed, only the regular form, proportion, and symmetry, which are purely geometric properties of space and thus cannot be the theme of a fine art.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.II. 470.)

It is therefore not surprising that Schopenhauer could not define subjective beauty. The same old errors from his theory of knowledge always and repeatedly threw themselves at him, leading him down the wrong paths.

I have said above: something is only beautiful according to the formal conditions of subjective beauty. From this, it follows that beauty as such cannot be attributed to the thing in itself, independent of our perception. Only an object can be beautiful, i.e., one in which the will enters into the subjective forms. This is not to be misunderstood and twisted to mean that the subject from its own means produces beauty in the object. Through this, empirical idealism must lead to

absurdities, but for the development of human knowledge of the most universal and important philosophical direction — must be applied to aesthetics. We recall that only through matter does the object differ from the thing in itself. The subjective form of matter precisely expresses the qualities of the thing in itself, but in a very peculiar way: the essence of the will is entirely different from matter *toto genere*. Therefore, I cannot say that the will is blue, red, heavy, light, smooth, rough, etc.; but I must rather say: in the essence of the will lie these qualities, which act on the subject, so that the object is perceived as blue, red, heavy, light, smooth, rough. In exactly the same way, objective beauty is to be explained. Not that which appears in the beautiful object, the will, is beautiful, but in the essence of the will lies what the subject calls beautiful in the object. This is the easily fallible, clear result of genuine transcendental idealism applied to aesthetics.

Why we may nonetheless speak of a beautiful soul, I have explained in my aesthetics. We call a soul beautiful because of its even movement, due to the harmonious relationship in which its will stands to the intellect. It is a measured, tactful soul. It has no absolute uniformity, but a predominantly uniform movement, for the former is not possible. The beautiful soul is capable of both passionate excitement and languor, but it always soon regains balance, finding the point where will and intellect return to harmonious motion, which is neither detached from the earth nor directed towards its burden.

Schopenhauer says:

While some excel through their heart, others through their intellect, there are still others whose excellence lies in a certain harmony and unity of the whole being, which arises from the fact that heart and intellect are so appropriately matched in them that they mutually support and enhance each other.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.II. 601.)

Schiller characterizes the beautiful soul as follows:

A beautiful soul is one in which the moral feeling of all the human senses has finally assured itself to the extent that it can leave the direction of the will to the affect without fear, without being in danger of standing in contradiction to its decisions. In a beautiful soul, thus, sensibility and reason, duty, and inclination harmonize, and grace is the expression of its appearance.

(*On Grace and Dignity.*)

This beautiful soul will also, through the eyes and facial features, shine outwardly and transfigure even the ugliest face in such a way that one sees only the soul in it, not the flawed form in which it must manifest itself.

Art is the transfigured mirror of nature. Since nature does not consist solely of beautiful objects — whether these can all be regarded aesthetically — this already shows that art must diverge into two directions. If art aims to reproduce only beautiful objects and the movements of the beautiful soul, then it is ideal art. But if it reflects primarily the characteristic peculiarities of individuals, then it is realistic art, which stands alongside the ideal art with equal rights and goes neither an inch higher nor an inch deeper. Even though the latter makes the subject essentially happier and calmer than the former, realistic art reveals the true nature of the will, its insatiable ugliness, its nameless misery, its anxieties and fears, its defiant arrogance, and its pitiful despair, its madness, exuberance, and so forth. And the human being, shocked, speaks like Hamlet's mother:

*Thou turn'st mine eyes into my very soul;
And there I see such black and grained spots,
As will not leave until tinct.*

(Du kehrest die Augen recht in's Innre mir,
Da seh' ich Flecke, tief und schwarz gefärbt,
Die nicht von Farbe lassen.)

Both types of art lead people into the ethical realm, one by clarifying their nature, the other by generating the desire: to always be so happy, blessed, and calm, for whose fulfillment only ethics can provide the means. And herein lies the high significance of art in general, its intimate connection with morality.

Only one demand must be placed on the aesthete when it comes to realistic art, namely: that its works be immersed in the cleansing flood of the subjective beauty. It must idealize the characteristic. Otherwise, it is no longer art, and anyone with fine sensibilities would much rather observe real life directly than waste their time on the insignificant, trivial, though carefully worked out, creations of misguided artists.

Now we turn to the sublime and the comic.

Regarding the sublime, I must first speak of Kant. Kant cast a very clear look into the essence of the sublime and not only correctly recognized its two types, but also rightly limited it to the subject. According to him, a person feels the sense of the sublime when they do not feel belittled by the greatness of an object or when they overcome the fear of a powerful natural phenomenon,

overcome the state of humiliation, elevate themselves above it, and enter into free objective contemplation.

Upon this, Kant bases his division of the sublime into:

- 1) the Mathematically Sublime,
- 2) the Dynamically Sublime.

At the same time, he remarks that we express ourselves incorrectly

when we call an object of nature sublime, for we can correctly call many of them beautiful.

(Kr. d. U. 94.)

The true sublimity must lie only in the soul of the one making the judgment, not in natural objects, whose evaluation evokes this mood of the soul, as sought within.

(ib. 106.)

Schopenhauer adopts the classification and also limits the sublime only to the subject, but he speaks of the objects that cause the subject to feel sublime as beautiful, which is not entirely correct. He says:

What distinguishes the feeling of the sublime from that of the beautiful is this: with the beautiful, pure knowledge wins the battle without struggle; whereas with the sublime, that state of pure knowledge is achieved only after a conscious and violent tearing away from the unfavorable perceived relationships of the object to the will, through a free, consciousness-accompanied elevation above the will and the knowledge that relates to it.

(W. a. W. u. V.I. 238.)

In the object, both are not essentially different: for in both cases, the object of aesthetic contemplation is not the individual thing, but the idea striving for revelation in it.

(ib. 246.)

According to this, as I have said above, the object that brings us into the sublime state is always beautiful, because everything that is known without the will is beautiful. This requires the qualification that an object which elevates me may be beautiful, but does not have to be beautiful.

It matters very little by what means a person elevates themselves; the main thing remains that they are elevated. Kant as well as Schopenhauer went too far when they linked the possibility of elevation to a very specific line of

thought. They did not consider that this would presuppose knowledge of their works, while many people feel the sublime without having heard the names Kant or Schopenhauer. Thus Kant says regarding the mathematically sublime:

The greatness of a natural object, at which the imagination fruitlessly uses all its capacity for comprehension, leads the concept of nature to a suprasensible substrate (which at the same time lies at the foundation of our ability to think), something that is great beyond all measure of the senses.

(*Kr. d. U.* 106.)

and allows the humbled subject to elevate itself to the "ideas of reason." Schopenhauer, on the other hand, attributes the elevation to immediate consciousness, stating that

all worlds exist only in our representation, as mere modifications of the eternal subject of pure knowledge, which we find as soon as we forget individuality, and which is the necessary, determining bearer of all worlds and all times.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 242.)

Regarding the dynamically sublime, Kant says:

Nature is called sublime here only because the imagination is elevated to depict cases in which the soul can feel its own sublimity in its determination to rise above nature.

(*Kr. d. U.* 113.)

Schopenhauer says:

The unshaken observer feels himself both as an individual, a fragile manifestation of will, helpless against the mighty nature, subject to chance, and as an insignificant nothing against the tremendous forces of nature; and at the same time, as the eternal resting subject of pure knowledge.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 242.)

Naturally, Schopenhauer looks down with pity on Kant's explanations, which are supported by moral reflections and hypostases from scholastic philosophy. The truth is, everyone (from their standpoint) is somewhat right, as well as other explanations being correct. I refer to my aesthetics and ask whether a faithful believer does not experience the same thing. A devout Christian who enjoys contemplating a storm at sea, and this spectacle, says to himself: "I stand here in the hand of Almighty God." He will certainly experience an elevated

feeling, though it is certainly not in the same sublime mood as Schopenhauer was once in.

The sublime is thus a state of the subject, brought about by nature, and there is no sublime object. But has the sublime been fully exhausted by the treatises of Kant and Schopenhauer? Absolutely not! There are sublime characters.

Schopenhauer indeed speaks of the sublime character but gives a definition of it that does not fully encompass the entire sphere of the concept; moreover, he dismisses the matter too quickly. Kant also mentions a person who is self-sufficient, sublime, but without a satisfying explanation.

In my aesthetics, I touch on the feeling of the sublime in connection with the conviction of a person, at the moment of elevation, that they do not fear death, whether this is an illusion or not. This explanation includes all other possibilities because they all lead, through various winding paths, to one goal: contempt of death. It makes no difference whether one says: my soul is immortal, or another: I am in God's hands, or a third: the whole world is mere appearance, and the eternal subject of knowledge is the essential bearer of all worlds and all times — death is never feared: *simplex sigillum veri*.

This contempt of death is always based on illusion. One feels fully secure and convinced that one would remain contemplative even if life were truly threatened. But when the moment of truth arrives, the individual tumbles from their dreamy height and thinks only of saving their beloved self.

If this contempt of death remains even when danger approaches, and life is truly at stake, then such a will is elevated and sublime. Those soldiers who overcome fear in battle and who calmly make their observations amid a rain of bullets are not only in an elevated state but their character is fundamentally sublime: they are heroes. Likewise, heroes are all those who willingly risk their lives to save another endangered one, whether in fires, sea storms, floods, or other dangers. Such individuals are temporarily elevated, and one cannot know whether they will act the same way at another time, in a different place, when asked to risk their life again. Elevation here reveals itself as a quality of the will, which lies only as a seed in humans and, after its realization, returns to being a mere seed.

In contrast, for the true wise person, this elevation remains unfolded. He recognizes the futility of life and longs for the hour when he will enter the peace

of death. In him, contempt for death — or better, contempt for life — has become the fundamental mood of the will and regulates his actions.

But the most sublimely elevated of all is the wise hero, the fighting man in the service of truth. He is also the one object that more than any other can elevate the subject into a sublime state; for he is, or was, a human, and everyone believes they can sacrifice their life for the highest aims of humanity, just as he did. This also explains the deep, magical influence Christianity has on atheists: the image of the crucified, who willingly went to death for the salvation of humanity, will shine and uplift hearts until the end of time.

Just as the beautiful soul is most visible in the eyes, so too is the sublime will manifested in the object. It reveals itself most clearly in the eyes. No painter has ever so perfectly depicted this revelation as Correggio in his painting of the Veil of Veronica (Berlin Museum). The painting leaves a deep impression even on a coarse mind and can ignite the boldest deeds. I also believe that many self-confessions have already been made before it.

The comic, which Schopenhauer addressed inadequately, and in a place where it apparently does not belong, is placed within the theory of knowledge. He recognizes only the abstract comic, not the sensual (perceptual) comic.

If the contemplative mind steps out of the dense stream of humanity, momentarily or forever, and looks down at it, into it, a smile will soon cross its face, or dwarf-shattering laughter will erupt. How is this possible? Generally speaking, it is said: a measure has been applied to a phenomenon, and it is either shorter or longer than expected. The comic arises from this discrepancy, this incongruence.

It is clear that the measure cannot have a fixed length. It depends on the education and experience of individuals, and while one person finds a phenomenon in order, another discovers a discrepancy in it that plunges them into great merriment. The subjective condition of the comic is also some measure; the comic itself lies in the object.

Schopenhauer claims that for all types of laughter, at least one concept is necessary to produce the discrepancy, which is incorrect. When Garrick laughed at the dog in the parterre, whose master had put on his wig, he did not proceed from a concept as a spectator but from the form of a human being.

On the other hand, Schopenhauer's treatment of humor, although incomplete, is excellent. Humor is a state, like the sublime, and is closely connected to it. The humorist has recognized that life as a whole, regardless of the form it takes, is ultimately worthless and that non-existence is decidedly preferable to being. He possesses the insight, but not the strength, to live according to this knowledge. Time and again, he is drawn back into the world of life. He then contemplates life, and in himself, he experiences the contempt for life, as well as the irony of its drives and actions, and in all people, the awareness that he does so, as she cannot help it – thus with a bleeding heart; and under jokes and jest lies the bitter seriousness. The last words of the unforgettable Rabelais are of the highest degree of humor:

Tirez le rideau, la farce est jouée;

for he did not like to die, and yet again so gladly.

Moving on to the arts, I can be very brief. Because Schopenhauer ascribed an individual idea to every person and regarded man as the preferential object of art, he rarely set it down on the ground of sculpture, painting, and poetry against the truth. What he said there is almost universally excellent and belongs to the most thoroughly thought out and best that has been written about art.

However, his incorrect classification of architecture and music as part of nature must have led him to misjudge them.

I have already cited a passage above, which highlights that architecture must reveal the ideas of the lower levels of nature, i.e., rigidity, gravity, cohesion, etc., and I further emphasized that the artifact expresses the idea of its material. The building is the greatest artifact; what applies to the artifact also applies to all works of architecture. The form is the principal aspect of the artifact, the symmetry, the proportion of the parts, in short, the formal beauty of space. Material is secondary, not to reveal its heaviness and impenetrability, but to express the formal beauty of the material through color, smoothness, grain, etc. Imagine two identical Greek temples – perhaps the Theseum in Athens, or any other – and a copy of it in wood or sandstone. The latter would be painted in the same color as the Pentelic marble. It is clear that both would make the same impression. The impression would also remain if one acknowledged that it was a copy made of wood and painted, but for practical reasons, one would prefer the woodwork.

From this arises without compulsion the reason why both buildings, whose main lines are illuminated — as is very often seen at festivals in Italy — as well

as painted architecture, awaken such great aesthetic pleasure in us. The same is immediately significantly diminished when some lights of an illuminated building go out, because then we no longer have the whole form. Now I ask, how can illuminated architecture reveal the ideas of heaviness, etc.?

Schopenhauer's explanation in regard to painted architecture is entirely incorrect. He believes that in viewing it, we receive:

An empathetic resonance and the echo of deep spiritual calm and the total silence of the will, which were necessary to sink so completely into those lifeless objects and to perceive them with such love, i.e., here with such a degree of objectivity.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 258.)

How convoluted!

Schopenhauer's writings on music are brilliant, witty, and imaginative, but they too lose the essence of this magnificent art too often and become fantastical. The section on music in the second volume of *W. a. W. u.* V. is indeed very apt: "On the Metaphysics of Music" — for Schopenhauer swiftly surveys all experience and sails fresh and cheerfully across the boundless transcendent ocean.

He says:

Music is by no means, like the other arts, the image of ideas; but rather the image of the will itself.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 304.)

Since it is the same will that manifests itself both in ideas and in music, though in each of the two in entirely different ways, objectively considered, there must be a direct, though not a similar, resemblance; yet there must still be a parallelism, an analogy between music and (between) the ideas, whose appearance in the diversity and imperfection forms the visible world.

(*ib.* 304.)

And now the deepest tones of harmony are fundamentally connected with the lowest stages of the objectification of the single will (with inorganic nature, the mass of planets); the higher tones of harmony are connected with the ideas of the plant and animal kingdoms; the melody is compared with the reflective life and striving of human beings. Furthermore, it is said:

The depth has a limit, beyond which no tone is audible anymore: this corresponds to the fact that no matter is perceptible without form and quality.

(ib. 305.)

The impure dissonances, which give no specific interval, can be compared to the monstrous misbirths between two animal species or between human and animal.

(ib.)

And so on. However, I must argue that music stands only in relation to the individual will of human beings. It leaves out the qualities of this will, such as wickedness, envy, cruelty, mercy, etc., which are still the theme of poetry, and only reflects its states, i.e., its vibrations in passion, joy, sorrow, fear, peace, etc. It transfers through the vibrations of tones the will of the listener into similar vibrations and produces in them, without the grasping of any specific quality of the will, the same state of well-being or woe associated with it, yet it is at the same time so completely different, so uniquely individual. Herein lies the secret of its wonderful power over the human heart, and also over animals, namely horses.

Schopenhauer himself says very rightly:

It does not express this or that single and specific joy, this or that grief, or pain, or horror, or even lust, or tranquility, but rather the joy, grief, etc. itself.
(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 309.)

But when he nevertheless says: music evidently represents directly the essence of the will, this is false. The essence of the will, its qualities, are revealed only by poetry in its complete predicates, movement. Music only reflects its states, that is why it does not deal with the highest and most serious of the arts.

I cannot suppress a remark here. Goethe, who spoke of the witticism "architecture is frozen music," called architecture "silent" music. Schopenhauer picks up on the witticism and believes that the only analogy between the two arts is that, just as symmetry is the ordering and cohesive principle in architecture, rhythm plays the same role in music. The connection, however, lies deeper. Music, in its form, rests entirely on time, which it beautifully reveals through rhythm and meter, while architecture rests on space, whose relations it beautifully reveals through symmetry. If I hold the transitions from present to future, I get a line of frozen moments, a succession, which is a spatial juxtaposition. The flowing rhythm thus becomes rigid symmetry, and therefore the cheeky witticism has more meaning than Schopenhauer thought permissible to assume.

(Schopenhauer famously claims that time flows, but space stands still.) One must also not forget that, in essence, space and time are united, and that both music and architecture are based on numerical relationships, and one will recognize that the formal part of one art is related to the other. One might compare them to light and warmth, and call the formal part of music the metamorphosis of the formal part of architecture.

Before I leave aesthetics and move on to ethics, I must speak of Schopenhauer's preference for intuitive knowledge over abstract knowledge. This preference became a new source of errors, which helped ruin his ethics and is therefore deeply regrettable.

Only what is known intuitively, he says, has value and meaning.

All truth and all wisdom ultimately lie in intuition (*Anschauung*).
(*W. a. W. u.* V.II. 79.)

In other words: reason is the main thing, intellect is secondary.

Every fool has reason: give him the premises, and he will complete the conclusion.

(4 *fache W.* 73.)

He completely forgot here that reason must also form the premises, and that concluding is easy, judging is hard.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.II. 97.)

This contempt for reason stemmed mainly from the fact that he allowed reason only to form concepts and connect them, leaving only perception to the intellect; and further from the fact that he did not recognize the ideal connections of reason (time, mathematical space, substance, causality, and community); finally, also from the fact that he placed too deep a chasm between concepts and perception. All cognitive faculties are always in full activity and support each other. Schopenhauer must often concede to this. Thus, he says:

Reason and intellect always mutually support each other.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 27.)

The Platonic Idea, which becomes possible through the union of imagination and intellect (*Vernunft*).

(*ib.* I. 48.)

I also refer further to *W. a. W. u.* V.I. §16, II, Chap. 16, where he pays tribute to truth and places intellect (*Vernunft*) very highly. Nevertheless, intuitive knowledge remains the higher, and he says in the same place:

The most complete development of practical intellect, in the truest and deepest sense of the word, the highest peak that man can attain through mere use of his intellect, and through which the difference from the animal is most clearly shown, is the ideal, depicted in Stoic terms.

I will prove that man, with his intellect, can climb to a much higher peak, and that salvation is only possible through intellect, not through a disillusioned, wonderful, inexpressible intellectual intuition.

Ethics.

The thinking human has the wonderful characteristic of gladly falling into a fantastical image when faced with an unresolved problem, because he cannot bear the thought that the problem has not been solved and the truth remains unknown.

Goethe.

One does not understand the language of nature because it is too simple.

Schopenhauer.

It is the most difficult but also the most beautiful task for the philosopher: in their strictest demands, to base ethics only on data from experience, to base it solely on nature. The Stoics tried, but they could not continue halfway; Kant tried the same, but ended up with a moral theology; Schopenhauer also started with facts of internal and external experience but sank at the end of his path into a mystical sea.

It is clear that a philosophical system can only provide ethics without metaphysics when it has, in its theory of knowledge and in physics, unshakable, rock-solid pillars upon which the heavy superstructure can be supported. The slightest mistake in the foundation would bring down the most magnificent palace, sooner or later, to collapse.

We have thus first focused on examining the foundational pillars in physics that carry ethics, reviewing them once again, and collecting the scattered truths in Schopenhauer's works for this purpose. Soon, we will shed light on Schopenhauer's errors in the same light.

Ethics deals only with humans and their way of acting, i.e., with the individual human will and its movement. As we know, Schopenhauer spoke of every human being having a special idea and at a fortunate moment allowed individuality to resonate in it. This must be the starting point.

Every person is a complete whole, strictly guided by a specific character. He is the will to live, like everything in nature, but he wants life in a particular way, i.e., he has his own original movement. His principle is:

Let the world perish, as long as I am saved!

And his individuality at the core is egoism.

Egoism is, in animals as in humans, closely linked to the innermost core and essence of the same, indeed, they are essentially identical.

(Ethics 196.)

Egoism, by its nature, is limitless: man wants to absolutely preserve his existence, he wants to be free from pain, including all want and deprivation, and to have the greatest possible sum of well-being and every enjoyment to which he is capable, indeed, he even seeks to develop new capacities for enjoyment within himself.

(ib.)

Everything that stands in the way of his egoism stirs his displeasure, anger, and hatred: he will seek to destroy it as his enemy. He wants to enjoy everything, to have control over everything, but since that is impossible, he wants to control at least everything he can: "Everything for me and nothing for the others," is his motto. Egoism is colossal: it surpasses the world. For if each individual were given the choice between his own destruction and that of the rest of the world, one need not say how the vast majority would decide.

(ib.)

For now, let us simply note that man absolutely wants to preserve his existence.

From whom does he have his existence? From his parents, through their union.

They feel the longing for a real union and fusion into a single being, so that henceforth only this continues to live, and this receives its fulfillment in what they have produced, in which the hereditary characteristics of both are merged and united into one being, continuing to live.

(W. a. W. u. V.II. 611.)

That this specific child is born is the true, albeit unconscious, purpose of the whole love story.

(ib.)

Already in the first meeting of their (the parents') longing glances, his new life is ignited, revealing itself as a future harmonious and well-composed individuality.

(ib.)

What is decided by all the love affairs is nothing less than the composition of the next generation.

(ib. 609.)

The *dramatis personae*, who will appear when we have passed on, are here, in their existence and nature, determined by these frivolous love affairs.

(ib. 609.)

That the seeds brought together by the parents in conception propagate not only the peculiarities of the species but also those of the individuals, is taught by everyday experience.

(ib. 590.)

Why does the lover surrender completely to the eyes of his chosen one and is ready to make every sacrifice for her? Because it is his immortal part that longs for her.

(ib. 640.)

This last sentence must be more precisely formulated and read: because he seeks to preserve himself in existence, because he wants to be immortal.

These passages are clear and pure, and each bears the mark of truth. Every human being has his existence and essence from his parents. These are maintained through the children in existence, who preserve themselves in this same way.

The lovers are the traitors who secretly seek to perpetuate all the trouble and hardship, which would otherwise come to a quick end, and which they want to prevent, just as their kind thwarted it earlier.

(W. a. W. u. V.II. 641.)

There is no difference between parents and children. They are one and the same.

It is the same character, the same specific individual will, which lives in all descendants of a lineage, from the ancestor to the current heir.

(ib. 603.)

In the excellent, beautiful passage: "Heritability of Characteristics," Schopenhauer states that the child inherits a particular will from the father and a particular intellect from the mother. Based on careful study and numerous observations, I have modified this doctrine to the conclusion that most of the will qualities come from both the father and the mother, but the intellectual abilities mostly come from the mother alone. The mixture depends essentially on the

condition of the parents during conception. The mother's will qualities are, as opposed to the father's, almost neutralized (equalized) and vice versa, others are weakened, while still others pass purely onto the new individual. What is certain is that in the child lives what was in the parents. A new being is not something new, but a rejuvenated old.

At the lowest stages of the animal kingdom, death frequently follows immediately after copulation, which reveals very clearly the nature of the relationship between parents and children. Insects, for instance, which die soon after mating, live on until the following year. (Burach, *Physiology* I, § 285.) Among the higher animals, and especially humans, this relationship becomes more obscure, as the parents generally continue living. However, one should keep in mind: (1) that a child can emerge from an egg, which contains the quintessence of the female will; (2) that this egg is nothing until it is fertilized by the seed, which contains the quintessence of the male will. Fertilization gives the seed slumbering in the egg its true existence; the energy of fertilization gives the seed the essence, the specific qualities of will, according to the above rule.

In the Vedas, the dying man gives his senses and all his abilities individually to his son, in whom they are to live on. The truth is that he had already passed them on to him at the moment of conception. The life of a man who can no longer procreate is, as the Indians say, like the movement of a wheel that continues to turn for a while after the driving force has left it.

From this, it follows that the center of gravity of human life lies in the sexual instinct. It alone secures for the individual the existence which it desires above all. Man is essentially the will to live; only secondarily does he desire a particular kind of life. If he cannot have this, he resigns himself almost always and is content to live in any form. Thus, every day, one sees dozens of people breathing in circumstances that do not in any way correspond to their character; but they want, with insatiable desire, above all else, existence, life, life, existence, and they constantly hope that one day this life will take a form they desire, whether through struggle or through luck.

For this reason, no one devotes greater seriousness to any matter than to the business of procreation, and in attending to other matters, he condenses and concentrates, in such a striking way, the intensity of his will, as in the act of procreation. It is as if his energy were tripled or even multiplied tenfold. No wonder! It is a matter of the continuation of his essence, for the time being, through the following generation, although this only lasts an indeterminate time. Since the expression of his will in the sexual drive is so powerful, he believed he must conclude that not just the individual, but the entire species was involved in the act of procreation. The force of this act took temporary possession of the individual, filled it with overwhelming feelings, and almost burst the physical

vessel. It was nothing else. No wonder! But let us look more closely at this man in the highest rage. His strength is multiplied. He lifts loads that he cannot move in a calm state. Has the spirit of the species perhaps also come upon him in his rage, in a miraculous way? Dr. Schrader, director of the N. Ö. State Insane Asylum, recently organized an exhibition in Vienna of such objects that his poor mentally ill patients, in fits of rage, had worked on. Among them, one saw solid iron rods, bent crooked, door hinges and clamps torn from the walls, metal tools and containers that had been smashed and flattened, and, among other things, a cup of Bessemer steel torn into six pieces. Was perhaps, in such fury, the spirit of the species also at work, or was it simply the unhealed will, which here produced its "endless" power? Unfortunately, the word is only too true:

One does not understand the language of nature because it is too simple.

—

Copulation is the only means to preserve life.

The genitals are the true focal point of the will.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 390.)

The sexual instinct is the core of the will to live, the concentration of all will.

(*ib.* II. 586.)

The sexual instinct is the most perfect expression of the will to live, its most clearly defined type.

(*ib.* 587.)

If the will to live were to express itself merely as an instinct for self-preservation, this would only be an affirmation of the individual appearance for the span of time of its natural duration. But where the will to live affirms itself for all time, it also expresses itself as the sexual instinct, which looks ahead to an endless series of generations.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.II. 649.)

From the highest point of my philosophy, I have always considered the affirmation of the will to live in the act of procreation as its most distinct expression.

(*Parerga* II. 444.)

Only and solely through the continuous exercise of such an action does the human race exist.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.II. 651.)

That act is the core, the compendium, the quintessence of the world.

(*ib.* 652.)

Through procreation, we are, and through procreation, we become. Let us now turn to death. Death is complete annihilation. The chemical forces, subjected to the type, are released again: he himself is extinguished like a light that no longer has oil. —

The end of the individual through death needs no proof but is recognized by sound reason as a fact, and as such is confirmed by the confidence that nature lies as little as it errs, but openly reveals its actions and essence, even naively expresses it, while only we ourselves cloud it with delusion in order to interpret what suits our limited view.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 382.)

What we fear in death is, in fact, the destruction of the individual, which it declares to us openly and unconcealed, and since the individual is an objectification of the will to live itself, its entire being resists death.

(*ib.* 334.)

That the most complete manifestation of the will to live, which is presented in the extremely artificially complicated mechanism of the human organism, must crumble to dust and that all its essence and striving is ultimately and visibly given over to destruction — this is the naïve declaration of the ever-true and honest nature, that all the striving of this will is essentially for nothing.

(*Parerga* II. 308.)

Opinions change with time and place, but the voice of nature remains always and everywhere the same; therefore, it is to be observed above all. In the language of nature, death means annihilation.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.II. 529.)

I summarize:

- 1) The essence of man is the rejuvenated essence of his parents;
- 2) Man can only preserve his existence through procreation;
- 3) Death is absolute annihilation;
- 4) The individual will, which does not rejuvenate in the child, and does not secure its continuation in it, is irretrievably lost in death;
- 5) The focal point of life lies in the sexual drive, and therefore only the moment of procreation is of significance;
- 6) The moment of death is devoid of any and all significance.

Now, let us call man's striving to maintain his existence the affirmation of the will to live according to Schopenhauer; in contrast, his striving to shake off

existence, to destroy his type, i.e., to free himself from himself, we call the negation of the will to live. In affirmation, it is clear that:

- 1) Man most clearly and surely affirms his will in the act of procreation;
- 2) He can only free himself from life, release himself, if he leaves the sexual drive unsatisfied. Virginity is the *conditio sine qua non* for salvation, and the negation of the will to live is fruitless if man only embraces it after having already affirmed his will by procreating children.

With that affirmation over the body and up to the presentation of a new life, and with the suffering and death that belong to the appearance of life, the once more renewed possibility of salvation, brought about through the highest ability of knowledge, is declared fruitless this time. Here lies the profound reason for the shame about the act of procreation.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 388.)

In this entire presentation, I have repeated the course of thought of my philosophy and supported it everywhere with passages from Schopenhauer's works. These passages include, among others, those which say the exact opposite: according to the already cited Goethe's word:

It is a continual setting up and taking down, an unconditioned utterance and instantaneous limitation, so that everything and nothing is true at the same time.

Schopenhauer wrote as a clear, sober, unprejudiced observer of nature; the others, whom I will now cite, wrote as transcendent philosophers, observers of nature, who sometimes stood with clenched fists before the truth and then lashed out at the lofty goddess of nature. At such moments, a thick veil must have been laid over his otherwise sharp and penetrating intellectual gaze, and his behavior in this condition resembles someone groping in the dark, who determines the colors of objects from the data of the sense of touch. His brilliant power shows itself only in the admirable, artful assembly of heterogeneous elements and in the careful concealment of all cracks and fissures.

All his fundamental errors, which we already know, appear in ethics like a gang of arsonists, ready to destroy his work. Before I present them individually, I want to allow him to condemn himself by quoting the following. He says (*Parerga* I. 202):

There is nothing more unphilosophical than always talking about something of which one has neither knowledge nor any concept of its essence.

At the top of the fundamental errors are the occasional causes. These condense, in ethics, into the crassest occasionalism, which Kant denounces with the words:

One can foresee that no one will accept this system, to whom any philosophy is important.

(*Kk. d. U.* 302.)

Schopenhauer did not heed the warning and wrote:

Procreation is, in relation to the procreator, only the expression, the symptom, of his decisive affirmation of the will to live; in relation to the offspring, it is not the cause of the will that appears in him, for the will is neither cause nor effect; rather, it is, like all causes, merely an occasional cause of the appearance of the will at this time and in this place.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 387.)

Death openly declares itself as the end of the individual, but in this individual lies the seed of a new being.

(*Parerga* II. 292.)

The dying person perishes, but a seed remains from which a new being emerges, which now enters into existence without knowing where it comes from or why it is the way it is.

(*ib.*)

The fresh existence of every newborn being is paid for by the age and death of one who has passed away, but who contained the indestructible seed, from which this new being has emerged: they are one and the same being.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.II. 575.)

Thus, it becomes clear to us that all the beings living at this very moment contain within themselves the actual core of all future living beings; these, therefore, already exist in some sense.

(*Parerga* II. 292.)

This means, in plain words: in the death of any organism, its essence remains untouched. It sinks back into the One Will, and this places it as active force into some seed or egg. What was human can become an oak, a worm, a tiger, etc., or the essence of a dying beggar can become a king's son, a dancer's daughter, a courtesan, and so on. It is inconceivable that a man who wrote the

brilliant chapter on the heritability of characteristics could have such thoughts. It is as if it were a Brahman giving a lecture on metempsychosis or reincarnation, or a Buddhist priest would hold such a view about palingenesis. But no! Both doctrines are profound, invented religious dogmas intended to support morality. Schopenhauer, however, knows no retribution after death, and life in this world is the only possible punishment for the will. Yet, it is true that all future living beings already exist now; but this is to be understood only in the sense that all future oaks are descended from present oaks, and future humans from present humans, in a completely natural way. I have every reason to assume that Schopenhauer derived his absurd occasionalism from the extraordinarily important *Karma* doctrine of Buddha, which I will discuss in metaphysics.

Now, the occasional causes bring the restless and fleeting real matter and shake their locks.

"How?" one will say, "should the persistence of mere dust, of raw matter, be regarded as the continuation of our being?" Oh! Do you know this dust? Do you know what it is and what it can do? Learn to know it before you despise it.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.II. 537.)

How pitiful!

To matter follows the denied individuality.

Individuality I knew as a characteristic of every organic being, and therefore, when this is self-conscious, it is also a property of consciousness.

Now, to conclude that the same life-giving, evolved principle inheres in entirely unknown principles (!) is uncalled for; all the more so, as far as I can see, that in nature every individual appearance is the work of a general force, active in a thousand identical forms.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.II. 536.)

That the will in us fears death is because the knowledge of its being holds itself back in the individual appearance, from which arises the illusion that it perishes with this, just as an image in a mirror disappears when one breaks it, as if it were destroyed.

(*ib.* II. 569.)

After the denied individuality comes the denied real succession and the fatal confusion of real development with that of "endless" time.

An entire eternity has passed before we existed: but that does not trouble us at all. However, the idea that after the brief interlude of an ephemeral existence, a second (!) eternity should follow in which we will no longer exist, is hard, even unbearable for us.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.II. 531.)

There is no greater contrast than that between the unstoppable flow of time, which sweeps its entire content along with it, and the rigid immobility of what is actually present, which at all times is the same.

(*ib.* 548.)

At any given point in time, all animal species, from the mosquito to the elephant, are completely present. They have already renewed themselves a thousand times over and have remained the same.

(*ib.* 546.)

Death is the temporal end of the temporal appearance: but as soon as we remove time, there is no end, and the word has lost all meaning.

(*ib.* 551.)

Beginning, ending, and duration are concepts that derive their meaning solely and exclusively from time and thus only apply under its assumption.

(*ib.* 562.)

Here one can only say: how naive!

Behind time stands the species.

The lions that are born and die are like the drops of a waterfall; but the *leonitas*, the idea or form of the lion, resembles the unshakable rainbow above it.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.II. 550.)

The species, i.e., the individuals connected by the bond of procreation.

(*ib.* 582.)

To the individual, the matters of the species, as such, the sexual relationship, procreation, and feeding of the offspring are incomparably more important and urgent than anything else.

(*ib.* 582.)

Through the genitals, the individual is connected with the species. The eternal idea of man, extended through time into the human race, appears as the connecting bond of procreation, once again appearing as a

whole in time.

(*ib.* II. 719.)

What ultimately draws two individuals of opposite sexes to each other with such force is the will to live, which presents itself in the entire species and here anticipates the objectification of its essence in the individual, which these two can bring forth in service to its purposes.

(*ib.* II. 612.)

The individual acts here without knowing it, in the service of something higher, the species.

(*ib.* 627.)

This inquiry and examination is the meditation of the genius of the species about the possible individual and the combination of its characteristics. The species alone has endless life and is therefore capable of endless desires, endless satisfactions, and endless pain.

(*ib.* 630.)

This is fundamentally false. The bond of procreation connects the parents with the children, i.e., the procreators with themselves, not the individuals with an invented species. When individuals procreate, they act in their own service and not on behalf of a transcendent higher power. Through the genitals, the individual secures their existence beyond death. Thus speaks

the visible world, what is actually and truly given, the uncorrupted, the one exposed to no delusion, through which we, in this way, penetrate the essence of things.

(*Parerga* I. 177.)

Next to the species stands the denied cognizability of the thing as such.

It is impossible to recognize something as bad or as itself, if I have already accepted it as something knowable, then I have already mistaken myself in my relationship to the actual (!), inherent being of the appearance: insofar as I recognize this being itself, I am not mistaken.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 664.)

(Only the appearance in time, not the thing in itself) Schopenhauer from which draws the conclusion that death cannot touch our innermost essence at all. Very clearly, he expresses this in *Parerga* II. 334:

Against certain silly objections, I remark that the negation of the will to live by no means implies the annihilation of a substance, but merely the

cessation of the act of willing: the same entity that has willed up to this point wills no more.

Thus, it is a will that no longer wills, i.e., something about whose essence one can have no concept at all.

Above, I defined the negation of the will to live as the striving of the will to free itself from itself. The will, in this world, wills the purest life, the noblest movement, and in death, annihilation, and this willing is now life itself, its movement, until the last breath. If we now grasp the negation of the will to live less sharply, and define it as the striving of the will to live, but in a form that can only be defined negatively, i.e., as utterly different from the forms of life in the world, then it must still will this inconceivable life, because, in the end, it must will something; for a will that does not will cannot be conceived. We are not speaking here of an unbroken series of conscious acts of will, but of the will to live in its entirety.

Thus, the statement mentioned is utterly devoid of sense. Schopenhauer speaks, by the way, in other places quite boldly and confidently of a form of existence that is not the existence of the one will. He says:

The terrors on the stage confront the spectator with the bitterness and worthlessness of life, as does the nothingness of all his striving: the effect of this impression must be that, even if he becomes aware of it in a dark feeling, it would be better to tear his heart away from life, to turn his will away from loving the world and life; whereby precisely then, in his innermost depths, consciousness is stimulated, making it clear that there must be another kind of will for another kind of existence.

(*W. a. u.* V.II. 495.)

The self-evident question that arises here: in what kind of world could such another kind of existence be led, he answers curtly with the words:

If I say: "in another world," it is great folly to ask: "where is this other world?" For space, which first gives meaning to all where, belongs with this world; beyond it, there is no where. — Peace, rest, and bliss dwell only where there is no where and no when.

(*Parerga* II. 47.)

The absurdity of this almost comical sentence requires no further elucidation.

How did Schopenhauer conceive of the One Will to live? I believe (since one can have no conception of a mathematical point) as a sea, of which one part

is in endless motion, and the other in eternal absolute rest. The waves, which do not wish to be waves, fall back into the calm part; those, however, which affirm themselves, fall into the moving part, which immediately rises again as new waves to the surface. It is the sea of the mystics, divided into God as divinity and God as God.

Now comes the intellect, fundamentally different from the will.

The will is metaphysical, the intellect physical.

(*W. a. u.* V.II. 225.)

The intellect, as a mere function of the brain, perishes with the death of the body; however, by no means does the will.

(*ib.* 306.)

The subject of knowledge is the lantern that is extinguished after having fulfilled its service.

(*ib.* 570.)

It is certainly not necessary for me to clarify once again the relationship between will and mind. I recall something that was said, and the fact that Schopenhauer himself ultimately had to retract and confess that the intellect was there to recognize the will, just as the stomach is there to digest the will, etc. I will just ask quite simply: what does a corpse teach us? It teaches us that not only consciousness, reason, understanding, etc., are extinguished, but also the will. The whole idea of the human being,

i.e., this specific character with this specific intellect, is dead.

(*Parerga* II. 246.)

Intuition follows the intellect as the preferred mode of knowledge.

That only an appearance finds its end, without the thing in itself being contested thereby, is an immediate, intuitive knowledge of every person.

(*Parerga* II. 287.)

Has Schopenhauer here thought anything clear? How is the most ingenious person supposed to intuitively recognize that they are immortal? And even more: every person is supposed to be able to do this! Truly, the errors of Schopenhauer sometimes appear with such audacity and impudence that they make the gentlest blood boil. In mystical rapture, triggered by fasting and penance, some pious saint may have seen themselves in a transfigured vision that gave them the certainty that their soul is immortal; but for every person to be able to recognize their immortality intuitively exceeds all comprehension.

Schopenhauer also hastens to trace this intuitive knowledge back to feeling, for just four lines further we read:

Everyone feels that there is something else, a being once created from nothing by another being.

Let this bring Schopenhauer's chief error, his metaphysical inclination, to a close.

Tripod speak:

Behind our existence lies something else, which only becomes accessible to us when we shake off the world.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 479.)

I believe we become aware at the moment of death that our existence had been merely an illusion limited to our person.

(*ib.* II. 689.)

Death and birth are the constant renewal of the consciousness of the finite and beginningless will, which alone constitutes the substance of existence (yet every such renewal brings a new possibility for the denial of the will to live).

(*ib.* II. 571.)

The oscillation of Schopenhauer between an immanent realm and a simultaneously coexisting transcendent realm (an oscillation that no philosopher since has managed to avoid, and which only my philosophy has brought to a sudden end), and his futile efforts to bring both realms into harmony, are shown nowhere more clearly than in this:

One could say: The will to live presents itself as pure phenomena, which totally become nothing. This nothing, along with the phenomena, however, remains within the will to live, rooted in its very ground.

(*Parerga* II. 310.)

At least he is honest enough to add:

That is, of course, quite dark!

Of course, for the transcendental Schopenhauer, the moment of death is not the hour of birth but the hour of death, the most important moment in all of

life. He speaks of it in the same solemn, anointed tone as Kant does of conscience.

Death is the great opportunity, not to cease being oneself: woe to the one who uses it.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.II. 580.)

At the hour of death, it is decided whether man falls back into the bosom of nature or whether he does not, but rather — for this contrast there is no image, concept, or word.

(*ib.* 697.)

The death of the individual is the ever-recurring and unremitting inquiry of nature to the will to live: Have you had enough? Do you want to come out with me?

(—)

In this sense, Christian care is considered the proper use of the time of dying, through exhortation, confession, communion, and extreme unction: hence also Christian prayers for protection from a sudden end.

(—)

Dying, however, is to be regarded as the actual purpose of life: at the moment of death, everything is decided that was only prepared and initiated through the entire course of life.

(*ib.* 730.)

At the hour of death, all the mysterious (though essentially rooted in us) powers that determine the eternal fate of man gather together and come into action. From their conflict, the path emerges that one must now walk, for one's palingenesis is now being prepared, along with all the good and bad that are included in it and are irrevocably determined by it. — On this rests the profoundly serious, important, solemn, and terrifying character of the hour of death. It is a crisis in the strongest sense of the word, a Last Judgment.

(*Parerga* I. 238.)

With Plato one would like to say: Oh, you odd one! — When the little children are afraid, the nurse must sing to them. Should Schopenhauer — should he really — — — —?

This is the right place to say a word about suicide. Schopenhauer, as a human being, stands completely unprejudiced against it, which I greatly credit him for. Only cold, heartless people, or those caught up in dogmas, can condemn a suicide. Fortunate are we all that a door has been gently opened for us, through which we can enter the quiet night of death when the heat in the sultry hall of life becomes unbearable. Only the crassest despotism can punish attempted suicide.

If criminal justice condemns suicide, it is neither a valid ecclesiastical reason nor anything but decidedly laughable: for what punishment can deter someone who seeks death? If one punishes the attempt at suicide, it is the clumsiness with which it failed that is punished.

(*Parerga* II. 329.)

In contrast, the philosopher Schopenhauer declares suicide, without any substantial reason, to be a pointless act. He asserts:

A weary soul cannot hope for liberation from death and cannot save itself through suicide; only with false pretenses does the dark, cold Orcus lure him as the harbor of rest.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 331.)

The suicide negates only the individual, not the species.

(*ib.* 472.)

Suicide is the arbitrary destruction of a single appearance, while the thing-in-itself remains undisturbed.

(—)

This is false. As Schopenhauer explained *ex tripode*: the will is metaphysical, the intellect physical. Yet our corpse clearly shows us that the whole idea of man is destroyed. He treats suicide the same way. He assumes the demeanor as if he knew exactly, from the surest source, what happens to a suicide after death. The truth is that a suicide, as the thing-in-itself, is annihilated in death, like any organism. If he does not continue living in another body, then death is his absolute annihilation; otherwise, he escapes with his weakest part from life. He stops the wheel that otherwise would have spun a little longer, after being infused with the force that set it in motion.

Also read page 474 in Vol. I of *W. a. W. u.*, where the death by starvation chosen in asceticism is said to have a different result than ordinary suicide, and one will marvel at the errors of a great mind. —

I will best conclude these preliminary investigations into ethics with another good thought of Schopenhauer's:

Philosophy should be mediative knowledge; therefore, it must be rationalism.

(*Parerga* II. 11.)

We now approach the main questions of ethics:

- 1) Is the will free?
- 2) What is the foundation of morality?

That the will is not free is a very old but ever-contested truth. Christ spoke of it, and Paul, Augustine, Luther, Calvin adhered to it. The greatest thinkers of all times have also acknowledged it, and I name: Vanini, Hume, Hobbes, Spinoza, Priestley, Kant, and Schopenhauer.

We now have to examine the position these latter two philosophers take toward *libero arbitrio indifferentiae*.

According to Kant, the world is a whole of appearances. These appearances, along with their interconnections, are brought forth by the thinking subject from its own resources (through space, time, and categories). Yet every appearance rests on a thing-in-itself. Kant has, as we know, shown that the thing-in-itself is manifested by the appearance, since he derived it from the hand of causality, which should only apply in the realm of appearances. Based on this apparent relationship between the appearance and something that manifests in it, Kant then made his famous distinction between the intelligible character and the empirical one justified, which Schopenhauer

considers the most beautiful and profound that this great spirit, indeed, that mankind has ever produced

the greatest

of all achievements of human depth

of thought. Above all, it is now a matter of seeing whether this praise is deserved or not.

At the outset, it suffers from a *petitio principii* for the reasons given: for Kant assigns the empirical character an intelligible one without further ado:

without proof, which, according to his philosophy, cannot be provided. Let us see here more clearly what Kant means by the two characters. He says:

I call that which is not an object of the senses, which is itself not an appearance, intelligible.

(*Critique of Pure Reason*, A 420.)

Every efficient cause must have a character, i.e., a law of its causality, without which it would not be a cause. And we would therefore assume for a subject of the sensory world, first, an empirical character through which its actions, as appearances, would be in relation to other appearances according to constant natural laws and from which they could be derived as to their conditions.

Secondly, we would have to assign it an intelligible character, through which it would be the cause of its actions as appearances, but which itself, in terms of its conditions, does not belong to the domain of the senses and is not itself an appearance.

(*ib.* 421.)

This intelligible character could never be known directly because we can perceive nothing from it; however, insofar as it appears, it must be thought in accordance with the empirical character.

(*ib.* 422.)

Thus, it is about the specific nature of the causality of a subject of the sensory world: its nature, according to which it must always act. This nature is its empirical character. As such, it is an appearance of an X, of a non-extended, timeless thing-in-itself, which, though deprived of all necessity, nevertheless must be thought as the free ground of the appearance, and in accordance with the empirical character.

With the empirical character, we get to know ourselves, while we cannot know the intelligible one except through a brief conclusion, without being able to comprehend it; for the latter cannot be known directly.

In the example of the liar (*Critique of Pure Reason*, A 431), it is said:

One traces one's empirical character back to its sources, which are found in poor upbringing, bad company, partly also in the malice of a nature that is insensitive to shame, partly in frivolity and recklessness.

And from other passages, it becomes clear that the empirical character is the receptivity of a given sensuality.

Now, based on the above, one might think that the intelligible character is the substrate of these qualities that appear, the characteristic peculiarities of character, in short, the consistently identical constitution of the heart; for the empirical character is merely the appearance of the intelligible one, and this is only the transcendental cause of the former, so between the two, even if the intelligible one in its essence is not directly recognizable, there should be no absolute difference.

Nevertheless, Kant places the intelligible character in the mind of the human being:

A human being, who only knows all of nature solely through the senses, also recognizes himself through mere apperception, indeed in actions and internal determinations that he cannot count among the impressions of the senses, and to himself freely admits to being partly phenomenon, partly in regard to certain abilities, a purely intelligible object, because his actions are not counted among the receptivity of sensuality. We call these abilities understanding and reason; primarily, it is the latter entirely and preferably distinguished from all empirically conditioned forces, as they consider their objects purely according to ideas.

(ib. 426.)

Thus, a cognitive faculty is the transcendental ground of the moral qualities of a person, of the particular nature of their will, of their capacity for action.

Here I must protest decisively; not only from the standpoint of my philosophy, but also in the name of Schopenhauer, who has brilliantly proven that the essence of the thing-in-itself, intellect, and self-consciousness does not necessarily belong together, and that these can never be the transcendental ground of an appearance.

Kant continues:

Pure reason as a merely intelligible faculty is free from time, and therefore not subject to the conditions of time sequences. The causality of reason in the intelligible character does not arise, nor does it begin at a specific point in time in order to produce an effect. For otherwise, it would itself be subject to the natural law of appearances, insofar as causal series are temporally determined, and causality would therefore be of nature and not of freedom. Therefore, we will say: When reason can exercise causality in relation to appearances, it is a faculty through which the sensory condition of an empirical series of effects first begins.

(ib. 429.)

This is equally false and springs from the pure intuition of time *a priori*, which belongs to sensibility alone. We know, firstly, that the present is the form of reason, and secondly, that independent of the ideal time of a perceiving subject, the thing-in-itself lives in real movement. If the thing-in-itself were removed from time, I would by no means see real movement, and it would be taken out, isolated, and motionless, floating in the stream of development. The intelligible character can, therefore, now be set in reason or in Schopenhauer's will to live, consequently producing an empirical series of effects when its actions, its handlings, this series of effects it produces, is itself part of the chain, the links of which are most strictly bound by necessity.

Let us, however, disregard this and assume the intelligible character to be free. How

could the action of the same be called free when it is determined precisely and necessarily by its empirical character (of sensory nature)?

(*Critique of Pure Reason*, A 429.)

There are only two possibilities: either the intelligible character (the way of thinking) once and for all determines the nature of the empirical character (the sensory nature), and the empirical character of a person remains the same for life, only spread out into a series of individual acts, intelligible; or man assumes an exceptional position in nature and is free, even as an appearance, having *liberum arbitrium*.

Kant avoids this alternative and attributes to the intelligible character the ability to determine the empirical character at any time.

For since reason itself is not an appearance and is not subject to the conditions of sensuality, it does not involve any temporal sequence, even regarding its causality, and therefore the dynamic law of nature, which determines the temporal sequence according to rules, cannot be applied to it.

With regard to the intelligible character, of which the empirical character is only the sensory schema, there is no before or after, and each action is the immediate effect of the intelligible character of pure reason, which thus acts freely ... and this freedom of theirs cannot be seen merely negatively as independence from empirical conditions but positively, as a faculty by which a series of events begins by itself.

And now follows the example of the liar, from which it clearly and distinctly emerges that the intelligible character can determine the empirical one at any time.

The blame is based on a law of reason, whereby one regards this as a cause that could and should have determined the behavior of man, irrespective of all the stated empirical conditions.

The action is attributed to the intelligible character of the liar; he is now, in this very moment, as he lies, entirely responsible, and thus reason, regardless of all empirical conditions of the act, is completely free, and the omission of the act is entirely attributed to him.

Furthermore (*Critique of Practical Reason*, V 139.)

To fulfill the categorical imperative is in everyone's power at all times.

In other words: the human being is always free, and the necessity of his actions is an illusion, just as he himself (as a body), the world, everything is only an illusion.

Another result could not be expected from the standpoint of nominally critical, but in fact empirical idealism. Kant, with his words, acknowledges necessity, but in his heart to freedom of human actions. It is also impossible to encompass freedom and necessity with one hand in the world. Either only freedom or only necessity.

Kant himself must confess:

In the application, if one wants to unite them (freedom and necessity) in the same action and thus explain this union itself, great difficulties arise that seem to make such a union impossible.

(*Critique of Practical Reason*, V 211.)

And:

The solution to the difficulties presented here has something particularly challenging about it and is hardly accessible to any clear exposition. Yet, is there any other way, or at least any easier or more plausible one?

(*ib.* 220.)

The problem, by the way, apart from everything else, was not yet ripe for a solution in Kant's time. Every person has a certain sphere of influence; Kant's was the domain of cognitive faculties, where he accomplished something immortal. In morality, his task was merely to reflect on all related questions comprehensively. He did so in the most comprehensive way possible, although he produced nothing lasting. It was reserved for a fresh force (Schopenhauer) to unveil the true thing-in-itself, which alone can be the source of all moral actions. Kant left the thing-in-itself as x in the theory of knowledge; but in ethics, where it

was necessarily touched upon in a particular way, he left it as a mystery, as if human reason, in which it apparently rests, was not exhausted in this way. Schopenhauer, however, unveiled it and, as if his thinking had nearly exhausted itself, could not deliver flawless ethics. He had to leave it to us to explain the absolute separation of the immanent from the transcendent realm, the union of freedom and necessity in one and the same action, clearly and convincingly for everyone.

Not by words, but in their sense, Kant started from a purely cognitive and impurely sensual soul. Man belongs to two worlds: the world of the senses and the intelligible world,

in which we already now are, and in which our existence is to be continued according to the highest determination of reason, as we are instructed by specific guidelines.

(Critique of Practical Reason, V 226.)

Soon a special will is available to each soul, soon both are given to one, soon the will is nothing, and soon it is something. The following passages will clarify this.

An arbitrary will is merely animalistic (*arbitrium brutum*), which cannot act otherwise than through sensual drives, that is, pathologically determined motives. But the will, which is independent of sensual drives and thereby set in motion by motives presented by reason, is called the free will (*arbitrium liberum*), and everything that is determined by this, with the result as its basis, is considered practically valid. Practical freedom can be proven through experience. For not only what attracts, that is, what immediately affects the senses, determines the will, is human arbitrariness, but we have a capacity to overcome the impressions on our sensory desire by means of representations of what is beneficial or harmful to us in a more distant sense.

(Critique of Practical Reason, V 599.)

Only a rational being has the capacity to act according to the representation of laws, i.e., according to principles, or to have a will. Since deriving actions from laws requires reason, the will is nothing other than practical reason. If reason unavoidably determines the will, then the actions of such a being, which are recognized as objectively necessary, are also subjectively necessary, i.e., the will is a faculty to choose only that which reason recognizes independently of inclination as practically necessary, i.e., as good. However, if reason alone is not sufficient to determine the will, it is still subject to subjective conditions (certain motivations) that do not always align with the objective principles. In other

words, the will is not entirely determined by reason (as is indeed the case with humans), so the actions, which are objectively recognized as necessary, are subjectively contingent, and the determination of such a will, in accordance with objective laws, is called necessity.

(*Critique of Practical Reason*, V 33.)

Aside from the relationship in which the understanding relates to objects (in theoretical knowledge), it also has a faculty of desire, which is called the will, and the pure will insofar as pure understanding (which in such a case is called reason) determines the will through the mere representation of a law as practically necessary. The objective reality of a pure will, or, which is the same thing, a pure practical reason ...

(*ib.* 162.)

Thus, we have:

- 1) a. an animalistic will,
b. a free will;
- 2) only one will.

This one will is

- 1) indifferent, since it is determined sometimes by the pure, sometimes by the impure soul;
- 2) it is not indifferent, but rather
 - a. the will as such, when it expresses the relationship of the understanding to the faculty of desire;
 - b. the pure will, when reason is practical through the mere representation of a law.

It is not possible to give a concept more ambiguity, in short, to push confusion further.

Kant's distinction between the intelligible character and the empirical one does not deserve the praise that Schopenhauer so abundantly bestowed upon it. Kant grasped at both freedom and necessity at the same time, with the result that he neither fully captured one nor the other; he positioned himself between two chairs.

Why then did Schopenhauer accept this doctrine? Because it suited his metaphysical inclination and because it was so convenient to, as needed, now emphasize necessity, now freedom.

However, he did not leave Kant's doctrine unaltered but reshaped it just as forcefully as Plato's theory of ideas. First, he transformed Kant's intelligible character into the will as the thing-in-itself, while Kant quite unambiguously, clearly, and concisely said it was reason; second, he let the empirical character be determined once and for all by the intelligible, while Kant granted the intelligible the ability to reveal itself at any time in the empirical character. Schopenhauer teaches:

The empirical character is, like the entire human being as the object of experience, a mere appearance, thus bound by the forms of appearance, space, time, and causality, and subject to their laws: on the other hand, the thing-in-itself is independent of these forms and therefore is not subject to temporal succession but remains unchanged and immutable and is the basis of this entire appearance, its intelligible character, i.e., its will as the thing-in-itself, to which, in such a capacity, absolute freedom, i.e., independence from the law of causality (as a mere form of appearance), also belongs. But this freedom is transcendental, i.e., not manifest in appearance.

(Ethics 96.)

Thus, for the world of experience, *operari sequitur esse* (operation follows being) is established as an exception. Every thing acts according to its nature, and its effect according to its causes gives this nature. Every person acts according to who they are, and their action, which is necessary, is determined in every case solely by their motives. The freedom, which cannot be found in the *operari*, must lie in the *esse*.

(ib. 97.)

It is clear that Schopenhauer, in his important treatise "On the Freedom of the Will", which belongs to

the most beautiful and profound things ever written,

substantially improved Kant's doctrine — but his distinction of the intelligible from the empirical character is still not Kant's. The deep gulf between the two explanations is something he constantly avoids addressing; only twice, torn by displeasure, he briefly laments:

The will, which Kant most inappropriately, with unforgivable violence to language, calls reason.

(W. a. W. u. V.I. 599.)

One sees in Kantian ethics, particularly in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, always the background thought that the inner and eternal essence of

human beings consists in reason.

(Ethics 132.)

In the excellent treatise mentioned, Schopenhauer proves undeniably and clearly that the will, as the empirical character, is never free. While this is not new, it is his indisputable merit to have definitively settled the controversy over freedom and unfreedom of human actions for all rational people. The unfreedom of this will is henceforth counted among the established truths that philosophy has already firmly wrestled for. From transcendental freedom, however, we shall now speak.

Should Schopenhauer have really, at least this one time, remained consistent with his view? Unfortunately, this is not the case. He even perforated the necessity of human acts of will; for he allowed transcendental freedom of the human will, which he had earlier said was

not manifest in appearance,

to step into appearance as *deus ex machina*, first in two cases, and then in only one.

This freedom, this omnipotence — can now, and indeed where it appears in its most perfect form, the fully adequate knowledge of its own nature, manifest itself anew, by either, also here, at the summit of reflection and self-awareness, willing the same thing that it once blindly willed, without recognizing itself, where knowledge, both in the individual and in the whole, for it always remains a motive; or, conversely, this knowledge becomes its quietus, which pacifies and dissolves all willing. This is the affirmation and negation of the will to live, which, in terms of the individual's change, is general, not a single act of will, not the development of character being disturbingly modified, but either through ever-stronger expression of the former way of acting, or conversely through the abolition of the same, livingly pronounces the maxim that, with the now achieved knowledge, the will has been grasped as free.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 363.)

On page 113, 476 pages later, it says:

In truth, actual freedom, i.e., independence from the law of causality, belongs only to the will as a thing-in-itself, not to its appearance, whose essential form everywhere is the law of the ground, the element of necessity. But the only case in which this freedom is immediately visible in appearance can be that which, as appearance, has come to an end.

Thus, Schopenhauer clearly says: only in the negation of itself is the will free; in the first instance, it is also free in the affirmation.

To be consistent is the greatest duty of a philosopher and is yet found most rarely.

(Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, §122.)

The division of the individual will into an intelligible and an empirical character is inadmissible according to my philosophy.

The individual human will enters life with a very specific character and remains in real development until death. From one point of movement to another, or subjectively expressed, from one present to another, this character, which I want to give here the name of unchangeability, as unity, moves. Each of its actions is the product of its nature and an adequate motive. What appears in each action is not one character. If one wishes to call this empirical because one learns about its nature only through experience, one may do so; but the assumption that the empirical character is merely seemingly divided into separate parts in time and that it is timeless and intelligible must be rejected as absurd: for it would only make sense if time were truly only *a priori* intuition, which I believe has been sufficiently refuted. But if the thing-in-itself is comprehended in real development and time is the ideal form given to us in order to follow the real succession and recognize it, then the subtle distinction has lost all meaning, and it may no longer be spoken of as one character — one may call it whatever one wishes.

Regarding the transcendental freedom, which Schopenhauer assigned to the *esse* and not to the *operari* in his excellent treatise "On the Freedom of the Will," I have also assigned it to the *esse*. I know of neither a marvelous Occasionalism nor a fearsome hour of death that would prepare the palingenesis of mankind,

along with all the good and bad contained within it and irrevocably determined by it.

At the moment of conception alone is the character of a person determined, and indeed with necessity. Two very specific people come together and beget a very specific third, which is to be understood as a rejuvenated old being (a link in a series of developments). This new individual now develops according to the words of the poet:

As on the day that lent you to the world,
The sun stood to greet the planets,
You quickly grew and flourished,
According to the law by which you began.
You must be what you are, you cannot escape it,
Thus spoke the Sibyls, thus the Prophets;
And no time and no power shall tear apart
The imprinted form that develops in life.

(Goethe.)

Every being has thus a nature (an *esse*), which it could not have chosen with freedom. But every being gives direction to another, and so we eventually arrive at the pure being of a transcendent unity, to which, before it fragmented, we must attribute freedom, though we cannot comprehend it, no more than we can comprehend absolute rest. Insofar as everything that is originally was in this simple unity, everything has chosen its *esse* with freedom, and every person is thus responsible for their actions, despite their specific character, from which their actions flow with necessity.

This is the only possible, entirely correct, and so long vainly sought solution. One of the most difficult problems of philosophy, namely the coexistence of freedom and necessity in one and the same action.

Kant gave humans freedom at all times, Schopenhauer (whose inconsistency I disregard) freedom at the hour of death, and I took all and every freedom from him, referring true freedom to the transcendent realm, which has perished and made way for the clear world of plurality, movement, and unconditional necessity: the source of all our knowledge and all truth.

Before we can move on to the foundation of morality, we must examine the immutability of the will.

The most beautiful blossom, or rather the noblest fruit of Schopenhauer's philosophy, is the negation of the will to live. More and more, one comes to realize that only on the basis of this doctrine can one seriously talk about philosophy taking the place of religion, penetrating even the deepest layers of the people. What did philosophy before Schopenhauer offer to the hearts of humans, crying out for redemption? Either pitiful cobwebs of the brain about God, the immortality of the soul, substance, accidents — in short, a stone; or careful, very astute, and entirely necessary investigations of the cognitive faculties. But what does a human ask in moments of amazement about themselves, when reflection gains the upper hand and a soft, sad voice speaks within them:

I live — and know not for how long;
I die — and know not when;
I go — and know not where;

according to the subjective forms, space and time, according to the law of causality, and the synthesis of a multitude of appearances? The heart wants something to cling to, an unshakable foundation in the storm of life, bread and more bread for its hunger. Because Christianity satisfied this hunger, Greek philosophy, in its struggle with it, was defeated. And because Christianity gave an unshakable foundation, on which everything rested when all else wavered and trembled, while philosophy was the stage of barren disputes and furious battles, often the most distinguished minds, exhausted and weak, threw themselves into the arms of the Church. But one can no longer believe now, and because one can no longer believe, one will continue with the miracles and mysteries of religion only its indestructible core: the saving truth. Total indifference has seized the minds, which Kant so aptly called "the mother of chaos and night." This indestructible core of the Christian religion has now been grasped by Schopenhauer with a strong hand and brought into the temple of knowledge, as a holy fire, which will break forth as a new light for humanity and spread over all lands, for it is so constructed that it can inflame the hearts of individuals and masses alike.

Then religion will have fulfilled its mission and completed its path: it can then release the human race, now led to maturity, and even quietly pass away in peace. This will be the euthanasia of religion.

(*Parerga* II. 361.)

But the negation of the will to live, this glorious fruit of Schopenhauer's philosophy, must first be secured by himself, for he clutches his child firmly and threatens his life.

What first stands in opposition to the negation of the will to live is the rejection of individuality.

If individuality is only an illusion, if it stands and falls with the knowing subject, then the focus of human nature lies in the species, in Schopenhauer's beautiful conception of the Idea of Man (in whom an undivided will wants nothing different); thus the individual cannot be redeemed except through the species, i.e., nothing else than through the will of all humans,

since the species only exists in individuals,

or in other words: The individual, who has nothing left to desire but to be expelled from the ranks of the living, must wait until it pleases all humans to have the

same wish. A philosophy that teaches this can never replace the Christian religion, which elevates the individual from the mass at any moment and nourishes them with the hope of individual salvation.

I certainly do not need to prove again the basic fallacy of the matter. The real individuality is as certain as any axiom in mathematics.

One could, based on another explanation from Schopenhauer, say: If the one indivisible will is fully present in every individual, then, if a human being truly denied their will freely, the whole world would have to perish. But although some people deny their will, the world still stands firm and secure.

The second fundamental error, which makes the denial of the will illusory, is the misrepresented real development.

If the innermost essence of the individual is motionless, timeless, behind its appearance, then salvation is utterly impossible. Denial can only follow affirmation. The state of affirming the will cannot be simultaneously present with the state of denying the same will. The mystic says: "If the light is to shine in, the darkness must first be dispelled." Setting aside the notions of before and after, one brings the individual into two opposite states in one present, which the human brain cannot think of. Here, this important doctrine of philosophy (the denial of the will to life) proves clearer than somewhere else the impossibility of the Kantian pure views of space and time, and on the other hand, the fruitlessness of my epistemological theory.

Closely tied to the misrepresented real development is, thirdly, Schopenhauer's teaching of the immutability of the empirical character.

The character of the human being is constant: it remains the same throughout their entire life.

The human being never changes.

(Ethics 50.)

On the other hand, he denies humans the ability to entirely abolish their character.

The key to resolving these contradictions lies in the fact that the state in which the character is removed from the power of motives is not directly derived from the will but from a changed form of cognition. For as long as cognition is no different from that which is ensnared in the *principium individuationis*, i.e., fundamentally following the law of causality, the power of motives remains irresistibly strong: however, when the *principium individuationis* is transcended, when the ideas, even the essence of things

in themselves, are directly recognized as the same will in everything, and from this cognition, a universal quieting of the will arises; then the individual motives become ineffective because they are clouded over by a corresponding form of cognition, having retreated into a completely different form. Hence, the character cannot change partially anymore but must be wholly abolished by the consequence of a law of nature, performing the will whose manifestation it is in its entirety: but even this entire character, the character itself, can be completely abolished through the aforementioned change in cognition.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 477.)

The human being enters existence with very specific qualities of will. He exists because he desires life at all; secondly, he wants life in a certain form. There is no doubt that his will has very specific traits. Every clear-minded person can recognize this, even without philosophical education, and I recall Nero's father, who, as Suetonius reports, with truly great objectivity, declared: "From his and Agrippina's character, only a despicable and malicious nature could be born." However, the qualities of will exist in children only as germs. This is important and must be emphasized.

To the specific character of a human being, cognition is given without being able to move it outward. All motives that could move him externally are of these two fundamental truths, we must recognize.

The seeds of firm qualities of will are soft and can be influenced.

This is where the importance of education comes in. A quality of will can be strengthened, another weakened, a third nearly brought to ruin, and another revived, which was already close to suffocating.

The means by which the educator achieves his purpose is, generally speaking, sensitivity, which, as we know, in a threefold relationship to the will stands. First, it is a dependent guide, then it accompanies its deeds with feeling, and thirdly, it opens up the deepest core of the human will through self-awareness.

The educator initially gives the child skills and a certain overview of real circumstances. This transforms the child's mind into a more or less skillful guide and gives the will the possibility of freer movement. Then he uses sensitivity to shape the seeds of will qualities in the manner indicated through discipline. Finally, through religion, the child is enlightened about the value of life. If he is a thinker, he will say to himself: "The highest good is the peace of the heart — everything else is nothing. But the peace of the heart stands above total destruction, the earthly image of dreamless sleep. As long as you must live,

forget yourself and act for others. Life is a heavy burden, and death is salvation." He does not need to fear that his pupil will immediately throw himself into the water and seek death. Youth wants life and existence, but perhaps the words will come to mind and become a motive later.

The world itself completes the education. If a wild, untamed individual enters it, the world becomes his first educator, and its nature corresponds to the neglected subject; for it seldom speaks, it is cold as ice and without mercy. With an iron fist, it shoves the inexperienced and peculiarities aside and hammers at the solidified, hardly changeable qualities of will. If the individual is too brittle, it breaks him; if he is smart, from birth he will slip away and escape; if he is good-natured and narrow-minded, it binds and sucks him out. The influence of cognition on the will is fully acknowledged by Schopenhauer. He says:

Since the motives that determine the appearance of character or action exert their influence through the medium of cognition, but cognition is changeable, wavering between error and truth and often fluctuates, it is generally corrected in the course of life, albeit to very different degrees. Thus, the behavior of a person can noticeably change without this allowing one to conclude a change in their character.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 347.)

All that motives can do is change the direction of one's striving, i.e., make a person seek on a different path what they unchangeably seek. Therefore, instruction, improved cognition, or external influence can teach that one was wrong in their means, and thus make them pursue the goal, which corresponds to their innermost nature, in a completely different way, even towards a completely different object than they previously sought. But never can it make them truly desire something fundamentally different than what they have previously desired.

(*ib.*)

Only cognition can be corrected; hence, one can come to the insight that these or those means that were used before do not lead to their purpose or bring more harm than benefit: then one changes the means, not the ends. — Ultimately, the sphere and realm of all improvement and refinement lies solely in cognition ... Education aims at this. The development of reason, through knowledge and insights of all kinds, is morally important because it opens the access to motives that would otherwise remain closed to the person. As long as they did not understand these, they could not become motives for their will.

(*Ethics* 52.)

Sometimes passions, which one pursued in youth, are later freely denied only because the opposing motives have only now entered into cognition.
(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 349.)

In this powerful (indirect) influence of cognition on the will, as conceded by Schopenhauer, the mutability of character is implicitly contained; for if the will, through cognition, is caused to condemn one of its qualities to permanent inactivity, it must gradually become rudimentary: it is as if it no longer existed at all.

One can generally say: Every human being is will to live, thus in every human being lies the possibility of expressing all qualities of the will. Through heredity and education, some qualities are particularly prominent in some individuals, while all others exist only as seeds with the potential to develop.

However, one cannot place too broad limits on the mutability of character.

The mutability is a fact. Even rejuvenated old existence is a changed state, in which two wills and two intelligences have acted on each other and brought about a new connection between will and intellect. The young idea enters later into life (in the broadest sense) and forms itself. Can it remain entirely free from the influences of its respective environment? It is not possible.

From this, we draw the following conclusions:

- 1) The human being enters life with both strong and weak seeds of will qualities;
- 2) The strong can be weakened, and the weak strengthened through education, for example, by the world;
- 3) At every moment of his life, the human being is nonetheless a particular *I*, i.e., it is the connection of a specific will with a specific mind, which *I*, with sufficient motive, must act out of necessity. The human being always acts out of necessity and is never free, even when he denies his will.

Another proof of the ability to transform character was provided by Schopenhauer through acquired character, which he placed alongside the intelligible and empirical character; for acquired character emerges when a person particularly cultivates certain tendencies of their empirical character while letting others wither. I must also point out that Schopenhauer's portrayal of acquired character is flawed. He speaks quite generally about the development of natural traits, without considering them from the perspective of ethics.

The mode of behavior that stems necessarily from our individual nature has now been brought into clearly conscious, ever-present maxims, by

which we perform them with such deliberation as if it were learned, without being misled by the passing influence of mood or the impression of the moment — without hesitation, without wavering, without inconsistencies.

When we have examined where our strengths and weaknesses lie, we will develop, use, and employ our prominent natural tendencies in all possible ways and always strive to see how they are useful and valid; but entirely, and with self-overcoming, avoid efforts for which we are naturally poorly equipped.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 360.)

Such general statements do not fit into ethics. If we apply them, for instance, to a character whose most prominent trait is an inclination to theft: he is to carry this out with the same deliberation and methodical precision, without hesitation, without wavering, without inconsistencies, and if honesty dares to speak within him, he should silence it through self-overcoming. Truly: *difficile est, satiram non scribere*.

Finally, I must mention that Schopenhauer, because he had to deny real development and especially the immutability of the will's essence, claimed that the differences in character cannot be explained. (*W. a. W. u.* V.II. 604.) However, this can very well be explained, as I have shown in my politics.

We now stand before the main question of ethics: the question of its foundation.

Here, too, I must first speak of Kant, but with few words, since Schopenhauer's excellent critique of Kantian ethics has already destroyed it. Kant's procedure is as follows:

he made into a result what should have been the principle or presupposition (theology) and took as a presupposition what should have been derived as a result (the commandment).

(Ethics 126.)

And the main flaw of his foundation of morality is the lack of real content, the complete lack of reality, and thus of possible effectiveness.

(*ib.* 143.)

However, it will be useful to note three results of Kantian ethics. The first is that through reason, through clear cognition in concepts, we have an influence on our will.

We have a faculty, through ideas of what is even remotely useful or harmful to us, to overcome the impressions on our sensual faculty of desire.

(*Kk. d. V. 599.*)

The second is that only complete unselfishness can give an action moral value. If even the slightest hint of egoism comes into play, the action has, at best, legality, not morality. The third result is that a truly moral action, therefore, does not occur in life.

Indeed, it is utterly impossible to establish through experience even a single case with complete certainty in which the maxim of an otherwise dutiful action was based solely on moral reasons and on the idea of duty.

It can be concluded with certainty that there really was no secret drive of self-interest, under the mere pretense of an idea, as the actual determining cause of the will.

(*Critique of Practical Reason. V. 27.*)

And since that is the case, Kant's ethics, which began so purely, had to end as moral theology.

Without a God and a hoped-for world, the magnificent ideas of morality are indeed objects of approval and admiration, but not the driving forces behind intention and action.

(*Kk. 607.*)

Schopenhauer criticizes Plato's and the Stoics' claim that virtue can be taught and attributes to ethics only the purpose

to explain the highly diverse moral behaviors of human beings and trace them back to their ultimate ground.

(*Ethics 195.*)

He also holds the view that only selflessness gives an action moral value and states openly:

The absence of all egoistic motivation is the criterion of an action's moral worth.

(*Ethics 204.*)

Let us now examine Schopenhauer's foundation of morality.

On the surface, it appears that he provides only one basis for morality; however, upon closer examination, two foundations are found, namely:

- 1) Compassion,
- 2) The transcending of the *principium individuationis*,

which I must prove. He says:

How is it possible that the well-being and suffering of another, directly and in the same way as my own, affect me, move my will, and become my motive, so that I sometimes even become the sole source of my motives to such a degree that I pursue another's well-being and suffering as if they were my own, more or less directly. — Clearly, this happens because the other person becomes the ultimate purpose of my will, just as I am for myself. Also, because I immediately and directly do not want their suffering, but their well-being, just as I want my own. This necessarily presupposes that I feel their suffering as such directly through compassion, as I feel my own, and thus want their well-being directly, just as I want my own. This requires that I identify with them to such an extent, i.e., that the complete distinction between me and any other, on which my egoism rests, has been to some degree abolished. Since I cannot literally be in the other person's skin, I can only identify with them through the cognition I have of them, i.e., through the idea of them in my mind, identifying with them to such an extent that my action announces the abolition of that distinction. This analyzed process — is the everyday phenomenon of compassion. (Ethics 208.)

One cannot read this statement without admiring the sharpness of mind required to generate it. How finely cognition is woven into it, as it transcends the *principium individuationis* and penetrates the simple phenomenon of compassion. Compassion is not purely a *state* of the will, like sorrow, fear, or displeasure in general; it is not the outflow of a will moved by a motive of merciful intent, but — if I had to name it — it is a feeling combined with transcendent cognition at the same time. The process is entirely different. Upon witnessing great suffering, whether of a person or an animal, we feel immense pain, a grief that tears our hearts apart, and in many cases, particularly when an animal suffers, it is greater than that felt by the sufferer. Neither do we cognitively recognize nor feel in any way *identical* with the sufferer; rather, we feel within ourselves a very *positive* pain, from which we strive to free ourselves by making the sufferer free of pain. Consequently, the individual who helps a suffering person acts entirely out of egoism. They help themselves in the truest sense of the word when they help another; for by helping the other, they rid themselves of their own pain.

I cannot deny the moral value of actions that flow from a merciful will; but if an action is moral solely because it does not stem from egoism, as Schopenhauer insists, then actions based on compassion are not moral, no matter how one turns the issue.

From this, it already follows that compassion cannot be the highest principle of morality. I will now prove this in detail. First, Schopenhauer feels compelled to call upon reason, the true Cinderella of his philosophy, for help.

However, it is by no means necessary that compassion be genuinely aroused in every individual case, which often happens too late anyway; rather, the once and for all acquired knowledge of suffering, which every unjust action necessarily brings upon others, evokes the maxim *neminem laede* (harm no one) in noble minds, and reasonable deliberation raises them to the firm resolve always to respect the rights of others. —

For although principles and abstract cognition are by no means the source or first foundation of morality, they are nonetheless (!) indispensable for a moral way of life.

(Ethics 214.)

Without firmly established principles, we would be irresistibly at the mercy of immoral drives when they are aroused by external impressions or emotions.

(*ib.* 215)

Secondly, Schopenhauer himself admits

that the reprehensibility of unnatural moments of lust cannot be derived from the same principle as the virtues of justice and humanity.

(*ib.* Preface XIX.)

Thirdly, most acts of justice find no place on this foundation. Think of the many cases where people are deceived without the victims ever feeling it if they are ever able to experience it. Every wicked person knows in such cases that they are causing no suffering; how should compassion now be able to prevent them from deceiving? And if it does not concern fellow humans but the *state*? A deception committed against the state, a wildlife poaching, a tax fraud, has always been, in the eyes of the world, the most forgivable sin. The state is deceived daily, and compassion for the poor state has never kept a rogue from fraud. Schopenhauer must have surely considered this case, but he got around it with a trick:

The mere violation of the law, as such, will indeed be condoned by conscience and by others, but only as long as the maxim, to respect every right, which makes a man truly honest, has not been broken.

(Ethics 236.)

Here, one must simply ask: Is *reason*, or is *compassion* the highest principle of ethics? If it is compassion, then poaching cannot be an immoral act.

Finally, the foundation is too narrow, for holiness cannot stand on it. But Schopenhauer is not embarrassed. He forcibly turns compassion into a consequence of transcending the *principium individuationis*, and now, at the same time, allows holiness, the denial of the will to live, to emerge from this transcendence as the last stage. This is, however, incorrect, and it is clearly one step further, as I have previously stated: Compassion, which is in the same state of will as mercy, has nothing to do with cognition; the cognition provides it with the motive to express itself, just like any other quality.

So, what exactly is this *transcendence of the principium individuationis*?

Virtue indeed arises from cognition, but not from the *abstract* cognition that can be communicated through words.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 434.)

The true goodness of disposition, the unselfish virtue, and the pure nobility do not stem from abstract cognition but from cognition nonetheless: namely, from an immediate and intuitive cognition that cannot be reasoned away or rationalized, a cognition that is not abstract and cannot be communicated but must arise in each individual themselves, and thus finds its true expression not in words, but only in deeds, in the course of human life.

(*ib.* 437.)

Those who have read the *Theologia Germanica* will recall the words of the noble Franckforter:

And what would be revealed, or what would be lived, of this no one sings and says. It was not spoken with the mouth, nor thought or recognized by the heart, as it is in truth.

In fact, Schopenhauer is here deeply immersed in mysticism: all immanence is gone, and "the highest power of man" is extinguished. There is a bitter irony in the fact that the very man who could find no words of ridicule and contempt strong enough for "the post-Kantian wisdom," "the wisdom of

charlatans and windbags," had to grasp an "intellectual vision" at the peak of his philosophy in order to complete his work.

However, let us look above all and assume that holiness arises from an intuitive cognition: is it free of egoism? Oh no! The saint desires their own well-being, they want to be freed from life. They cannot wish otherwise. They can deeply wish from the bottom of their heart that all people might be saved, but their own salvation remains the primary concern. A pious Christian is first and foremost concerned with the salvation of *their* soul, and accordingly, the actions they take to secure eternal life are their main pursuit.

And thus we also see Schopenhauer's ethics, like Kant's, despite energetic protests, remain grounded in egoism and directed at the salvation of individual beings, which Schopenhauer forcibly veils in no other way. The sentences:

The absence of all egoistic motivation is the criterion of an action of moral worth;

And

Only what is done out of duty has moral worth;

these are hollow, meaningless phrases, born in the solitary and silent study room, which neither life nor nature — nor truth itself, in short — supports: there are only egoistic actions.

Now, I want to briefly establish morality, purely immanently.

All virtue is based either on a good will that has come into being in the flow of becoming: a noble quality of will that was awakened in some way, cultivated, and under favorable circumstances, became ever stronger until, in an individual, a truly merciful will manifested itself; or it is based on cognition: a recognition that illuminates a person regarding their true well-being and ignites their heart. An originally good will is therefore not a prerequisite for moral action. Moral actions can flow from compassion, but they do not have to.

Human egoism does not manifest merely in the desire to preserve oneself in existence but also in the fact that the "greatest possible sum of well-being," every enjoyment to which one is capable, is pursued, and in avoiding pains that one cannot evade, even the smallest ones. From this arises the task for the intellect: to have the general well-being of the will solely in view and determine it through abstract cognition, through reason. In this way, natural egoism is transformed into refined egoism, i.e., the will binds its drives to what recognized

well-being demands. This well-being has multiple levels. If the will strives to avoid stealing, taking revenge for an offense so as not to be punished, being murdered, or punished further, then this process continues until, finally, one's highest well-being is found in not avenging oneself at all. Everywhere reason acts as a guide to the will, through abstract concepts. To this end the blind, unconscious will has divided a part of its movement so that it can move in a different way than before, just as it became plant and animal, because it wanted to move differently than as chemical force. However, it would be a delusion to believe that these acts were free. Every transition to another movement was and is mediated by the real, necessary development. All movements are consequences of an initial movement, which we must call a free one. Thus, reason, which we call a liberating principle, has become necessary and now works with necessity: there is no place for freedom in the world.

I do not say that the will, after setting up any restriction of general welfare, must always act accordingly. Only a tasted cognition, as the mystics say, is fruitful; only an ignited will can willingly act against its character. But when the will seeks to redeem itself, it can do so only through reason, with its concepts so contemptuously treated by Schopenhauer.

It is reason that, through experience and science, presents life to man in all its forms, tests, compares, and concludes, and finally leads man to the cognition that non-existence is preferable to all existence. And if the will is disposed and this abstract cognition strikes it with irresistible force, to such an extent that a violent desire arises within it, then the work of salvation is completed on the most unnatural paths, without intuitive cognition, without signs and wonders. Thus, what was once true faith is today the essential knowing needed to be blessed. It is no longer in moments of otherworldly rapture but through sharp observation and continuous thinking that man finds himself at the threshold and does not look in wondrous ways upon the fact that everything individual will to life is, that in no way, whether the life form is that of a beggar or a king, one can be happy.

If the mentioned cognition ignites the heart, then man must enter rebirth with the same necessity as a stone must fall to the earth. And since virtue cannot be taught, nor can virtue be taught to a heart that does not recognize its highest good in non-existence from some philosophical rawness or a comprehensive intellectual horizon unless the heart has received an ascetic direction at its conception through true education. The crude person can only recognize their well-being in the goods of the world, in wealth, honors, fame, pleasure, etc. If true education enables them to seek something higher, they are given the opportunity to find it.

The recognition that non-existence is better than existence, an ignited will, is the highest principle of all morality (a subordinate principle is the originally

merciful will). Neither compassion nor the mystical transcending of the *principium individuationis*, and the Danish Society of Sciences was entirely correct not to crown Schopenhauer's writing.

From the ignited will flows virginity, holiness, love of enemies, justice, in short, all virtues, and the depravity of unnatural lust vanishes on its own, for the conscious *will to die* hovers over the world.

However, the actions of the saint are no longer egoistic because they now act according to their enlightened nature, to their self, their "I," their self that can no longer be denied. Their actions are always necessary because they stem from a particular character and a particular spirit, under particular circumstances, at every moment of their life. — If every action is egoistic, one must not overlook the degree of egoism. The person who sees the world for what it is and desires only death is an egoist like the one who desires life with all its power; but the egoism of the first is not the same egoism that is usually called bad egoism or selfishness. —

The attentive reader will have noticed that I have not integrated morality into my system. I have done so deliberately. I only established the cognition that non-existence is better than existence (to which a will is ignited), from which an immanent ethics can develop, but which depends on no metaphysics. In contrast, in my philosophy, I have first linked this cognition to the development of humanity from existence into non-existence and in turn linked this to the course of the entire cosmos, i.e., to the will of God, whose only act was the world. God simply wanted non-existence. Since we were all in Him, *before* the world existed, this explains by itself the magnificent harmony between the actions of a person who only has their highest good in mind and the actions demanded by the great religions. Therefore, morality has been sufficiently founded above, *without metaphysics*, although an action, at its deepest level, can only be called moral if it is firstly gladly done and secondly aligns with the command of a higher power (in my case, the fate of the universe). Morality is not an idle invention of humans but rather a very wise glorification of a *better* means to an end. The affirmation of the will to live, even when it is confirmed through theft and murder, does not form a contradiction to the denial of the will because fate arises from the effect of all things. The difference lies in the *reward*: here, peace of heart in life and annihilation in death; there, the continuation of existence, either in a life of individual duration or in an indefinitely long life.

Schopenhauer very accurately explains remorse:

Man realizes that he has done something that was not truly aligned with his will: this recognition is remorse.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.II. 679.)

However, I cannot agree with his explanation of conscience. He says:

The ever more complete acquaintance with oneself, the ever-growing record of deeds, is conscience.

(*Ethics* 256.)

Fear of conscience for what has been done is nothing other than remorse, or pain over the recognition of oneself as such, i.e., as will.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 350.)

A person either acts according to their character or against it, according to their general well-being. If they act against their character, they can feel remorse; if they have not acted according to their well-being, pangs of conscience may plague them. For in consideration of their well-being, a person takes everything into account that they know (including what they firmly believe). If they act despite everything that speaks against it, the same voice that previously warned them will now trouble them. It is the voice of conscience. A fear of conscience is only felt by those who believe in retribution after death or fear of discovery.

I must finally return to the extremely important denial of the will to live. It must be clear, bright, and recognizable for everyone.

It is based on the recognition that non-existence is better than existence. However, this recognition is fruitless if it does not ignite the will, for there is only one principle: the individual will. Schopenhauer completely misunderstood the relationship between intellect and will. Just as in aesthetics, he entirely separated the intellect from the will and allowed it to enjoy aesthetic pleasure alone, while it nevertheless became clear that the will is relieved of all suffering, so in ethics, it is inappropriate to ascribe to the intellect a compelling influence over the will.

The final work of intelligence remains the abolition of the will, for it had served its purposes.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.II. 699.)

Through another path, the intellect can even act against the will by exalting itself in the phenomena of holiness.

(*Parerga* II 452.)

This is wrong. The recognition that non-existence is better than existence, which depends on high mental cultivation, must be followed by the decisive will to *want* non-existence. For the will to desire this, it must have gradually been awakened by the clearly recognized great advantage of non-existence. This desire most easily arises from a will that, from the beginning, is gentle, mild, and good; then from the one that suffers greatly; or from the one that easily passes into aesthetic contemplation. Moral enthusiasm is supported by the early imprinting of the corresponding motives.

It should now be noted that, just as cognition alone is unfruitful, so too is an ignited will unfruitful if it has already affirmed itself in childhood. Schopenhauer himself strongly emphasized this important point in the already cited passage:

With that affirmation over one's own body, and up to the representation of a new — redemption is this time declared fruitless.

We will not be deterred by the fact that, *ex tripode*, his metaphysical inclination causes him to contradict this clear, true statement: nature continuously confirms it over and over again. Moreover, the passage is not isolated. It says in *W. a. W. u.* V.I. 449:

Voluntary, complete chastity is the first step in asceticism or the denial of the will to live. It denies the affirmation of the will that extends beyond individual life and gives the indication that, with the life of this body, the will, whose appearance it is, is being abolished. Nature, always true and naive, says that if this maxim became universal, the human race would die out.

I have nothing to add, except that complete chastity is the only step that certainly leads to redemption.

That complete chastity is the innermost core of Christian morality is beyond doubt.

He said to them: "Not everyone can accept this word, but only those to whom it is given. For there are eunuchs who were born that way from their mother's womb, and there are eunuchs who were made eunuchs by others, and there are those who made themselves eunuchs for the sake of the kingdom of heaven."

(Matthew 19:11-12)

And Jesus answered and said to them: "The children of this age marry and are given in marriage. But those who are considered worthy to attain that age and the resurrection from the dead neither marry nor are given in marriage, for they cannot die anymore, because they are equal to angels

and are sons of God, being sons of the resurrection."

(Luke 20:34-36)

These are the ones who have not defiled themselves with women, for they are virgins. These follow the Lamb wherever He goes. These have been purchased from among men as firstfruits to God and to the Lamb.

(Revelation 14:4)

It is good for a man not to touch a woman.

(1 Corinthians 7:1)

The unmarried man is concerned about the things of the Lord, how he may please the Lord. But the one who is married is concerned about the things of the world, how he may please his wife. There is a difference between a wife and a virgin.

(1 Corinthians 7:32-33)

Saint Augustine also speaks unequivocally:

I know some who murmur: 'What if,' they say, 'everyone wished to abstain from all sexual relations? From where would the human race continue?' Oh, if only all would wish this! Love alone, with a pure heart and good conscience, and unfeigned faith, would fill the City of God much more quickly, and the end of the world would be hastened.

(De bono coniugali)

And it is also written in the Book of Wisdom:

For blessed is the barren woman, who is undefiled, who has not known the sinful bed; she will have her reward in the time of visitation, and her soul will find rest in eternal life.

A barren person, who does nothing wrong with his hand, nor thinks evil against the Lord, will be given a special gift for his faith, and a better portion in the temple of the Lord.

(3. Cap. 13,14.)

It is better to have no children, when one is virtuous, for the same brings eternal praise, for it will be remembered both by God and by people. Where it is, it is taken as an example; but whoever does not have it, desires it and is adorned with an eternal crown, and retains the victory of the chaste struggle.

(4. Cap. 1, 2.)

But no blessed life after death is earned by those who deny life effectively, but rather the complete and total annihilation of their being. They have indeed struggled and are dead forever: it is finished! —

Nevertheless, the teaching of the denial of the will to live applies to *everyone*, at *all times*. First, so that no further affirmation beyond individual life occurs, and thereby the possibility is given to be redeemed *earlier*. Second, so that the rest of individual life may proceed in peace and tranquility. Third, so that one can, through education and enlightenment, sow the seed of redemption into the tender hearts of children, and in this way indirectly work on one's own redemption, which one has forfeited.

It is wrong for Schopenhauer to think that the denial of the will to live negates the entire character. The individual character recedes into the background and colors the new nature. One will retreat into solitude and live quietly, another will chastise themselves in the same way, a third will remain faithful to their calling, yet another will only care for the well-being of others and go to their death for humanity, and so on. Why not?

Because many followers of Schopenhauer's philosophy do not perceive signs and miracles within themselves, they are consumed by pain and believe they are not chosen. This is a very serious practical consequence of a theoretical error. Ecstasy is not at all a sign of salvation. The sign, and at the same time the condition, is the voluntarily chosen virginity without external coercion.

The state in general of those who deny the will to live, Schopenhauer describes incomparably well, and I cannot refrain from quoting a few passages.

A person who, after many bitter struggles against his own nature, has finally completely overcome it, remains nothing more than a purely cognizing being, as the unclouded mirror of the world.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 462.)

If the sexual drive is suppressed, the consciousness will be imbued with that carefree and cheerful nature of individual existence, and indeed to an elevated degree.

(*ib.* II. 649.)

The good character lives in an outward world homogeneous with his essence: to others, he is not a "non-self," but rather "I once again."

(*Ethics* 272.)

The person in whom the denial of the will to live has become complete and full of renunciations, seen from the outside, is poor, joyless, and full of deprivation; but his state is, viewed from within, full of inner joy and true heavenly peace. It is not the restless urge for life, the jubilant joy, which strongly contrasts with the preceding suffering or follows it as a consequence, as we see in the changing moods of lively people; rather, it is an unshakable peace, a deep calm and intimate cheerfulness, a state in which, even when the eyes and imagination are turned back to life, not even the greatest longing can return.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 461.)

If we turn our gaze away from our own poverty and timidity to those who have overcome the world, in whom the will, having attained full self-knowledge, negated itself freely and completely in everything, and who then only await the disappearance of their last trace, along with the body that animates them; we see, instead of the restless drive and activity, instead of the constant transition from desire to fear and from joy to suffering, instead of the never-satisfied and never-dying hope from which the life dream of the willing human is made, that peace which is higher than all reason, that complete stillness of the mind, that deep tranquility, unshakable confidence and cheerfulness, of which only the faintest reflection in the countenance, as Raphael and Correggio have depicted it, is a full and certain gospel.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 486.)

Politics.

Everyone, even the greatest genius, is in some sphere of knowledge decisively bound by ignorance.

Schopenhauer.

We must consider it a fortunate circumstance that Schopenhauer did not attempt to solve a single problem of philosophy solely from the empiricist-idealist perspective but was also weary of the heavy chains, cast them off, and viewed things as a realist. He did as Kant did, who, when he reached the thing-in-itself, would have had to stop at something like an X. Precisely because Schopenhauer's system became entirely shattered by contradiction, on the other hand, it offers a wealth of healthy, true, and important judgments. Even in the field of politics, alongside the most absurd views, we find good and excellent ones, though unfortunately, the latter are in a frightening minority. The reason for this lies in the fact that, in this field as well, prejudiced, well-suited citizens could speak on behalf of Schopenhauer. The misery of the people is excellently portrayed, but only to give pessimism a foil to shine against. Otherwise, Schopenhauer's words offer only scorn and contempt for the people and their aspirations, and one turns away with disgust from this perversity of the great man's sentiment.

From pure intuition, beginning with *a priori* notions of time, Schopenhauer first denies the real development of the human race.

All historical philosophy, no matter how refined it may present itself, assumes, like Kant, that time is a determination of things in itself.
(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 322.)

History is like a kaleidoscope that, with every turn, shows a new configuration, while we really (!) always have the same before our eyes.
(*ib.* II. 545.)

All those who set up such constructions of the course of the world, or, as they call it, history, have not grasped the main truth of all philosophy, which is that in all time, as in all becoming and arising, the same thing constantly repeats itself, the ideas are eternal, time is ideal.
(*ib.* 505.)

These mentioned philosophers of history and glorifiers are therefore simple-minded realists, in addition optimists, eudaimonists, thus flat fellows

and ingrained philistines, moreover also actually bad Christians.

(ib.)

This abundant outpouring of bile from the enraged idealist has always given me great pleasure; for why did he have to become enraged? Only because he did not understand the main truth of all philosophy, that time is indeed *ideal*, but the movement of the will is *real*, and that the former depends on the latter, not the latter on the former.

Just as we should not pay attention to the above invectives, we will calmly set aside his good advice:

The true philosophy of history should recognize the identical in all events, of both the old and the new times, of the East as well as the West, and, despite all the differences in specific circumstances, costumes, and customs, see the same humanity everywhere. This identical and unchanging element, under all variations, consists in the basic qualities of the human heart and mind — many bad, few good.

(W. a. W. u. V.II. 506.)

He has the most curious view of history itself:

History lacks the fundamental character of science, the subordination of knowledge, instead of merely coordinating the same. Therefore, there is no system of history, as there is in every other science. So, it is indeed a form of knowledge, but not a science; for nowhere does it recognize the individual through the general.

(W. a. W. u. V.II. 500.)

Even the most general in history is, in itself, still only an individual and unique thing, namely a long *period of time* or a major event: in relation to this, the particular stands as the part to the whole, but not as the case to the rule, as it does in all actual sciences. Instead, history only conveys concepts, not merely facts.

(W. a. W. u. V.II. 501.)

Such a distorted viewpoint cannot even be thought. Every science was, for so long, merely a body of knowledge until the details, the countless cases, which stood side by side in long rows, were brought together and placed under rules. And every science becomes increasingly scientific the higher the unity is placed, the final principle in which all threads converge. The immense material of empirical knowledge must be sorted, connected, and additional points continually affixed — that is the task of the philosopher. Now, suppose history, during Schopenhauer's time, had been just a body of knowledge, then for him, it would

have had the most urgent call to action: the countless battles, offensive and defensive wars, religious wars, discoveries and inventions, political, social, and spiritual revolutions — in short, the sequence of history would have to be brought under general viewpoints, and these again would have to be generalized until one reached the ultimate principle, and history would have been made a science *par excellence*. He would have, despite his idealism, been able to do this because the other sciences, recognized by him, are nothing but classifications of things in themselves and their effects. But aren't they much more classifications of *phenomena*, phenomena whose value and reality are the appearances of eternally enduring, completely incomprehensible ideas?

But was history during Schopenhauer's time just a body of knowledge? Not at all! Even *Kant* recognized history as the cultural history of the human race, i.e., it had been recognized that Alexander's campaign into Asia was something more than the suppression of a rebellion, that Luther's protest was something more than the separation of a German monk from Rome, that the invention of gunpowder was more than an accidental occurrence in a laboratory of an alchemist. Alchemists, etc. Kant then, in his small but brilliant writing, "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose," had tried to give the movement of the human race from its earliest beginnings an aim: the *ideal state* that would encompass all humanity. And Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel had, with true enthusiasm, grasped Kant's thoughts to expand them and let them penetrate everywhere. Fichte in particular should be highlighted, who in his immortal works: "Outlines of the Present Age" and "Addresses to the German Nation" — even though they contain completely untenable views and many palpable errors — set the goal for the entire earthly existence of our species:

That the human race, with freedom, would arrange all its relationships according to reason.

Thus, it would have been Schopenhauer's duty not to ignore Kant but rather to connect with Kant's philosophical writings on history and, inspired by their spirit, make history even more scientific, as Kant had attempted to do. Instead, Schopenhauer preferred to bury the truth rather than be yoked to the cart alongside the three "post-Kantian sophists."

I have demonstrated in my politics that the ideal state of Kant and Fichte cannot be the final goal of the movement of humanity. It is merely the last checkpoint in the movement. Furthermore, both Kant's and Fichte's arguments suffer from talking too much about ultimate causes and world plans and too little about the actual causes at work. A world plan presupposes a divine intelligence, which cannot be seriously considered. Speaking of an ultimate cause is only valid insofar as we can deduce from the direction of the development sequence how, from the mist of the oldest history, it becomes clear that the current state

leads to an ideal point. Finally, there is a flaw in the fact that, although the movement was fixed, but the *factors* from which it emerges every minute were not brought to a higher expression.

I am convinced that I have given history, just as I have given aesthetics and ethics, the character of a true science, and for further details, I refer to my work.

However, no matter how the life of humanity may develop, one thing is certain: the last generations will live in one and the same form of state:

The ideal state: the dream of all good and just people. But it will only be the precursor of the "final emancipation."

Although Schopenhauer assured us above that all development is fundamentally only an illusion and a joke, he is far from speaking of a state of nature for humanity and of a subsequent state following from it, nor from casting a glance at a possible goal for humanity. We want to follow the realists now.

It is not possible to construct the state of nature in any other way than by disregarding all the institutions of the state and viewing humans only as animals. One must skip over all forms of social association and only hold on to the animal aspect. In such a state, there is neither law nor injustice, only violence. One cannot even speak of a law of the strongest. Every human in the state of nature acts according to their nature and all available means. A person may have property, like an animal has its nest, stores, etc.: it is uncertain, provisional, no legal property, and the stronger can take it away at any time. Here, I stand with Hobbes, "the man's very limited empirical mode of thinking," where the right and wrong of conventional law are arbitrarily assumed and therefore have no validity outside of the positive laws that are prescribed.

Schopenhauer now denies this and says:

The concepts of right and wrong, as *equivalent* (!!) to injury and non-injury (to which the avoidance of injury also belongs), are obviously independent of all positive legislation and precede it, so there exists a purely ethical right, or natural right, and a pure, i.e., independent of all positive statutes, legal doctrine.

(Ethics 218.)

He was so stubborn in his false view that he passed the most unjust judgment, which we are now forced to reflect on, which Spinoza passed. He says:

The obligatory optimism forces Spinoza into some other false consequences, among which the absurd and often very offensive statements of his moral philosophy stand out, particularly in the 16th chapter of his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, where they grow into real infamy.

(*Parerga* I. 79.)

And what statements did he have in mind? Statements like the following:

For it is certain that, when considered in absolute terms, nature gives supreme right to everything that is in its power, meaning that the law of nature extends as far as its power reaches.

But because the universal power of all nature is nothing but the power of all individual things together, it follows that each individual has supreme right to everything that is in its power, whether by reason or force, as far as its power extends.

Thus, the natural right of each individual is not determined by sound reason but by desire and power.

In other words, statements which (if one understands the word "right" correctly) indeed justify the entire 16th chapter, for the best part of what was written there. They express great truths that were fought against but could not be conquered, and which *pessimism*, like *optimism*, must acknowledge.

Schopenhauer then directs his defense of these truths to the empiricists of the savage (Ethics 218), for which he obviously lacked any justification; for the savages, although living in the most miserable society, are no longer in the state of nature and have an unwritten customary law, which, since human reason unites them, separates mine and yours as clearly as the best civil code of civilized states.

Regarding the origin of the state, it is well known that some adhere to the view that it arose from instinct, while others believe it came into being through a contract. The first view is best represented by Schiller:

"Nature treats man no better than it does its other creations. It acts for him, before his intelligence can act for itself. He comes to the state. The

compulsion of needs threw him into it before he could choose this condition in his freedom; necessity governed them by mere natural laws before they could be governed by laws of reason."

(*On the Aesthetic Education of Man*)

Schopenhauer, on the other hand, adopts the contract theory.

As agreeable as egoism is to the individual, in cases of injustice, it is nevertheless a necessary consequence of suffering injustice inflicted on another individual, which is a great pain. And as reason, which overrides everything, emerges from the one-sided standpoint of the individual to which it belongs and detaches itself from the attachment to momentary enjoyment, the enjoyment of injustice in one individual would always be outweighed by a relatively greater suffering from the injustice done to others. It also found that, since everything was left to chance, everyone would fear that they would suffer much more often from occasional acts of injustice than they would enjoy the benefits of occasionally committing injustice. Reason recognized from this that to distribute suffering as evenly as possible, the best and only means of sparing everyone from suffering injustice was to renounce the enjoyment of committing injustice. This – easily derived from egoism – was the gradually invented and perfected means of the state contract, or law.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 405.)

I have also subscribed to the contract theory.

Schopenhauer speaks of the state itself only with disdain. To him, it is nothing more than a coercive institution.

Since the demand for justice is purely negative, it cannot be enforced, for it can be exercised by all at once without harming anyone (*neminem laede*). The coercive institution for this is the state, whose sole purpose is to protect individuals and the whole from external enemies. Some German philosophical quacks of this degenerate era would like to twist it into a moral, educational, and edification institution, with the Jesuitical purpose of eliminating personal freedom and individual development in the background.

(*Ethics* 217.)

How was it possible, one must involuntarily ask, that such an eminent thinker could have held such a *night-watchman* idea (as Lassalle aptly put it) about the state? Who taught him to read and write? Who gave him his classical education? Who provided libraries for his inquisitive mind? Who did all this and at the same time protected him from thieves and murderers and, as part of the

whole, from foreign arrogance — who if not the state? Could he have written even a single page of his immortal works without the state? How small the great man seems here!

The state is the historical form in which the human race alone can be redeemed and will only break apart at the moment of humanity's death. It first compels people to act legally, and this compulsion restrains the natural egoism of most citizens. One must also certainly grant Fichte the right, who says:

The state promotes the possibility of the general development of virtue among the human race through its mere existence by ensuring that external good manners and morality, though they do not last long as true virtue, are enhanced ... If the nation lives through a series of generations in peace and quiet under this constitution, only then will new generations, born from these, rise in nobility and true virtue.

(Ges. Werke 7. B. 168.)

so it stands undoubtedly firm that strong, tenacious qualities of will are modified and weakened through constant compulsion. Secondly, the state protects religions, which are necessary for awakening charity and mercy in people for as long as not all people are ready for philosophy, i.e., virtues that the state cannot enforce in people. Thirdly, as already mentioned, it is only in the state that the possibility is given for humanity to be redeemed; since not all individuals are capable of achieving the necessary education and insight to understand that non-being is better than being, the masses are prepared for the denial of the will to live by pushing their suffering to the extreme.

Humanity must wade through a Red Sea of blood and war toward the Promised Land, and their desert is long.

Jean Paul.

Only in the state can man develop his will and his intellectual abilities, and thus it is only in the state that the friction necessary for salvation can arise. Suffering grows, and so does sensitivity to it. Thus, it must be, for as long as the ideal state is in existence; for wild men cannot be its citizens, and man in his natural egoism is a predatory beast, the *l'animal méchant par excellence*. To tame him, glowing iron rods must be driven into his flesh: social misery must come over him — physical and spiritual torments, boredom, and all other means of discipline. As the rough will is tamed, the growth of the spirit goes hand in hand, and on the ever-growing wings of intellect, the enlightened demon of objective knowledge and moral enthusiasm rises.

Schopenhauer certainly recognized the power and benefit of heavy, lasting suffering, but he did not want to accept that the state is the condition for it. He says quite rightly:

Suffering in general, as it is imposed by fate, is a second way to reach the denial of the will: yes, we can assume that most people come to it through this path, and that it is suffering itself, not just recognized suffering, which most often brings about complete resignation, often near the point of death. — Most of the time, the greatest suffering must come, the will must be broken, self-denial must occur. Then we see humans, after passing through all stages of increasing distress, brought to the brink of despair through the strongest resistance, suddenly turn inward, recognizing the world, changing their entire being, elevating themselves above themselves and all suffering, and, purified and sanctified through it, in unshakable peace, bliss, and exaltation, willingly renounce everything they once desired with the greatest intensity, and gladly accept death.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 463.)

I cannot repeat here how states, through the development of the society contained within them, further evolve toward the ideal state. I will only say one more thing. At Kant's time, the ideal state was merely the dream image of philanthropists. Reality offered only a vague hint of it. Since then, the mists have lifted, and even if it still lies far, far in the future — it already casts its shadow over humanity. What shakes the body of the fourth estate is the longing for education, i.e., the longing for a better guide, for another movement, a movement that brings the end of all movement, in short, the redemption of the world from being into non-being. This longing necessarily lies in the general movement of the universe from being into nothingness. Only fools could think that the movement of the universe could stop at this point, and only fools could be deceived by the dirty foam, which the classes above them and around them stir up, pointing to something entirely different with their hinting crystals, whereas, on the surface, the powerful longing for education connects to it. When a man opens his innermost heart to you, you will hear him almost invariably say: "I want to get out of my misery; I want to eat and drink like the rich and distinguished; the best must be mine; they are the fortunate, we are the unfortunate, the defeated, the disinherited. The recognition of things in the true sense of the word educates, that the higher the spirit develops, the less life can satisfy, that the will to live in all forms of life must be essentially more unhappy — the raw person who cannot convince himself that he alone is unhappy is calmed when he is told, 'You wish to deceive yourself, you lie, you are in the pay of the bourgeoisie,' the philosopher calls out to him. 'Very well,' he says, 'you will learn.'"

And he will learn, he must learn, in a new order of things. —

And we recognize from the shadow of the ideal state, in the political arbitration courts of our time, in the peace league, in the battle cry: 'The united states of Europe,' in the awakening of the Asiatic peoples, in the abolition of serfdom and slavery, finally in the words of the ruler of one of the mightiest countries in the world:

Trade, instruction, and the rapid transmission of thoughts and materials through telegraphs and steamships have changed everything, so I believe that God has prepared the world to become one nation, to speak one language, to reach a state of completion where armies and wars are no longer necessary.

— Grant.

Not that summer is at the door, but the cold of winter is retreating from the valleys, and humanity lies in the spring breeze.

How did Schopenhauer envision a development of humanity?

If the state were to achieve its perfection, it could, through the united forces of humanity, ensure that nature no longer teased and exploited people, and finally, through the progress of all kinds of good, something resembling happiness could be achieved, at least a semblance of it. But, it is still far from this goal: countless, eternal evils weigh down human life, foremost of which is boredom, and, ultimately, the emptiness of existence, which occupies the idle mind, preserving it in suffering; partly even the strife between individuals, which is driven out from within and manifests itself outwardly — like wars between nations. This entire struggle will eventually cease when the experience of supreme, tested wisdom eliminates and defeats everything, and the true result of the last planet's course will come, the last, essential evil that now stands against the previous illusion.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.I. 413.)

One must laugh heartily. Economic works seem to have been completely unknown to Schopenhauer; otherwise, he would have had to know from Carey's polemic against Malthus what an enormous number of people our planet can still accommodate and feed. Who even knows how human nutrition will evolve? But leaving this aside, it can be stated with certainty that if the earth ever becomes fully populated, the entry of this state will coincide with the salvation of humanity; for humanity is a part of the universe, and this has the movement from being into non-being. —

In general, our philosopher lacked any and all understanding of political issues, which is very easy to prove. He says:

All of humanity, with the exception of a very small part, has always been crude and must remain so because the great amount of physical labor necessary for the whole does not allow for the development of the spirit.
(Ethics 246.)

The monarchical form of government is the natural one for humans. —
There is a monarchical instinct in humans.
(*Parerga* II. 271/272.)

The jury is the worst of all criminal courts.
(*ib.* 274.)

It is absurd to grant Jews any share in the government or administration of any state.
(*ib.* 279).

In *Parerga* II. 274, he seriously suggested that
the imperial crown should alternately pass between Austria and Prussia for life.

In wars, he only sees robbery and murder, and he leads them with intimate pleasure whenever the opportunity presents itself, quoting Voltaire's saying:

In all wars, it's only about stealing.

The exemption from military service, he demands in *Parerga* II. 524 as a reward (!) for diligent students, while every sensible and honorable person gladly and willingly fulfills their military duty.

And then there are the following sentences:

The clean gender, without intellect, without love of truth, without integrity, without taste, without striving for anything noble, without rising above mere material interests, including political matters, to something beyond them.
(*Parerga* I. 187.)

The common nature remains a common nature.
(*Parerga* II. 73.)

To which one can only cry out in indignation: Phew! and *proh pudor!*

Here is also the place to criticize the injustice done against the Jews. The reason for the hostility lies in the *immanence* of the Jewish religion. That it has no belief in immortality was something the transcendental philosopher could never forgive.

As for the Jews themselves, it cannot be denied that the sudden freedom given to them produced strange phenomena. Many of them, supported by their wealth, have become cheeky, arrogant, audacious, and insolent, and some have retained what Schopenhauer aptly describes:

The national character of the Jews (whom he once calls the 'Maushchels') attaches itself to known faults, including a wonderful absence of what the word '*verecundia*' expresses.

(*Parerga* II. 280.)

But one should not forget that it is this very lack of restraint, which followed 18 centuries of oppressive pressure and extreme contempt, that produced such fruits. Now they take revenge on mankind with their cold, dead Mammon: to the ruin of the individual and the entire world of humanity.

Money, a thing, originally conceived harmlessly for the convenience of humans, a hollow and insignificant representative of true goods — then gradually growing in significance, providing unspeakable benefits, mixing things and peoples in increasing exchange, the finest nerve spirit of the connection between nations; finally, a demon, changing its color, instead of being an image of things, becoming a thing itself, yes, the only thing that devours all others — a blinding phantom, which we, as if it were happiness, chase after, a mysterious abyss, from which all the pleasures of the world emerge, and into which we have thrown the highest good of this earth: brotherly love. — And so, peoples, indeed almost all of humanity, hunt in trembling haste after the torments of exchange: acquiring and consuming, as happiness slips from their hands, leaving them to play blissfully in the sunshine of God's goodness, like birds in the air. — But it must be so, for surely things will one day be different; in the giant educational plan of humanity, it is perhaps intended that humans will gain this experience and gradually be saved from it, until they are led to their moral freedom.

— Adalbert Stifter

If, however, one looks past the arrogant behavior of some, one will find in this people a mercy, especially in the women (though they often express themselves tactlessly), which is worthy of all praise, and an innate cleverness, a kind of sagacity, which, when developed, grows into the highest intellectual strength. Truly, when we recognize the truth that the movement of humanity

proceeds from an ever-weakening will and an ever-strengthening intellect of individuals, it will, if the general history were not documented, then the will and mind modifications caused by immense suffering in the Jews would be the best proof of this.

The only truly delightful thing that Schopenhauer's works offer regarding politics is the reflections on fate. Although Schopenhauer hesitates, gives and then takes back, asserts and refutes, always complicated, hard to grasp, one must nevertheless admit that the entire world is a cohesive whole with a fundamental movement. He says:

Here, the demand forces itself upon us, or the metaphysical-moral postulate, of an ultimate unity of necessity and chance. However, I consider it impossible to gain a clear concept of this unified root of both.
(*Parerga* I. 225.)

Thus, all those chains of causality that advance in the direction of time form a large, common, many-threaded web, which, in its full breadth, also moves in the direction of time and constitutes the course of the world.
(*ib.* 230.)

In this way, everything reflects itself in everything else, and each resonates with every other.
(*ib.* 231.)

In the great dream of life, all life-dreams are so artfully intertwined that everyone experiences what is due to them and simultaneously provides what others need. Thus, a major world event adapts to the fates of thousands, in a unique way, for each individual.
(*ib.* 235.)

Would it not be arrogant narrow-mindedness to consider it impossible that the life courses of all humans, in their interweaving, should have as much consensus and harmony as the composition of the many seemingly chaotic voices that, in their tumult, create a symphony? We may even reduce our fear of that colossal thought when we recognize that the subject of the great dream of life is, in a certain sense, only one thing: the will to live.

(*ib.*)

If one assumes a simple unity coexisting with the world of multiplicity, then everything in the world is dark, confused, contradictory, mysterious. But if one assumes a simple unity prior to the world, which then splintered into a world of

multiplicity, where only the latter now exists, the most difficult philosophical problems are easily resolved, as I have shown. The disintegration of the original unity, which we cannot perceive, into multiplicity was the first movement. All other movements are merely necessary consequences of this first. Fate is no longer a mystery and from the common root of necessity and chance, one can gain a clear concept, something Schopenhauer, who always confused the transcendent with the immanent, had to deny.

Looking from here at the ethics and politics of Schopenhauer, and at my ethics and politics, the difference is revealed in its full magnitude.

A philosophy that wants to take the place of religion must, above all, provide the comfort that religion offers — the uplifting, heart-strengthening notion that everyone can be forgiven for their sins and that a benevolent providence guides humanity to its best outcomes. Does Schopenhauer's philosophy give this? No! Like Mephistopheles, Schopenhauer sits on the bank of the human river, mocking and calling to those writhing in pain, crying out for salvation: *Your reason will not help you in the slightest*. Only intellectual contemplation can save, but only for those predestined by some mysterious power can it partially happen. Many are called, but few are chosen. All others are condemned to languish *forever* in the hell of existence. And how poor the one who believes that they can be redeemed in the totality of humanity; they cannot die outside their ideas, unless the ideas change them from within and beyond time.

Indeed, everyone wishes to be redeemed from the state of suffering and death; they want, as it is said, to reach eternal bliss, to enter the kingdom of heaven — but not on their own feet; instead, they wish to be carried there by the course of nature. But that is impossible.

(*W. a. W. u.* V.II. 692.)

I, on the other hand, say, under the guidance of nature: whoever wants to redeem themselves can do so at any time "*through reason and science, humanity's highest power*." The infallible means, which in no way depends on time, is *virginity* for the real individual, whose development is not tied to time. Those who have already lost the possibility of redemption in this generation, even for their children, and those who could still grasp the means but lack the strength — let them all be of good courage and fight on honorably. Sooner or later, they will be redeemed, either *before* the entirety or *within* the entirety, for the universe is moving from being to non-being.

Metaphysics.

A drop, trembling on the lotus leaf:
So quickly does fleeting life decay.
Eight corners with the seven seas,
The sun, like the noble gods that perish,
You, me, the world — the time will shatter everything:
Why then should he care about anything?

Sankara Atscharja according to Höfer.

This part of my critique of Schopenhauer's philosophy would be the most extensive if everything pertaining to it had not already been discussed; for I must repeat: Schopenhauer was not an immanent but a transcendent philosopher, one who surpassed experience. In good moments, he observed nature faithfully and honestly and recorded the results of these observations in his works; but immediately afterwards, he was led astray by the wrong idealism, which gave rise to the greatest confusion and the most glaring contradictions. I will not quote Goethe's words again here; instead, I will point to an occurrence in Schopenhauer's lecture. His two perspectives of the world: the realistic and the empirically idealistic, had to follow each other directly, which made his train of thought appear completely erratic. This back-and-forth must have shown itself so clearly in his style, that it seems clear and pure only on the surface. In fact, an attentive reader will soon notice that it becomes more rigid and stiff, crude and prickly, with the appearing philosopher becoming increasingly unsure of himself. This insecurity in his train of thought becomes especially evident in the essays on death and the relationship between death and the indestructibility of our essence. The most striking example can be found in the chapter on destiny, especially on pages 221 and 222, where a thought is presented so awkwardly that it seems to dissolve instantly; the limitation is barely justified but is immediately dissolved again, and this play repeats itself several times. The skeleton of sentences, torn from one another, where the philosopher's staggering footsteps leave traces, reads grammatically as follows:

yet - much more - however - meanwhile - although - however - certainly -
alone - indeed - but - meanwhile - alone -

a schema that is extraordinarily eloquent.

Here I would like, as promised, to untangle the little bouquet of "Actually," which will clearly show Schopenhauer's uncertainty.

- 1) Matter is actually the will;

- 2) the thing in itself actually has neither extension nor duration;
- 3) the unity of the will is actually not comprehensible with our intellect;
- 4) nations are actually mere abstractions;
- 5) form and color actually (fundamentally) do not belong to the idea;
- 6) the idea is actually (precisely) as foreign to space as time is;
- 7) not the shape, but the expression is actually the idea;
- 8) the knower actually has, in its own nature, only the appearance before it;
- 9) in history, we actually always have the same before us;
- 10) dying is actually the purpose of life;
- 11) the subject of the great life-dream is actually (in a certain sense) only one thing: the will to live;
- 12) actually, my philosophy does not go to any otherworldly things, but is actually immanent.

A nice dozen!

Schopenhauer now appears, on the one hand, as an honest natural scientist and, on the other hand, as an amphibian: half natural scientist, half transcendent philosopher. Thus, he also appears in a third form, namely as a pure metaphysician, on the field of animal magnetism. Here, he lets himself, with inner joy, *con amore*, move forward and follows the pull of his heart without reflection.

The inadequate
Here becomes event;
The indescribable
Here it is done.

(Goethe)

He teaches us that the phenomena of animal magnetism, at least from a philosophical standpoint, are among all the facts presented by accumulated experience without comparison the most important ones.

(*Parerga I*, 284.)

And he boldly asserts:

As in somnambulistic clairvoyance there is a dissolution of the individual isolation of knowledge, there can also be a dissolution of the individual isolation of the will.

(*W.i.d.N.* 102.)

He does not hesitate to say:

There is no reason to see why a being that still exists in some form should not manifest itself and act upon another, even if it is in a different state.
(*Parerga I*, 313.)

And he has the courage to attempt to explain ghostly apparitions:

It cannot be dismissed *a priori* that the possibility of a magical effect might proceed from someone who has already died.
(*Parerga I*, 325.)

We must explain it to ourselves that, in such cases, the will of the deceased still passionately directs itself toward earthly matters, and now, in the absence of all physical means of influence on them, seeks a refuge in what is, in its original, metaphysical characteristic, an influence belonging to it in life, as well as in death: magical power.
(*ib.* 326.)

Indeed, he takes up the "incidents reported and asserted from so many and different sides" with the utmost reserve, even presenting them as if they were not possible at all, but at the core of his soul lies, clear to anyone who wants to see, the unshakable belief in supersensible powers. That he did not openly admit his belief was due to the fact that he probably knew it would affect his scientific reputation, and, as always, the strongest motive was the winner.

Schopenhauer's transcendent (not, as he wants it, immanent) dogmatism rests on three incomprehensible figments of the imagination:

- 1) real matter,
- 2) the one indivisible will in or behind the world,
- 3) the ideas,

similar to the Trinity: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, or the Indian Trimurti. Particularly striking is the resemblance to the Christian Trinity, as the Holy Spirit is known to proceed from the Father and the Son, and, according to Schopenhauer, the idea must be represented as the quality of the same in matter. Let us pass over these errors of the genius into oblivion.

All religions of the world, all past and still effective cosmologies and secret doctrines, all philosophical systems contain only that which man has explored in and about himself. Either it is the original principle of space and time (Zend

religion), or matter and force (*Kong-fu-tse*), or spirit, matter, time, and space (Egyptians), or being (Brahmanism, Eleatics, Plato), or becoming (Heraclitus), or substance (Pantheists), or force, spirit (Judaism), or will (mystics, Schopenhauer), or individuality (Buddha), etc. Man was always embedded in the world, either behind it, above it, or within it, as an element of his person, which he often fantastically extended, inflated, embellished, purified, or generalized so much that it became barely recognizable.

Among all religions, two stand out because their focus falls on the center of truth, in which individuality emerges: genuine Christianity and the teachings of the Indian prince Siddhartha (Buddha). These so different teachings fundamentally agree and confirm the Schopenhauer system, as clarified for me. We now want to briefly glance at these systems, particularly the former in the form given by the noble Franckfurter in *Theologia Deutsch* (Stuttgart 1853), where individuality is reflected much more purely than in the Gospel.

First, the Franckfurter distinguishes between God as Godhood and God as God.

God as Godhood does not belong to will, knowledge, or revelation, nor to anything that can be named, spoken, or thought of. But God as God belongs to saying: that He expresses Himself and reveals Himself and this All without creation. This is everything, not in God as an essence, and not as an action, as it is without creation; and in this expression and revelation lies the personal distinction.

(117.)

And now, the tremendous leap from potential-being to actual-being, he says:

God willed that what was essentially His creature in Him be worked and exercised. What should it do otherwise? Should it be idle? What purpose does it serve? Thus it would be just as good if it were nothing, and better: for what is good for nothing is useless and contrary to God's will and nature. Well then! God willed that work and practice should not occur without creation, so it should be so. Should there still be any being that was neither this nor that and had no effect, it would be like being or not being, and what kind of God would that be?

(119.)

The excellent man here becomes anxious and frightened. He stares down into the abyss and trembles with the words from the depths:

One must turn back and remain here; for one might become so engrossed and inquire so deeply that one would not know where one was or how to turn back.

(—)

From now on, he remains on real ground, and the most important part of his teaching begins. Indeed, he has an idealistic inclination (all pantheism is necessarily empirical idealism), by which he declares the creatures to be mere appearances:

What has now flowed out is not a true essence and has no essence other than in the perfect, but it is an accident, or a shine and a semblance that is no essence, or no essence has otherwise than in the fire where the shine flows out, or in the sun, or in a light,

(7.)

but he does not follow the wrong path and immediately returns to the right one. On this path, he now finds the one thing that can be found at all in nature, the main point, the core of all beings: real individuality, or the individual will.

In all that exists, nothing is forbidden, and nothing is contrary to God, except one thing alone: that is one's own will, or wanting something other than what the eternal will desires.

(203.)

What did the devil do differently, or what was different in his fall or rebellion, other than that he assumed that he was something, and something belonged to him? This assumption and his I and his Me, his Mine and his Myself, this was his rebellion and his fall.

(9.)

Was Adam any different from that? People say that Adam ate the apple and therefore was lost or fell. I say: it was because of his assumption and his I, his Me, his Mine and his Myself, and the like. Had it been seven apples, it would have been the same. Had there been no assumption, he would not have fallen.

(9.)

Whoever now lives in selfhood and according to the old man, he is called and is Adam's child.

(57.)

All who follow Adam in pride, in lust of the flesh, and in disobedience are all dead in their souls.

(–)

The more selfhood and I-ness, the more sin and wickedness.

(61.)

Nothing burns in hell but one's own will.

(129.)

Adam, I-ness, selfhood, self-will, sin, or the old man, the turning away and separation from God, that is all one and the same.

(137.)

All wills outside of God's will (that is, all own wills) are sin, and everything that happens from one's own will.

(189.)

If there were no own will, there would be no hell and no evil spirit.

(201.)

If there were no own will, there would be no property. In heaven, there is nothing of one's own: therefore, there is contentment, true peace, and all blessedness.

(217.)

Whoever has or wishes to have anything of his own is self-centered; and whoever desires to have nothing of his own and desires nothing, he is free and no one's possession.

(–)

Therefore, man should stand and be free without himself, that is, without selfhood, I-ness, me, mine, myself, and such; so that he seeks himself and his own as little as possible, and should be as little concerned with himself as if he did not exist.

(51.)

Man should die to himself, that is, to human lust, comfort, joy, desire, I-ness, selfhood, and all such things in man to which he clings or on which he still rests in contentment or values, whether it be man himself or other creatures, whatever it may be. All of that must go away and die if man is to be made right and true in truth.

(57.)

If a reunification with God is to take place, the individual will must be completely killed; for

I-ness and selfhood are separated from God and do not belong to Him, but only as much as is necessary for personality.

(123.)

The last sentence is a good testimony to the prudence of the mystic, who did not allow perverse reason to let the whole world dissolve into a sluggish, slumbering, slack infinity.

How can man come to self-abandonment, how can he destroy his own will in himself? The mystic above all speaks the truth that everyone can be redeemed.

That man is not ready or willing for this is truly only his own fault; for man could not create and consider anything else if he took care of his preparation in all things and diligently considered how he might become ready for it, in truth, God would prepare him, and God has more diligence and earnestness and love for preparation than for the pouring in, once man is ready.

(79.)

And moving to the execution, he says:

The most ancient and dearest, that which is in all creatures, is knowledge or reason and will, and these two are with one another so that where one is, there is also the other; and if these two were not, there would be no reasonable creature, but only cattle and a beastly being, and that would be a great defect, and God wants what is His and His possession to be gained in a real way, as it should be and belongs to perfection.

(207.)

With his reason, man first recognizes himself and thereby falls into a very peculiar state, which has been aptly named the "lust of hell," from which, however, God redeems him.

For if you truly recognize yourself in truth, that is the highest art, for it is the highest skill; when you recognize yourself well, you are more praiseworthy to God, and when you do not recognize yourself and recognize the course of heaven and all planets and stars and all the power of herbs and all the complexion and inclination of all men and the nature of all animals, and you would also have the skill of all those who are in heaven and on earth.

(31.)

When man truly recognizes himself and realizes who and what he is, and finds himself to be so vile, evil, and unworthy of all the comfort and goodness that has happened to him from God and creatures, he comes into such deep humility and self-contempt that he deems himself unworthy, thinking that the earth should not bear him, and also believes that it would be just if all creatures in heaven and on earth rose up against him and avenged themselves on him, their creator, and caused him all suffering and torment, for he thinks himself worthy of all that.

(39.)

And therefore he will and can no longer desire any comfort or redemption, neither from God nor from all creatures, which are in heaven and on earth, but he wants to remain uncomfited and unredeemed and deems himself neither worthy of comfort nor redemption, and his only desire is damnation.

(—)

But God does not leave man in this hell, but rather takes him up to Himself, so that man desires nothing else and cares for nothing else but the eternal good, and realizes that the eternal good is so noble and surpassing that no tongue can express His greatness, comfort, and joy, peace, rest, and contentment. And when man desires nothing else, seeks nothing else but the eternal good alone, and himself no longer seeks anything, nor seeks what belongs to him, but seeks only the honor of God, then joy, peace, delight, rest, and comfort, and suchlike, are all man's portion, as much as is proper for man in heaven.

(41.)

Our mystic also knows a second, more natural way.

But one should know that light or knowledge is nothing or useless without love.

(165.)

It is certainly true that love must be guided and taught by knowledge; but if love does not follow knowledge, then nothing comes of it.

(167.)

Any love must be taught and guided by a light or knowledge. Now the true light makes true love, and the false light makes false love; for what the light considers the best, it presents to love as the best and says that it should love it, and love follows it and fulfills its commandment.

(169.)

True love is guided and taught by the true light and knowledge, and the true, eternal, and divine light teaches love not to love anything other than the true, simple, and perfect good, and not for any reward or something else, but purely out of love for the good, and for the reason that it is good, and that it should be loved justly.

(175.)

And now begins a true inward life, and then God Himself becomes the human being, so that there is nothing left that is not God or of God, and nothing that accepts anything else.

(229.)

The mystic describes the behavior of such a "deified" person as follows:

But whoever wishes and wills to suffer for God must and shall suffer everything, that is: God Himself and all creation, nothing excepted; and whoever is obedient to God, composed, and subject to Him shall endure and accept everything and be led by God. He who wishes and wills to endure all things must and shall be composed, subordinate, and obedient in a suffering way and not in an active way, and this all in a silent inward abiding at the inner core of his soul, in a secret, hidden patience, willingly bearing and enduring all things or adversity.

(83.)

It follows then that man may ask for or desire nothing more, neither from God nor from creatures, except bare necessity, and all of this with fear and not as a right, and he allows nothing to happen to his body and nature out of pleasure but only out of necessity, and does not allow anyone to help or serve him except in pure necessity, and all of this with fear.

(95.)

And the state of such a deified man is described by the Frankfurter as follows:

What then does the union consist of? In this: that one purely, simply, and entirely in truth is united with the simple eternal will of God and, above all, without any will of one's own, and that the created will has flowed into the eternal will and is melted into it and has become nothing, so that the eternal will alone desires, does, and allows everything.

(105.)

These people are also in a state of freedom, having lost the fear of the pain of hell and the hope of the reward of the kingdom of heaven, but

rather, they live in perfect freedom and fervent love.

(35.)

And where the union takes place in truth and becomes essential, there stands the inner man, immovable in union, and God leads the outer man, and he is not moved by anything outside. This must and shall happen and occur so that the outer man speaks and acts as the inner man is ready and obedient, whether in suffering or in active duty.

(107.)

There arises satisfaction and inner peace, asking for nothing, desiring nothing, knowing nothing more, being ready to die, to be nothing, and to endure nothing. And all this becomes one, and one praises God for it, without lamenting any of one's sins.

(179.)

Nevertheless, the deified man is supposed to suffer everything and willingly endures it, but his will rises with power and full energy against the one demand: to fall back into the world, and the mystic here naively expresses the truth that the individual, until their last breath, wills and that the I, the self, can never be denied. One can deny the natural self, the original I, the "Adam," but never the true self.

And from the eternal love that loves God as the good and for the good, from which true, noble life is so deeply loved that it is never abandoned or discarded. Where this is in a person, even if they were to live until the Last Day, it would be impossible for them to let go; and should that same person suffer a thousand deaths and all the suffering that could fall upon them, all the suffering that could befall all creatures, they would rather endure all that suffering than let noble life be taken from them. Even if one were offered the life of an angel in exchange, they would not take it.

(141.)

And whoever is a true, virtuous person would not take the whole world to become unvirtuous, and would rather die a miserable death.

(165.)

The core of the teaching of the great, gentle Indian Buddha is *karma*.

The essential components of man are the 5 *Khandas*: 1) body, 2) feeling, 3) perception, 4) judgment (thought), 5) consciousness. The 5 *Khandas* are held together and are the product of *karma*.

Karma is activity, movement, moral power, omnipotence (action, moral action, supreme power).

Karma is in the body, like the fruit on a tree: one cannot say in which part of the tree it resides; it is everywhere.

Karma encompasses *kusala* (merit) and *akusala* (guilt).

Akusala consists of *klesha-Kama* (cleaving to existence, will to live) and *wastu-Kama* (cleaving to existing objects, specific will, demon).

Karma is individual.

All sentient beings have their own individual Karma, or the most essential property of all beings is their Karma; Karma comes by inheritance, or that which is inherited (not from parentage, but from previous births) is Karma; Karma is the cause of all good and evil, or they come by means of Karma, or on account of Karma; Karma is a kinsman, but all its power is from kusala and akusala; Karma is an assistant, or that which promotes the prosperity of any one is his good Karma; it is the difference in the Karma, as to whether it be good or evil, that causes the difference in the lot of men, so that some are mean and others are exalted, some are miserable and others happy.

(Spence Hardy. *A Manual of Buddhism*. 446.)

Alle fühlenden Wesen haben ihr eigenes individuelles *Karma*, oder der innerste Kern aller Wesen ist ihr *Karma*. *Karma* ist eine Erbschaft, oder das, was geerbt wird (aber nicht von den Eltern, sondern von früheren Lebensläufen), ist *Karma*. *Karma* ist die Quelle alles Wohls und Wehes, oder Wohl und Wehe treten vermittelt oder durch *Karma* in die Erscheinung. *Karma* ist ein Bruder, aber all' seine Kraft fließt aus Verdienst und Schuld. *Karma* ist ein Helfer, oder das, was die Wohlfahrt eines Menschen begünstigt, ist sein gutes *Karma*. Je nachdem das *Karma* von guter oder schlechter Beschaffenheit ist, gestaltet sich das Loos der Menschen, so daß die Einen niedrig, die Anderen hoch stehen, die Einen elend, die Anderen glücklich sind.

(Worte Budha's.)

Karma is therefore an individual, very specific moral force. At the birth of an individual, *Karma* is like a balance sheet (as merchants would say) in a double-entry system. The merit balance results from the sum of all good deeds in previous existences, rewarded after deduction; the guilt balance results from the sum of all bad deeds in previous lifetimes, minus the atoned ones. At the death of an individual, his *Karma* is the balance at birth, plus the good and bad actions done in the finished life course, minus the guilt committed in that lifetime and the deserved merit from previous lives.

The specific quality of *karma* is, therefore, not something passed from the parents to the child as an inherited individual character, but rather the *karma* of an individual is something entirely independent of the parents. The union of the parents is merely an occasional cause for the appearance of *karma*, which finds

its new body alone, without external assistance. Or in other words: the doctrine of *karma* is occasionalism. If a *karma* is freed by death from a specific quality, it causes conception, where the newly created individual corresponds to its essence, i.e., it envelops itself in the new body, which is most suitable for its connection with specific guilt and merit. It will therefore be either a Brahman, a king, a beggar, a woman, a man, a lion, a dog, a pig, or a worm, etc.

»With the exception of those beings who have entered into one of the four paths leading to nirwana, there may be an interchange of condition between the highest and lowest. He who is now the most degraded of the demons, may one day rule the highest of the heavens; he who is at present seated upon the most honorable of the celestial |

thrones may one day writhe amidst the agonies of a place of torment; and the worm, that we crush under our feet may, in the course of ages, become a supreme budha.

(36.)

A woman or a man takes life; the blood of that which they have slain is continually upon their hands; they live by murder; they have no compassion upon any living thing; such persons, on the breaking up of the elements (the five Khandas), will be born in one of the hells; or if, on account of the merit received in some former birth, they are born as men, it will be of some inferior caste, or if of a high caste, they will die young, and this shortness of life is on account of former cruelties. But if any one avoid the destruction of life, not taking a weapon into his hand that he may shed blood, and be kind to all, and merciful to all, he will, after death, be born in the world of the dewas, or if he appear in this world, it will be as a brahman, or some other high caste, and he will live to see old age.

(446.)

Mit Ausnahme derjenigen Wesen, welche auf einem der vier Wege nach *nirwana* wandeln, können die höchsten und niedrigsten ihre Stellung wechseln. Wer jetzt der unterste Dämon ist, kann einst den höchsten Himmel beherrschen und wer jetzt auf dem ehrwürdigsten himmlischen Throne sitzt, kann sich dereinst unter den größten Qualen der Hölle winden; und der Wurm, den wir |

jetzt zertreten, wird vielleicht im Laufe der Zeiten ein Lehrer der Menschheit werden.

Ein Weib oder ein Mann mordet; das Blut des Erschlagenen bleibt auf ihren Händen; sie leben von Mord; sie haben kein Erbarmen mit irgend einem lebenden Wesen. Solche Personen werden, bei der Auflösung ihres Leibes, in einer Hölle wiedergeboren, oder als Menschen einer niederen Kaste, wenn sie sich in einem früheren Dasein Verdienst erworben haben. Werden sie als Menschen einer höheren Kaste wiedergeboren, so sterben sie jung, und dieser frühe Tod fließt aus früher begangenen Grausamkeiten. Aber wenn Jemand keinerlei Leben vernichtet, keine Waffe in die Hand nimmt, um Blut zu vergießen, und gütig und barmherzig gegen Alle ist, so wird er nach dem Tode im Himmel geboren, oder, wenn er wieder in dieser Welt erscheint, so wird er als Brahmane, oder als Glied einer anderen hohen Kaste auf treten und wird ein hohes Alter erreichen.

(Worte Budha's.)

Karma works in the world, *sangsara*; it is destroyed upon entering *nirvana*.

What is *nirvana*? Four paths lead to it:

- 1) the path of *Sotāpanna*,
- 2) the path of *Sakadāgāmi*,
- 3) the path of *Anāgāmi*,
- 4) the path of *Arahant*.

Nagáséna, a Buddhist priest with a very fine dialectical mind, describes the beings on the four paths as follows:

1) *There is the being, who has entered the path sowán. He entirely approves of the doctrines of the great teacher; he also rejects the error called sakkáya – drishti, which teaches, I am, this is mine; he sees that the practises enjoined by the Budhas must be attended to if nirwana is to be gained. Thus, in three degrees his mind is pure; but in all others it is yet under the influence of impurity.*

2) *There is the being that has entered the path Sakradágami. He has rejected the three errors overcome by the man, who has entered sowan, and he is also saved from the evils of Kama-raga (evil desire, sensuous passion) and the wishing evil to others. Thus in five degrees his mind is pure; but as to the rest it is entangled, slow.*

3. *There is the being that has entered the path anágami. He is free from the five errors overcome by the man who has entered Sakradagami, and also from evil |*

desire, ignorance, doubt, the precepts of the sceptics and hatred.

4. *There is the rahat. He has vomited up klesha, as if it were an indigested mass; he has arrived at the happiness which is obtained from the sight of nirwana; his mind is light, free and quick towards the rahatship. (Spence Hardy. Eastern Monachism. 289.)*

1. Das Wesen, welches den Weg *sowán* betreten hat, bekennt sich vollständig zu den Lehren Budha's; es verwirft auch den Irrthum, *sakkáya-drishti* genannt, welcher lehrt: Ich bin, dies ist mein; es erkennt, daß *nirwana* nur durch Gehorsam gegen die von den Weisen anempfohlenen Vorschriften erlangt werden kann. Sein Geist ist demnach nach drei Richtungen hin frei, nach allen anderen steht er unter dem Einfluß der Unreinheit.

2. Das Wesen auf dem Wege *Sakradágami* hat die drei Irrthümer Verworfen, wie Das auf dem Wege *sowán*, und ist ferner frei von *Káma-raga* (böser Begierde, sinnlicher Leidenschaft); es wünscht auch Anderen nichts Böses. Sein Geist ist also nach 5 Richtungen hin rein, aber nach allen anderen ist er verwirrt und nachlässig.

3. Das Wesen auf dem Pfade *anágami* ist frei von den 5 Irrthümern wie Das auf dem Wege *Sakradágami* und auch frei von bösen Gelüsten, Unwissenheit, Zweifel,

Haß und verwirft die Satzungen der Skeptiker.

4. Der *rahat* hat alle Liebe zu anderen Dingen, wie eine unverdaute Masse, ausgespieen; er lebt in der Seligkeit, die der Anblick *nirwana's* hervorbringt. Sein Geist ist rein, frei und bewegt sich rasch der Erlösung entgegen.

The agreement between the following description of the state of a *rahat* and the Franckfurter's description of the state of a deified man is astonishing:

The rahats are subject to the endurance of pain of body, such as proceeds from hunger, disease; but they are entirely free from sorrow or pain of mind. The rahats have entirely overcome fear. Were a 100,000 men, armed with various weapons, to assault a single rahat, he would be unmoved, and entirely free from fear.

(287.)

Seriyut, a rahat, knowing neither desire nor aversion declared: I am like a servant awaiting the command of the master; ready to obey it, whatever it may be; I await the appointed time for the cessation of existence; I have no wish to live; I have no wish to die; desire is extinct.

(287.)

Die *rahats* sind körperlichen Leiden unterworfen, welche aus Hunger und Krankheiten entstehen; aber sie sind frei von Sorgen und Herzeleid. Die *rahats* haben die Furcht vollständig besiegt. Sollten hunderttausend bewaffnete Männer auf einen einzelnen *rahat* eindringen, so würde er unbewegt und furchtlos bleiben.

Seriyut, ein *rahat*, frei von Neigung und Abneigung, erklärte: Ich bin wie ein Diener, der die Befehle seines Herrn erwartet, bereit, Alles auszuführen, was mir gesagt wird. Ich erwarte die bestimmte Zeit, wann mein Dasein gänzlich aufhören wird; ich will weder leben, noch will ich sterben: Jeder Wunsch ist todt in mir.

Nirvana itself is non-existence:

Nirwana is the destruction of all the elements of existence. The being who is purified, perceiving the evils arising from the sensual organs, does not rejoice therein; by the destruction of the 108 modes of evil desire he has released himself from birth, as from the jaws of an alligator; he has overcome all attachment to outward objects; he is released from birth; and all the afflictions connected with the repetition of existence are overcome. Thus all the principles of existence are annihilated, and that annihilation is nirwana.

(292.)

Nirwana ist die Vernichtung aller Lebens-elemente. Das gereinigte Wesen erfreut sich nicht mehr durch Sinnenlust, nachdem es die Uebel erkannt hat, die daraus entspringen. Durch Vernichtung der 108 Arten böser Begierden befreite es sich von der Wiedergeburt, wie aus dem Rachen eines Alligators; es hat alle Anhänglichkeit an andere Wesen besiegt; es ist vollkommen frei vom Leben, und alle Schmerzen, welche mit der Wiedergeburt verknüpft sind, sind überstanden. Auf diese Weise ist das Leben bis in die Wurzeln vernichtet und dieser Vernichtung ist *Nirwana*.

Nirvana is, in fact, non-existence, absolute destruction, although Buddha's followers strive to present it as something real in the world, *sangsara*, and teach a life within it, as in the life of the *rahats* and Buddhas. *Nirvana* is not supposed to be a place, and yet the blessed are said to dwell there; in the death of the redeemed, every life principle is to be destroyed, and yet the *rahats* are to live.

The union with God, as spoken of by the Franckfurter, finds, as we have seen, its fulfillment in the world and is the same as the Kingdom of Heaven. The

Kingdom of Heaven after death is, like *nirvana*, non-existence; for if one crosses from this world and its life to another world, which is not this world and not this life, then - where is there any foothold?

If one compares the teachings of the Franckfurter, Buddha's teaching, and the teaching of the clarified Schopenhauer, one will find that in the main point, which shows the greatest possible agreement, is that the individual will, karma, and the individual will to live are one and the same. All three systems further teach that life is essentially unhappy, from which one must and can free oneself through knowledge; finally, the Kingdom of Heaven after death, *nirvana*, and absolute nothingness are one and the same.

Final Word.

Schopenhauer placed above his critique of Kantian philosophy Voltaire's saying:

It is the privilege of true genius, and especially of the genius who opens a path, to make great mistakes with impunity.

This saying must also be applied to him: for he was not only a true, but also a groundbreaking genius, whose achievements will never be forgotten, and indeed, he was allowed — yes, he had to make great mistakes as such. I have endeavored to uncover these (it was not an easy task), driven by sincere admiration and unspeakable gratitude towards the master, whose influence on me I cannot deny. For how could I better prove my gratitude to the great dead than by making his teaching, through the removal of excesses and absurdities, enlightening to everyone, like me, who is inclined to it? Schopenhauer's works are almost completely unknown. Of the few who know them, most have been repelled by their errors, throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Here was something to act upon! The most beautiful fruit of all philosophical thinking: the denial of the individual will to live had to be saved, placed on an unshakable foundation, and made visible to all. May the new cross lead to salvation for those who want to be saved but cannot yet believe. Four names will outlast all storms and revolutions of the coming times and only disappear with humanity itself: the names Buddha, Christ, Kant, and Schopenhauer.

I cannot conclude without saying a few words about Schopenhauer's style. It is thoroughly clear, luminous, and always to the point, especially when it comes to transcendent questions. One can call it the philosophical model style. *Clarity is the good faith of philosophers.*

A great adornment of Schopenhauer's works is his always apt similes, often of enchanting effect. They testify to the liveliness of his spirit, his extraordinarily great ability for combinations, and his artistic gaze into the visible world. Thus, he compares will and intellect with the seeing cripple, carried by the strong blind man; the intellect, influenced by a fearful or hopeful will, with a torch that one should read by, while it is shaken by the wind of the night; writings that deal with current issues, and are swept away by the current of development, with old calendars; a person who is self-sufficient, with the bright, warm, merry Christmas room in the midst of snow and ice on a December night (truly German!); the pleasures of a poor individuality with precious wines in a mouth tinged with gall; wealth and fame with seawater: the more one drinks, the thirstier one becomes; the normal reflex movements with the legitimate autocracy of subordinate officials, and so on.

Here also belong the apt expressions, such as: the brain must bite; the bourgeois characters in drama lack a trapdoor; the morning is the youth of the day; most people write not like the architect building according to a plan, but like someone playing dominoes; fate shuffles the cards and we play; all cramps are a rebellion of the nerves against the sovereignty of the brain; all things are wonderful to see but terrible to be, and so on.

His *Aphorisms on the Wisdom of Life*, his parables, and maxims abound with striking images, and every page shows the fine mind, the rich, genius, and superior intellect.

I also mention further his witty and sarcastic tone. How biting he is in the introduction to his work: *On the Will in Nature* (1835) against the Kantian system, which is the newest of all until now!

I will also address Schopenhauer's attacks against the "three sophists after Kant" and point to the philosophy professors. His tone is venomous and rough at the same time; yet they are fundamentally more harmless than they appear. When I read them, I always imagined his head with a smiling mouth and cheerful eyes. This is probably also how he looked as he entrusted his bitter words to the patient paper and — with contentment — scolded.

And now I ask in conclusion: when will the German nation fulfill the "immodest verse" of its second greatest thinker:

"A monument will the future generations erect to me!"
